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INTRODUCTION 
The election of 1916 holds a distinctive place in the national history 
ot the United States. Presidential elections are frequently political 
battles that affect the lives of only those directly concer.ned by changes 
in the political administration of our government. Especially is this true 
when the results of the election cause no change in the party in power as 
when the Republican Party continued its administration of governmental 
affairs. However, elections can and have had far reaching effects, when 
the issues raised in the campaign were of a very vital nature or when the 
questions deeply affected the lives of the people. The campaigns and 
elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 1912, and 1916 are instances of Presidential 
elections which vi tally affected and changed the lives of the people and the 
history of our country. 
The writer has chosen the election of 1916 as the topic of this thesis. 
History records that the Democratic Party won this election and thereby 
successfully succeeded itself for another four years and kept at the 
nation' s helm Woodrow Wilson. However, the writer is not concerned with the 
campaign and successful election of the Democratic nominee. :Most frequently 
the efforts of the victorious party are kept before the public eye and, 
being the winning questions and issues, they loom brighter and stronger 
under the banner of victory. Meanwhile, the minority party with its issues, 
questions, and.~ standards fades into oblivion under the ignominy of defeat. 
i 
It in 1916 the victory ot the issues, platform, and candidate ot the 
Democratic Party direotly affected the history of the nation tor the 
following tour years, then the failure, likewise, of the issues, platform, 
and candidate ot the Republican Party in this election atteoted, it only 
inversely, the tate of the nation during four very crucial years of its 
history. Granting that the success of the Democratic Party affected the 
history of our nation it 110uld seem. to follow tll.at its success was 
heightened by the failure ot the Republican Party. Believing this to be 
true, the writer has endeavored to learn of the activities and actions of 
the Republican Party in the election of 1916. 
Before starting on the topic proper it seemed worth while to com ider 
briefly the election of 1912 because attairs and events in that election 
1 
directly influenced the one which followed in 1916. In 1912 the Republican 
Parly, having been in power for ~ years, had apparently become confident 
and overbearing in its manner of handling governmental affairs. It had, 
consequently, incurred the enmity of many, not only those in the camp of 
the opponents, but also many progressively minded men in the Republican 
fold. In the convention halls that year the wishes and demands of these 
more alert, more progressive men were stifled by the 'steam roller' methods 
ot the 'Old Guard' Republicans. Ruthlessly and relentlessly the demands 
and desires of this dissenting group were ignored. Independently Jll8l1Y' 
delegates and their friends lett the Republican Convention in Chicago and 
1. Accounts of the eleotion ot 1912 were found in: William Thayer, Theodore 
Roosevelt, Houghton Mifflin and Co., Boston, 1929, 286-377; Edward 
Stanwood, History ot the PresidenT{, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1912, 
285-288; and William ~Bryan, I ale of Two Conventions, Funk and 
Wagnalls Co., New York, 1912, 2"52~.--
11 
assembling in Orchestra Hall in the same city, signified their intention 
of organizing a new political party. From this group developed the 
Progressive Party. 
The new group, inspired by their leader, Roosevelt, grew in numbers 
and in political strength in the months between June and November, 1912. 
The Republican Party was divided into two groups. One faction, made up 
of the regular Republicans continued their program. under the leadership of 
their candidate, William Howard Taft, while the new Progressive group, 
under the guidance of Roosevelt, enthusiastically campaigned throughout 
the country. These two groups, these two strong leaders, zealously worked 
to be victorious in the election. Consequently, instead of being a combat 
between the Democrats and the Republicans, the political struggle became a 
tri-cornered affair with the Republicans and Progressives struggling not so 
much against the Democrats as against each other. As was almost inevitable, 
the sohi8111. in the Republican fold led to a Democratic victory and the 
election of Woodrow Wilson. For the first time in sixteen years, the 
Democratic Party was to be at the helm of' the government. 
iii 
CHAPTER I 
THE ~CONVENTION PERIOD OF 1916 
Beginning with the pre-nomination oa.mpe.ign in the earlier months of 
the year a Presidential election creates much interest for the public at 
large. Newspapers, periodicals, meetings, and conversations continually 
place the political activities foremost in the minds of the citizens. 
Continuing through the summer the political speeches made on the campaign 
tours heighten the interests Gt the political thought and only after the 
votes from the last state have been recorded does the public relax and 
return to normal ways of living. Like an avalanche that is first started in 
the spring the interests and political activities of the citizens in the 
Presidential election continue or grow until the final count brings joy to 
the victors and despair to the losers. 
Early in January of 1918, rumbles of the forthcoming political battle 
were heard. Not from the camp of those in control in Washington, but from 
those groups out of power, from the Republicans and Progressives came the 
first sound of the political contest. The burning question in the minds 
of all who were keenly interested in political affairs was: Would the 
Republicans and Progressives unite in order to defeat the Democrats? In 
1912, the Progressives had been strong ebough to cause the defeat of the 
Republican nominee. While the power of this new party had not been great 
enough to elect its awn nominee, yet the tour million dissenting Progressive 
1. 
votes had been sufficient to cause the defeat of Tatt.1 However, after 
the election the new party failed to gain in numbers and in popularity. 
By 1914 its decline had been definitely noted for in the Congressional 
2 
elections of that year the party received fewer than two million votes. 
By 1916 the strength of the Progressive Party was being questioned. How-
2 
ever, that it still had strength, that it oould aid or hinder the Republican 
Party, was not denied. Could the Republicans afford to ignore or disregard 
the Progressive group? Did the Progressive leaders wish to enter the 
Presidential campaign as a third party? These burning questions no one 
wanted to answer. If a conciliation oould be effected, if a reunion of the 
two groups could be brought about the chances of defeating the Danocrats 
would become more certain. 
Cautiously and carefully the Progressives made the first move. Their 
leaders gave out the statement that the Progressive Convention would be 
called at the same time, in the same city as the Republican Convention, 
3 
namely, on June 7 in Chicago. Two interpretations were made tram this 
statement, either it meant that the Progressives were ready to enter the 
Presidential campaign with the Republicans or that the Progressives meant 
4 
to induce the Republicans to nominate Roosevelt. Seemingly, it was the 
hope of the Progressives that the two Conventions would nominate the same 
candidate and write the same principles in the platfor.ms. Since the defeat 
of the Democratic Party was the aim of both the Republioans and the Pro-
1. William E. Dodd. Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Doubleday, Page and Co., 
New York, 1920, 184. - - -
2. Ibid., 184, and William Starr Meyers. The Republican Party, The Century 
Co., New York, 1928, 419. -
3. Meyers, 4to. 
4. Editoriala "The Progressives Propose Amalgamation. "The Independent,January 
24. 191§ 109. ---
gressives the latter group showed a willingness to lay aside partisanship 
5 
and prejudice was the opinion expressed by one editor. However, the 
3 
Progressive Party leaders announced that the party would continue its 
allegiance to its principles of the protection of Amerioan citizens around 
the world, to a program. ot complete preparedness, and that it wt>uld follow 
6 
only a leader who stood for these prineiples. To this editor, this first 
gesture of amalgamation indicated that 
••• nothing but a shortsighted unwillingness 
on the part of the Republicans to meet these 
overtures in ungrudging spirit could now 
seem to stand in the way of a complete and 
harmoniou~ readjus~ent of the relations of 
the two ~roups. 7 
In the light of later events one "WOnders whether this gesture of the Pro-
gressives was whol~hearted, whether they meant to ever join the Republican 
group or whether they meant they would merge with the Republicans on two 
conditions, namely, that Roosevelt was the candidate and that his principles 
became the platform. 
The Republican leaders and wri tars maintained silence during the month 
of January. Only one incident worth not1ilg. occurred, namely, the speech 
8 
given by Charles Evans Hughes, a Justiee on the bench of the Supreme Court. 
Before the New York Bar Association the Justice gave a very creditable 
speech for which he was highly lauded and commended, but not one 1110rd was 
written eoncerning the possibility· of his candidacy as a Presidential nom-
inee. 
5. Editorial: "The Progressives Propose Amalgamation."~ Independent, 
January 24, 1916, 109. 
6. Ibid., 109. 
7. 11ii1. , 109. 
8. Editorial: "Judge Hughes's Address." _!!!!Nation, January 20, 1916, 66. 
4 
Early in February the political situation was still very nebulous. 
That the Progressive and Republican leaders were heartily in favor of 
removing the Democrats tram their position of control was agreed upon by 
all. But this opposition to the party in power was united only in its 
singleness of purpose, not in its program nor in its choice of leadership. 
Two groups were struggling for party dominancy, not openly but warily. All 
indications gave evidence that the group leaders were quietly and carefully 
sounding out the situation, were seeking to learn the strength of the various 
factions. Until the Convention was over eaoh group would diligently work 
for the success of its aims and its ohosen leader. 
The 'dyed in the wool' Progressives headed by George Perkins were the 
9 
most outspoken of the groups. They indicated that definite plans were 
being made for the Progressive Convention and that their program revolved 
10 
around Theodore Roosevelt as the Presidential candidate for the party. 
However, even the Progressive Party was divided into two groups, namely, 
into those who believed in the principles of the party and would only follow 
their leader, Roosevelt, while the second group hoped for victory under the 
banner of Roosevelt but were willing to follow a compromise leader. 
The other large group was the Republican Party and it, too, was 
divided, not into two groups but into three. The first was that group of 
regular Republicans known as the 'Old Guard' who, in the main, favored 
Elihu Root as a Presidential oandidateJ the second group was made up ot 
those who loyally and enthusiastically sponsored nominees from their native 
9. George Perkins, Chairman ot the National Committee of the Republican 
Party. 
10.!!! ~ Tribune, February 11, 1916. 
states; and the last group just co.ming into political prominence was 
composed of those Republicans who believed that Justice Hughes of the 
Supreme Court should be the standard bearer for the Republican Party in 
5 
the Presidential raoe. However, definite aligmnents, outspoken affiliations 
were not the mode of the moment. Too much was at stake, a rash statement 
too apt to be ruinous, so caution and taot were practiced by all leaders 
in each group. All were desirous of victory but were unwilling to forfeit 
their particular desires by unification, at least, not until it became 
absolutely necessary to do so. 
Seemingly, the Progressive leaders were more willing to openly profess 
their aims and plans. Theodore Roosevelt was their choice although the 
former President had made no public statement to the effect that he wished 
to be considered as a candidate. However, portions of a letter written to 
a friend indicated that the Colonel was contemplating the idea of being a 
Presidential candidate. The letter stated: 
Of two things, at any rate, I am sura. 
In the first place I not only do not desire 
but I will not take the nomination if it 
comes as a result of manipulation or of any 
maneuver whioh would seam to make it appear 
that I am striving for my own personal 
aggrandizement to secure it. Unless there 
is a popular feeling in the Republioan Party 
in the country at large such as to make the 
Republican leaders feel that not for my sake 
but for the sake ot the party and the country, 
it is imperative to nominate me, why I won't 
even consider accepting the nomination. In 
the m xt place it is utterly idle to nominate 
me it the country is in a mood either of 
timidity or of that base and complacent 
materialism which finds expression in the 
phrase 'Safety First.' If the country is 
not determined to put honor and duty ahead ot 
safety, then the people most emphatically do 
not wish me tor President. tor I will 
not take back by one finger's breadth 
anything I have said during the last 
eighteen months •••• ll 
6 
From this lengthy statEillent one could conclude that Roosevelt would beoome 
a Presidential nominee under certain conditions, the main one being it he 
l2 
were chosen as the candidate of' both the Republican and Progressive Parties. 
The likelihood of' such a proposal had not arisen in the minds of' Republican 
leaders. Citizens and political leaders knew that Roosevelt was fervently 
opposed to the Democratic administration and to the policies of President 
Wilson but not all agreed as to the ulterior motives that would prompt the 
13 
Colonel to enter the Presidential race. Many believed that the welfare 
ot the nation rather than personal ambition was the dominant reason tor his 
14 
entering the political arena once again. In Washington it was understood 
that Roosevelt was not determined to force himselt upon the Republican Con-
vention but being desirous ot reentering the Republican Party it was 
believed that the Colonel would abandon what seaned to be his special 
desires in order to assure success to the Republican Party and failure to 
the Democratic administration.15 That ma~ of the voters wished to have the 
former President beoome a nominee was evident frOm. the favorable sentiment 
16 
that was developing in many sections of' the country reported one paper. 
The Progressives seemingly felt that by being the first to declare 
11. Henry c. Lodge. editor. Selections from the Correspondence of' Theodore 
Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. 1884=i'918;YI. Charles Scribner's Sons. 
New York. !924. 479. --
12. Editorial: The Christian Science :Monitor (Boston), February 15, 1916. 
13. The Christ1an-sc1ence :Monitor. February 26, 1916. 
14. New York Tribune, February 16, 1916, and the Chicago Sunday Tribune, 
February l6, l916. 
15. The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 1916. and The Chicago Daily 
rrr'bune, February 13, 1916. 
16. Tlje §higagg Supd§y TriRppe FebruarJ 6, 1916. 
policies. by being the first to sponsor that prominent American. Theodore 
Roosevelt. as a Presidential candidate they would be in a better position 
to dominate the political situation at a later date. While they publicly 
made it evident that as a party they proposed to go ahead and plan their 
ovm campaign yet they made it evident that they were willing to meet and 
7 
discuss the political situation with their former enemies in the Republican 
Party. Late in February. the Republican and Progressive leaders met at a 
dinner and while the Progressives stated their aims and named their candi-
date they. also. by their approval of several nominees proposed by the 
Republican leaders. made it apparent that they might be willing to support 
17 
such nominees. 
Meanwhile the regular Republican Party was having difficulties. Too 
ma~ factions existed within its fold. eaCh group anxious to dominate. eaoh 
taction eager to place its nominee in the Whi-te House. The one group known 
as the 'Old Guard' working from its headquarters in the state of New York 
was divided into several groups. While some leading Republicans in the 
state were advocating Governor Whitman for the Presidency. others proposed 
Justice Hughes. while William Barnes. arch enemy of Roosevelt. heartily 
endorsed Elihu Root as a Presidential candidate. Of the three groups the 
last mentioned was most powerful in the state and consequently Elihu Root 
18 
came to the foreground as the Presidential nominee of the 'Old Guard.' 
Not only in the state of New York but also in many sections of the 
country Root was looked upon favorably as a candidate. On February 15 Root 
made a stirring speech that had tar reaching effects tor it became the 
17. The Christian Science Monitor. February 26. 1916. 
18. New ~ Tribune, February 17, 1916. 
8 
19 
keynote of the Republican Party campaign. In it he bitterly assailed 
President Wilson and severely criticised the pOlicies of the Democratic 
administration, especially those policies relating to affairs in Mexioo, 
to the tariff'J and he caustically denounced both the President and the 
administration for their manner of' handling the nation's foreign affairs. 
The speeoh was given wide publicity for it contained every battle cry that 
the Republican Party intended to hurl against President Wilson and his 
party. It gave evidence that the Republicans were beginning to for.mulate 
20 
the grounds upon which they would challenge the Democratic administration. 
Many were impressed by the striking similarity of Senator Root's opinions 
on prominent issues and problam.s to those held by Roosevelt, so much so 
that ma.ny felt that it sounded as if the speech had been written by the 
21 
former President. Some felt the speech indioated that Root had thrown 
his influence toward Roosevelt despite their political differences in 
22 
1912. While it draw cheers from the most conservative Republicans there 
was nothing in it to offend the susceptibilities of the most sensitive 
23 
Progressive was the opinion expressed by one writer. 
However, Root failed to receive the support of' the delegates from his 
own state tor when the Republican State Convention met it decided not to 
endorse aey candidate for the Presidency but rather chose to allow the state 
24 delegates to attend the National Convention in Chicago uninstructed. 
19. The Chicago Daily Tribiiiie, February 16, 1916. 
20. "Thfd., and editorbla "Mr. Root's Speech." The American Review of' 
ReVI'ews, March, 1916, 275. - -
21. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 17, 1916. 
22. '!bTd. 
23. 1'6Id. 
24. R. Ward. "The Inside of' a Convention." ~,!!!!Republic, February 26, 
1916. 
9 
Political friction within the state caused the decision. Barnes, refusing 
to endorse Roosevelt, sponsored Root, others sponsored the former President, 
25 
while another group was inclined toward Justice Ifughes. Consequently 
the fooal state of New York failed to aid in clarifying the political sit-
uation for neither Boot, Roosevelt, Whitman, nor Hughes were assured the 
political support of that state. Who was to be the Republican nominee? 
New York did not answer the question. However, some ideas were crystallized 
at this State Convention. It was believed that whether or not Boot became 
a Presidential candidate he would be the logical person to write the plat-
form of the Republican Party and that the candidate would have to fit the 
principles incorporated in it. 26 Some felt that Root by his aci:iions and 
words had indicated that in his opinion Roosevelt had 1:ihe necessary speci-
fications for the Presidential office, yet the fOld Guard' made ii:; known 
thai:; i 1:; was their belief thai:; Roosevelt; would eveni:iually suppori:i 1:ihe cause 
of Root ali:ihough the Progressive Pari:iy had definii:iely indicated that it was 
27 
against the venerable Senator. 
Ali:ihough the New York State Conveni:iion failed to agree upon a Presi-
deni:iial candidate, 1:ihereby adding to 1:ihe complexii:;y of the national polii:iica 
sii:iuation, the plai:iform. that was adopi:;ed by the Si:;ai:;e Convention,was i:;o 
have nai:iional influence. Ii:i was hoped that ii:; would serve as a pai:itern for 
28 
other Si:iate Conventions. '.Americanism' was the keynoi:ie and 'Preparedness' 
25. The Chrisi:iian Science :Monii:ior. February 19, 1916; New York Tribune, 
February 17, 1916. - -
26. New York Tribune, February 8, 1916. 
27 • Ibrd:-;-T'he Chicago nritr Tribune, February 27, 1916. 
28. J'altorii'r'in The~hr s an Science Monii:ior, February 21, 1916. 
10 
a watchword. It was significant that in the platform foreign af'fairs 
rather than political issues were to be the focal point in the pre-oonven-
tion campaign for while the Republicans were in accord in regard to the 
dominant issues, an agreement on a oandidate was another matter. 
In every Presidential election there always rises a group of men who 
loyally propose and support as Presidential candidates prominent leaders 
from their home states and these 'favorite sons' play a part in the prelim-
inary rounds of the political skirmish. In 1916 the list of 'favorite sons' 
included Senator Burton from Ohio who was regarded as a most powerful figure 
30 
from the Middle West. Likewise, Senator Sherman was considered a likely 
candidate not only in his home state of Illinois but also on the Paoifio 
31 
Coast. Friends of Governor Whi "lEan of New York had groomed him for the 
Presidency but the opposing factions in the state had forced them. to drop 
32 
their plans. In the West the stock of Senator Borah was being boosted as 
33 
Presidential, timber. However in the earlier months of the year no one of 
these potential candidates loomed particularly bright in the political sky. 
The last faction to be considered among the divided Republicans was 
that group of persons who were sponsoring Justice Charles Evans Hughes as a 
candidate for the Presidency. A peculiar situation in as much as the spon-
sorship was made without the approval of the Justice, in fact, with his open 
disapproval. In a letter written by the Justice his viewpoint concerning 
30 • .!!:! Christian Science Monitor, February 21,1916; and,.!!:! Chicago Sunday 
Tribune, February 19, l9l6. 
31. Ibid., February 21, 1916 
32. "specifications for a Presidential Candidate." The Nation,February 10, 
1916, 153. ---
33. The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1916. 
the efforts being made in his behalf was stated as followsa 
I am entirely out of polities and I know 
nothing whatever of the matters to which 
you refer. I am totally opposed to the 
use of my name in connection with the 
nomination and to the selection and 
instruction of any delegate in my interests, 
either directly or remotely.34 
The immediate reaction to this statsnent made by the Justice was a mixed 
one. Some papers expressed the belief that Hughes was sincere in his 
35 
refusal and congratulated him upon the stand he had taken. It was 
believed by these editors that the name of the Justice had been presented 
11 
to the people in order to affect other nominations. The tone used by these 
writers indicated utter disgust that such tactics should have been employed. 
Meanwhile, politicians were expressing their viewpoints, namely, that Hughes 
in refusing to allow his name to be used in connection with the Presidential 
nominations was beil2g sincere, but they felt that since he hadn't stated 
that he would not accept the nomination this signified that he would accept 
36 
the nomination if presented by the party. As. the days of February slipped 
by more interest was shown not only in the general political situation but 
in the candidacy of Hughes. As one writer expressed: 
Because of widespread confidence in his 
character and admiration for his record, 
the name of Charles Evans Hughes of The 
United States Supreme Court has been 
constantly mentioned ~n connection with 
the Republican nominations for the Presi-
dency, but there is no evidence of an 
organized movement in his candidacy until 
recently.37 
Hi tohoock, former Postmaster General, was believed to have started the 
boom for Hughes for selfish reasons. Republican Representative Slemp of 
Virginia learning of the situation wrote to Justice Hughes who replied as 
above. ~ Chioafo Daily Tribune,February 10,1916; and,!!!~ Tribune, 
February 11, 191 • 
12 
It was believed in Washington that Hughes was more popular in the West and 
Middle West and this was especially significant since the strength of the 
38 
Progressive Party was in those sections of the country. To some this 
meant that the Justice was acceptable to the Progressive leaders; others 
felt that the members of the Progressive Party were not united in their 
feeling toward the Justice, while others indicated that Hughes, as a candi-
date, was not acceptable to them because he was a reactionary, and had done 
39 
nothing to put him in the Progressive class. 
With the closing days of February the political situation began to 
take some shape. The Republicans and Progressives were united in one idea-
defeat of the Democratic Party. The Progressives openly were hedging, were 
seeking to dominate the situation yet knew they needed the support of the 
Republicans. Publicly the Progressives gave the impression of being willing 
to work along with the Republicans for the good of the nation, but actually 
no other candidate than Roosevelt was acceptable to them. As one Progressive 
leader statedt 
I propose to vote for a candidate who 
honestly believes in progressive principles 
of government and who is able and competent 
to guide the Ship of State through troubled 
waters without dishonor to the fl~ or danger 
to the ship • • • We {Progressives) believe 
Theodore Roosevelt is the only man in the 40 
country who can fulfill these requirements. 
35. _!!!! Chicago Daily Tribune, February 11, 1916; editorial in The Christian 
Science Monitor, February 17, 1916. 
36. Editorial: "Candidates." The American Review of Reviews, March,l916,276; 
editorial in The ChristieilS"cience Monitor, Fet>ruary 17,1916; and The 
Chica~ ri;~iTribune, February lO, 1916. -
37. Edito a : Justice Hughes Out of Politics."~ Outlook, February 23, 
404. 
38. The Christian Science Monitor, February 28 1 1916. 
39. 1lie New York Tribune, February 21, 1916. 
40. Former-"~rnor Bf;l.SS of New Hampshire as stated in The Chicago Daily 
Tr?bnna, Febrnacy 271 1916, 
13 
so with Perkins and other Progressive leaders against Boot and the iOld 
Guard' and f'or Roosevelt only; with Barnes and a portion of' the 'Old 
Guard' against Roosevelt and strongly for Root, the name of Hughes appeared 
in the list, if' 'favorite sons' can be discounted, as the only available 
candidate for the party that must unite in order to defeat the Democratic 
Party. 
All during March the question as to who should oppose Wilson in 
November continued to be unsolved. Newspapers and periodicals warily made 
efforts to sound out the thought and reaction of a public that for the t~e 
at least, was not wholly aware of the political situation. For in March, 
1916, the American affairs in Mexico claimed the focal attention of the 
public only to be superseded, frequently, by ominous rumbles of affairs 
across the seas. As a leading American wrote: "Our relations with Germany 
and the Mexican expedition have crowded politics to the rear, and only the 
41 professionals are taking an interest." 
But the election by the very nature of world conditions and by the 
unusual situation existing in the Republican circles was bound to be an 
important one. A good, scholarly account of the political situation was 
expressed by one editor who wrote that both the Democrats and those opposing 
them were too confident of' victory and that the result would " ••• be 
determined finally by the increasingly large body of patriotic citizens who, 
especially in a time like this, place their country far above party or 
42 
prejudice." No one was in a position to forecast. The paramount question 
41. Charles Seymour. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House From Neutrality 
to War, 1915-1917.:HOughton Miflin Co.;-New York, 1926,~. 
42. Editoria"l:"'on Republican Candidates." The North Amerioan Review, 
March, 1916, 332. ---
in the minds of many was: Can the elements comprising the opposition be 
united effectively? In the opinion of one editor the answer was in the 
43 . 
14 
affir.mative. In the years between 1912 and 1916. the differences between 
the Republicans and the Progressives had been lessened• pr~arily. by the 
Progressive leader himself and while Roosevelt wasn't ready to abandon all 
Progressive principles. he had indicated that' they were of minor importance 
44 in the " ••• face of more pressing problems." The problems then became 
not a question of whether the opposing groups could amalgamate. but rather 
could they agree on the selection of a candidate. and could they draw up a 
platfor.m that would. first. eliminate the possibility of a third candidate. 
secondly. win the support of the individual voters. Eliminating the 
'favorite sons' the race tor the Presiden~ dwindled to three candidates: 
Roosevelt. Root. and Hughes. In the opinion of this editor Hughes could be 
eliminated because he did not have the necessary qualifications for the 
PresidencyJ and, therefore, the question really became. 1~ould the regular 
Republicans forgive Roosevelt and vote for him or would the Progressives 
forget the part played by Root in the Convention of 1912 and be willing to 
45 
sponsor him." 
Early in March Roosevelt added to the perplexity of the situation when 
he issued a statement which announced that he prohibited the use of his name 
46 
on any primary ballot. Many took this to mean that he did not wish to 
run for the Presidency. However, on March 9th• the Colonel issued another 
43. Editorial: "On Republican Candidates." The North American Review, March 
1916, 333. ---
44. Ibid., 334. 
45. "''66Q. , 335. 
46. The Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 30, 1916. 
statement which neither affirmed nor definitely denied his intentions to 
enter the Presidential race and this action served to make the situation 
more hazy than before. His statement read as followsa 
I will not enter into any tight for the 
nomination and I will not permit any 
factional fight to be made in my behalf. 
Indeed, I will go further and say that it 
would be a mistake to nominate me unless 
the country has in its mood something of 
the heroic - unless it feels not only 
devotion to ideals but the purpose measurably 
to realize those ideals in action. 
It is for us of today to grapple w.L th the 
tremendous national and interna tiona.l 
problems of our ovm. hour in the spirit and 
with the ability shown by those who upheld 
the hands of Washington and Lincoln. · 
Vf.hether we do or do not accomplish this 
feat, will largely depend on the action 
taken at the Republiea.n and Pro~ressive 
National Conventions next June. 7 
In this statement he definitely requested that his name be kept from all 
15 
primary ballots so as to allow all the delegates as the convention "••• to 
be free to make a choice of candidates and in accordance with the needs and 
48 demands of the situation." 
This statement of the Colonel's caused various reactions throughout the 
country for some felt that this speech put him one step nearer to the 
nomination, others gathered that it meant that he was sponsoring Hughes, 
49 
while those in the 'Old Guard' shuddered. Undoubtedly they had cause for 
their feeling for Roosevelt had ardent followers in many sections of the 
47. Editorial: "Mr. Roosevelt and National Issues.• The Outlook, March 22, 
1916, 654; The Christian Science Monitor, March W, 1916; and New York 
Tribune, March 9, 1916. --
48. Ibid. 
49. 'Ei'P'ressions of opinion as found in New York Tribune, March 9, 24, 1916; 
and~ Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 5-;-i'9l6. 
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country. West of the Missouri River the allegiance to Roosevelt was strong 
and vigorous, from the Northeastern states came indications of an earnest 
desire that Roosevelt should be the eventual choice, and from Pennsylvania 
came the word that Senator Penrose and his group would probably back Roose-
velt. Colonel House, a leading Democrat, was of the opinion that Roosevelt 
with his ability for attracting the Western states and votes, would be the 
50 logical Republican opponent to Wilson. A poll made by two leading news-
papers gave proof of a growing sentiment in favor of Roosevelt, although in 
final analysis, these polls definitely indicated that most of the delegates 
51 
were going to the Convention uninstructed. 
With so many factions fighting for supremacy and doing it so warily, 
to detennine the actual strength of any one candidate was very difficult. 
Many felt that Roosevelt was not helping to clarify the situation. Was he 
in the race or not? Was the Colonel in a position to make a definite 
declaration regarding his intentions toward the Presidential race? One 
editor felt that Roosevelt was in an unusual predicament for he could 
neither allow his name to be used in the primaries unless he was ready to 
commit himself to the candidacy nor could he allow himself to be nominated 
Py the Republican Convention in Chicago on a platfor..wbioh enunciated views 
52 
contrary to those with which his public career was identified. Seemingly, 
the only course open for him. to take was one of waiting, of learning the 
attitudes and wishes of the citizenry and abiding by their decision. The 
50. Seymour, II, 346. 
51. The Chica£ Sunday Tribune, March 5, 1916; and The Christian Science 
~tor. rch 24, 1916. ---
52. Editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1916. 
1'1 
voters of the nation were not in doubt as to the principles or the political 
and economic viewpoints of the former President for by his deeds, actions, 
and speeches he had made known to the people his position, his beliefs, on 
foreign and domestic pxoblems and issues. While the for.mer President was 
willing to be the nation's executive once again, yet he was willing to 
accept the nomination only under certain terms. To gain a domestic or 
international reputation, to lead as he had done in 1912 a. crusading group 
under the Progressive banner were not his aims. Rather to be chosen as the 
nominee of both parties, Republican and Progressive, and to be elected the 
chief executive of the nation during what apparently was to be a critical 
53 
period was his aim. 
While Roosevelt had~ followers he also had many enemies, for many 
Republicans did not consider him the man of the hour. The events o£ 1912 
54 
were still fresh in their minds. However, some o£ the stalwart leaders 
of the Republican Party indicated their willingness to aooep~ the Colonel 
" ••• if'", as one editor stated, "it shall appear that he is the most avail-
55 
able man." Likewise, Roosevelt was gaining strength in Wall Street for 
some of the financial and industrial leaders who had opposed him in 1912 
56 
were showing a. readiness to follow him in 191~. 
During the month of' March Roosevelt gained in popularity and political 
strength. That the political situation was in his hands was the opinion of' 
57 
one editor. If Roosevelt should declare that he would support the choice 
53. ~r. Roosevelt and the National Issues." The Outlook, March 22, 1916; 
and The Chicago rilz Tribune, March 28 1 !9!'6. 
54. The Cllr'istia.n So enoe Monitor, March 22 1 1916. 
55. I'Ofd. 
56. Fred Davenport, "The Republican Trilemma." The Outlook,March 29,1916,73 
57. Editorial in!!!! Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1916. 
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of the Republican National Convention the outlook would be clear; if he 
should declare himself' in favor of' Hughes the breach between the two 
£actions would be closed; and it he should formally announce himself' as a 
candidate, he would, in the opinion of' this editor, receive the nomination 
58 from the Republican Party at the Convention in Chicago. 
One writer summed up the political situation by ter.ming it a trilemma 
with three splendid men- Roosevelt, Hughes, and Root - seeking the 
. 59 
candidacy. However, 1 t can not be honestly said that Hughes was seeking 
the nomination and the actions of' his friends in promoting his cause placed 
the Justice in an exl:;ra.ordinary position. He was caught between two very 
respectable traditions; one, that ··a .. Justice of' the Supreme Court should not 
seek the Presidency, and the other tradition that was deep in American 
6) 
feeling which said that no man had a right to refuse a call f'ro.m the people. 
The writer who held the above opinion f'elt.that Hughes was hoping to abide 
by both traditions by "•• .refusing to seek the office and refusing to make 
61 
it impossible for the office to seek him." 
That Hughes was an extremely capable leader, a thorough student; of' the 
law, an experienced statesman, and a man endowed with f.irm principles was 
62 
agreed upon by both friends and critics. One suoh critic wrote: 
He (Hughes) combines a. knowledge of practical 
politics which oomes from an intimate knowledge 
in political administration, with the farseeing 
vision of the statesman Which comes from the 
58. Editorial in The Christian Science MOnitor, March 22, 1916 
59. Davenport, 16c:-eit., 738. 
60. Editorial: "Let Hughes Declare Himself'." The New Republic, March 11,1916, 
144. --
61. Ibid. 
62. 'i58.Venport, ~·~·, 738. 
knowledge of the history of the principles 
that underlie our republican institutions 
and the moral, social, and industrial needs 
of our people. We yield to none in our 
admiration for his unswerving integrity 
and genuine .AmericaniSlll.63 
The greatest difficulty in the way of the nomination of the Justice 
19 
was that the people had no means by which they could dis cover the views and 
political alignments of Hughes. Since his appointment to the bench in 1910 
the Justice had made no speeches, written no articles that gave indications 
of his viewpoints because, as he had himself stated: "The Supreme Court must 
not be dragged into politics and no man is as essential to his country's 
64 
well being as is the unstained integrity of the courts. 11 Hughes, by his 
previous actions, had indicated that his views on national policies were 
strong and conservative, that he was neither a pacifist nor an advocate of 
preparedness and although the public was not aware of the convictions Hughes 
would take in national problems, it could be stated, wrote one editor, that: 
"It is not possible to conceive Hughes in a position of responsibility and 
65 
then as going off on a tangent. He would do the sane thing." However, an 
admirer of Hughes felt that the detachment of the Justice from political 
strife and friction added to his availibility in the minds of politicians 
and cautious voters. The fact that his current political views were not 
known would make him less subject to political attack by the opposition it 
66 
was believed. 
Since the great problem of the moment was the a.malge.m.ation of the 
Progressive and Republioan factions, and since Hughes had played no part in 
63. Editorial: "Justice Hughes and the Presidency." The Outlook, March 15, 
1916, 602. ---
64. Ibid. 
_65. Fred Davenport, "Shall it Be Hughes," The Outlook, :March 15,1916, 628. 
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the bitter quarrel of 1912 it was hoped that both factions 110uld be willing 
to sponsor him as the party leader in 1916. As so many leaders and voters 
~ere so bitterly opposed to both Roosevelt and Root because of their actions 
in the political upheaval in 1912, it seamed quite logical that Hughes 
would be the man for the voters to follow four years later. While political 
leaders and friends of the Justice were of the opinion that he would receive 
the nomination yet no great interest in the candidacy of Hughes was shown 
67 by the rank and file of the voters. 
One by one the states held their conventions and in the majority of 
the oases the delegates were sent to the Convention in Chicago w1 th no 
68 
instructions. Seemingly there was a feeling among the voters of the 
nation that the election would be a very crucial one, there was an awareness 
that no one candidate loomed above all others, or rather that three 
unusually splendid men dominated the political horizon. With the political 
situation at home and abroad so vi tal yet so uncertain, w1 th Presidential 
candidates having opinions either divergent or unknown, the voters adopted 
the attitude of waiting to see what would happen, or, as one writer stated: 
"••• there is a possibility of a change of feeling before the day of 
69 
decision arrives." 
Meanwhile the stalwart leaders of the regular Republican organization 
cominued their program of watchful waiting. Late in March the National 
Republtean Committee met to choose a chairman for the National Convention 
66. Ibid., 628. 
67. 1'EiVTYork Tribune, March 30, 1916; and editorial: _!!:! Christian Science 
MOiiitor, March !2, 1916. 
68. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 15, 19~6; and,!!!!~ Tribune, March 
22, 24, 19l6. 
69. "Presidemial Primaries and the 1916 Situation." ~ Nation,:March 30, 
21 
70 
but no selection was made and the meeting was deferred for another month. 
Such dominating leaders as Barnes and Hilles could neither agree on a 
71 
chairmen nor on the keynote speaker. A suggestion that the two groups, 
Progressives and Republicans, amalgamate their Conventions was not well 
received in the 'Old Guard' circles .for suoh a move would place the 
Progressive leaders in a position to nominate Roosevelt and, while the 
Republicans were unwilling to accept the Colonel, yet they were ready to 
agree on another candidate, one 'Who would be satisfactory to the Progress-
72 
ives. Even the 'Old Guard' realized that a hope of victory .for the 
Republicans in November would be lost without a united .front, yet their 
immediate plans to attain that end were not an acceptance of Roosevelt. The 
'Old Guard', seemingly, was .fearful of adopting a bold .front, thereby losing 
all possibilities of the Progressive support and yet by their hesitant 
attitude they were allowing the Progressives to gain ground and the Roose-
velt bo~ to reach formidable proportions. No doubt, these seasoned 
political leaders felt that while their opponents were heralding to the 
nation their plans and program they, by their silence, would profit by the 
mistakes made by the opponents and would be in a better position to plan 
counter attacks. 
The political campaigns having been outlined in March, changed little 
in the following month. While the Democrats were solidly united in their 
1916, 349]Editorials: •candidates." !he American Review of Reviews, March 
1916, 275; and The Chicago Sundal Tri'Duiie, Maroli 25, 1916-;-
70. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 19, l916. 
71. 1lie Christian Science MOnitor, March 22,1916; New York Tribune, March 21, 
!916. --
72 • .!!!'! ~ Tribune, March 13, 1916. 
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efforts to renominate and re-elect Wilson. the Republicans were torn asunder 
by the divergent groups within their ranks. While the voters were cognizant 
of the wisdom of choosing the next executive of the nation, both wisely and 
carefully, yet their political decision was hampered by the strangeness of 
73 
the situation. Seemingly, the list of active Republican nominees had 
dwindled to two, Roosevelt and Hughes, yet the former, as one newspaper 
stated: 
"• •• is not a candidate and there is no 
open assurance that he will accept the 
nom'nation. The defensive ar.my bears 
Hughes' banner, but cannot assure the 
voter that the Justice will accept the 
nomination if it be offered to him.74 
Each was a candidate and yet not a candidate. If the sincere hope of the 
parties was to be realized, namely, the fusion of the Republicans and the 
Progressives, then it se~ed to one editor that the wisest move was to have 
the nomination seek the man, "• •• one who would make the strongest appeal 
75 
to the sentiment of' the country." 
On March 31, Roosevelt set off a political bombshell by lunching at 
the home of' former Ambassador Bacon and among the guests were General Wood 
76 
and Roosevelt's erstwhile en~, Elihu Root. It was the first time these 
two political leaders had met in five years and although the occasion was 
supposedly not of a political nature, yet the meeting of leaders of opposing 
.factions could not help but be significant. Deep meanings were given to 
the so called reunion, yet strangely each group gave opposite interpretatio 
73. Editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1916. 
74. New York Tribune, April 3, 1916. 
75. 1'6I'd., editorial, April 6, 1916. 
76. Account of the luncheon taken .from: New York Tribune, April, 1916; 
~ Chicago Daily Tribune, April 11,""'!916; and !h!, Christian Science 
Monitor, April 11, 1916. 
The Progressive leaders were elated for they were sure that the meeting 
indicated that the Colonel had broken through the defense of the 'Old 
Guard' and that Roosevelt was out to win the Republican nomination from a 
77 
united party. It was pointed out that Root's keynote speech in the 
23 
78 
previous month had been 1 pr~paredness 1 which was the slogan of Roosevelt. 
George Perkins at a later Progressive conference emphasized the political 
importance of Roosevelt's meeting with Root, reiterated his belief that 
throughout the nation there was a growing sentiment for Roosevelt, and, 
therefore, the Progressive organization would go ahead with its plans for 
its Convention, and it expected to have a more representative body of 
' 79 delegates in June than it had had in 1912. Some leaders felt the coming 
together of Root and Roosevelt indicated that an effort to to~ a coalition 
govermn.ent was in the offing while others, with a feeling of hopefulness, 
80 believed the meeting assured victory for the Republican Party. It was 
one writer's opinion that the gathering together of men who had opposed each 
other in 1912 indicated that the'differences over which they had disagreed 
had been 'ironed out' and these leaders, having wisdom and foresight, 
appreciated that the events of the day were leading to a national crisis, 
81 
the solution of which demanded a reunion of Republican forces. Among the 
'Old Guard' opinions differed as to the significance of the luncheon meeting. 
Soma felt that it indicated that Roosevelt was considering the possibility 
ot giving his support to Root while other Republicans ware confident that 
77. Ibid. 
78. l'DICT. 
79. "fli'echristian Science Monitor, April 1, 1916. 
so. ~Luncheon and a Mora!." The New Republic, April 8, 1916, 235. 
81. Editorial: "Root, Roosevel~and Reunion." The Outlook, April 12, 19161 
829. -
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82 
the Colonel had decided to support Justice Hughes. 
Within a week after the luncheon Roosevelt gave out a clear, ringing 
. 
24 
statement of his views. To a political v~sitor from Washington he stated: 
Get it perfectly clear in your head that 
if you nominate me it IIDlst not be because 
you think it is in my interest, but because 
you think it is in your interest and the 
interest of the Republican Party and 
because you think it is in the interest 
of the United States to do so.B3 
In no uncertain terms the Colonel reiterated that ther~ would be no 
•pussyfooting' on any issues raised by him, that the platform upon which he 
could stand must contain a policy of ample and thorough preparedness, that 
he wuld not tolerate any samblanoe of hyphenated Amerioanism for he 
believed that: 
Every American citizen IIDlBt be for 
America first and for no other country 
even second and he has not any right 
to be in the United States at all if he 
has a divided loyalty between this 
country and my other.84 
He clearly stated his attitude tq,w&rd war when he said: 
I em not for war. On the contrary I abhor 
tm unjust tmd lm.nton war and I would use 
every honorable expedient to avoid even a 
just war. But· I feel with all my heart 
that you don't in the long run avoid war by 
maldng other people believe that you are 
afraid to fight for your own rights.85 
82. New York Tribune, April 2, 1916. 
83e The CJifO'ago Dally Tribune, April 6, 1916. 
84. 1'Drd. 
85. I'SI'(t. 
-
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In conclusion he said: 
•. • the surest way to keep peace and to 
keep it on terms that will enable Americans 
to hold their heads high and net hang them 
in shame is for him (Uncle Sam) to be so 
prepared in advance and I mean prepared in 
his own soul, as well as with his army and 
navy, that when he says anything the rest of 
the world will know that he means it and that 
he can make it good. 86 
The statement was stirring and typically Rooseveltian. Not once did he 
25 
openly say that he was a candidate for the Presidency, yet very clearly did 
he enunciate the terms under which he V«>uld consider accepting a nomination 
for that office. Perhaps it was his inimitable way of serving notice upon 
his ancient foe, the 'Old Guard' that it would net do to try to run him. on 
a platform that dealt with platitudes or on one designed to attract any 
element in the voting population that might be repelled by an out and out 
87 
statement of principles. This was the opinion given by one newspaper. 
The speech had far reaching et:f'ects. It net only served to clarify 
• 
in the minds of the voters the policies and principles o:f' the :f'ormer Presi-
dent, but 'With damaging ef:f'ects it brought cut the :f'act that his opponent, 
Justice Hughes, was silent as to his views on all the important problems 
and issues of the day. Once again there was a countryi1i.de boom for Roose-
velt, at least, these Republican or rather those anti-administration news-
papers by their editorials and news articles lead the public to so believe. 
It becomes very di:f'ficult for a reader to decide whether some of the news-
papers of that period expressed the actual political sentiment of the people 
or that their glowing reports were only an expression of the beliefs they 
hoped or would like to have the voters express. Eapeoially in the West and 
~ --------------------------------------------------------~2~6 
Middle West the newspapers gave forth the opinion that the people were 
giving their allegiance to Roosevelt and to the principles for Which he 
88 
stood. That he was the man the people wanted, the man the people believed 
in, the man who could be trusted to lead the Nation in an honorable manner 
during the critical times to come was the growing sentiment of many leaders 
89 
and citizens. The Democrats in Washington were becoming fearful for to 
them all signs pointed to a fusion of the Progressive and Republican 
factions before June and to a harmonious Republi oan Party with Roosevelt as 
90 
the chosen leader. This situation, naturally, was not to their liking. 
Det'inite statements and information concerning the candidacy of 
Justice Hughes could not be made by those who sponsored him as the Presi-
dential candidate. Conjecture was all they could offer. It was the fir.m 
belief of his friends that the Justice would accept the nomination if it 
were offered to him for Hughes was reported to have said that "••• he could 
not refuse the Presidential nomination if it came to him properly and that 
91 he would not enter such a refusal." The sentiment that the Justice would 
accept the nomination if the conditions were propitious crystallized during 
the month of April. A movement was started to prove that the Justice was 
'right' on the main issues on which it was expected the campaign would be 
92 
started. Friends and critics alike agreed that the toughest barrier to 
86. Ibid; other accounts of the speech found in: New York Tribune, April 6 1 
mG; and The Christian Science :V..onitor, Aprfi"'6,"""i91'6. 
87. New York Trrbune, April 6, 1916. 
88. New York Tribune, April 3, 6, 7, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, 
Ipri~ 1916; and The Chicago Daily TribUne, Ipril 6, 1916. 
89. Editorial "The Pre Nomination C~.w The Outlook, April 19,1916,880. 
90. The Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 19l6. 
91. ~ chicago Daily Tribune, April 6, 1916. 
92. :t!ew York Tribune, April 5, 1916. 
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cross, the greatest stumbling block, the highest obstacle to surmount in the 
proposed nomination of Justice Hughes was the fact that no one knew his 
oonviotions, his viewpoints on the current problems and political issues. 
HiS position on the bench of the highest court in the land prevented him 
93 
from making any statement concerning them. 
Those who opposed Hughes agreed that as long as he was a member of the 
supreme Court, he should not express his viewpoints on current political 
problems but as long as his convictions remained unknown they felt he could 
94 
not be considered as a Presidential nominee. One writer summed up the 
situation aptly when he wrote: 
I£ the Republi oans nominate Mr. Hughes 
they will nominate an unknown quantity. 
They will nominate a man of the highest 
character and ability, but one whose lips 
are artificially sealed on the great 
problems facing us.95 
Another group who opposed the nomination of the Justice did so on the score 
that the greatest service that the Justice could render to his country was 
96 
to continue "00 serve, ably and well, as a member of the Supreme Court. 
Only from intimate friends and political associates of Justice Hughes 
oould the Republican sponsors glean information as to the views and ideas 
97 
of the Justice on the current problems. It was reported that the Justice 
favored the development of the navy, the doubling of the size of the anny, 
the upholding of the Monroe Doctrine; that he believed that at the outbreak 
93. Ibid.; and The Chicago ftill Tribune, April 4, 1916. Likewise, similar 
view expressea Tn an ad or~a!: "The Pre-Nomim tion Campaign." The Out-
look, April 19, 1916, 880. 
94. "Justice Hughes and the Presidency. 11 The Outlook, March 15,1916, 602. 
95. Editorial:"The Pre-Nomination Campaign." The OUtlook, April,l9, 1916, 880 
96. Ibid. ----
97. New York Tribune, April 5, 1916. 
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of the war the nation should have prepared for aggression; that American 
rights and property should be protected by force, if necessary; that we 
should not have interfered in Belgium at the outbreak of the war; an.d the. t 
he was opposed to our withdrawal from the Philippines until the people in 
98 
the islands were ready for self government. 
HOwever, secondhand knowledge was not satisfactory to the voters of 
the nation and so the Justice continued to be regarded by many in a 
suspicious manner. Even those who admired him as a man and as a judiciary 
were reluctant to consider him as a Presidential candidate. That a member 
of the Supreme Court should enter a political contest for the Presidency 
was distasteful to many citizens. One writer seemingly expressed the 
opinion of many who believed as he did when he wrote: 
• • • his convictions that no member of 
the Supreme Court should ever entertain 
any political ambitions whatever since, 
in his view, the safety of the country 
might sometime depend upon a general 
confidence in the Supreme Court and 
such a confidence could not exist if 
there should be a possibility that its 
decisions could be influenced by the 99 
personal ambitions of any of its members. 
Refutal of this conviction came from one who earnestly advocated the candi-
daoy of the Justice for, in his opinion, the Justice was not using his 
judicial office as a •stepping stone to a political office' nor would the 
courts suffer by his action.100 Likewise, he felt that such action would 
98. Jacob Schurman, "Hughes-Why." The Independent, May 29, 1916, 329; also, 
editorials: "Nobody for Hughes.* The North American Review, May,l9l6,641-
50; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, April 9,19fr.-
99. William Garrill, "The Candidacy of Justice Hughes." The Nation,April 13, 
1916, 405. ----
lOO.Editorial: "Hughes not a Political Judge." The Nation, April 6, 1916,316. 
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not become a precedent, that the bench would not be made a place for 
nursing political ambition and if' Hughes were nominated it would not become 
a " ••• ease of' a political judge gaining the end of' his manoeuvres on the 
bench but of a man called to public service wholly irrespective of his course 
101 
as a judge." On all sides the controversy was waged on the question: 
Should Justice Hughes become a Presidential candidate? To many it apparently 
seemed unfortunate that a man as fine and splendid as Charles Evans Hughes 
could not have been in a position to openly declare his willingness to become 
a candidate for the Presidency. Yet had he not been a member of the highest 
oourt in the land would the political leaders and citizens have drafted him 
as a candidate? Was not his prominence as a Justice on the Suprema Court 
a major reason, a dominating factor in their conviction that he was a 
desirable candidate for the Presidency? The most unfort\mate angle of the 
whole situation was the fact that in 1912 the Justice had indicated his 
attitude to•vard the Supreme Court and the Pr13sidency. 'When questioned in 
that year as to his willingness to became a candidate for the Presidency 
he had said: 
I hope that as a Justice of the Supreme 
Court, I am rendering public service and 
may continue to do so for many years; but 
the Supreme Court must not be dragged 
into politics and no man is as essential 
to his country' s well being as is the 
unstained integrity of the courts.l02 
That in 191S Hughes still held to the above view can be deduced from the fact 
that in the interim of four years no action nor statement had been made by 
him refuting this conviction. 
101. Editorial: "Hughes not a Political Judge." The Nation, April 6,1916 1 376. 
102. Fred Davenport, "The Republican Nomination.""""''The Outlook, March 15,1916, 
628. -
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I£ this political struggle o£ 1916 had been waged between the two 
contestants, Roosevelt and Hughes, the story would have been far more simple• 
It vms the part played by the 'Old Guard' that complicated the situation. 
That they were a dominant force can not be denied and that as shrewd, crafty, 
experienced politicians they played a •waiting game' in the months before 
the convention must be admitted. Having no powerful candidate to propose 
other than Root, "Who had few followers West o£ the Allegheny Mountains, they 
were forced to choose between Roosevelt and Hughes. However, this they 
were not ready to do, so they adopted the course o£ playing one candidate 
against the other and by so doing they hoped in the end to dominate the 
situation and to nominate a oandidate o£ their own choosing. While the 
irreconoilables were not ready to support Roosevelt yet a victory £or the 
103 
Republican Party was their paramount aim. To win without the Colonel was 
their hope but eventually, i£ events so dictated, they would be forced to 
accept him, but meanwhile they continued to be non-committal in regard to 
him. This attitude was not taken by such hidebound Republicans as Barnes and 
his followers who, because of their intense hatred £or Roosevelt, definitely 
104 
intimated that party defeat was preferable to victory under Roosevelt. 
These seasoned politicians were certainly in a predicament. Roosevelt 
in his stirring speeches against the Democratic administration had 
practically drawn up the Republican platfor-m, had enunciated the principles 
105 
upon Which the Republicans could hope to defeat the Democrats. The 
ma orit of the Re ublicans, while StAtisfied to inau rate the principles o£ 
103. Editorial: "The Pre-Nomination Campaign." The Outlook, April 19, 1916, 
880; and New York Tribune, April 71 1916. -
104. The Christi&'n"'Scfenoe Monitor, April 8 1 1916. 
los. "NeW York Tri'bune, April 6, 1916. 
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Roosevelt into the party platform, felt that Roosevelt by his dominating 
manner had overstepped his prerogatives. As one leader stated that "••• he 
(Roosevelt) is trying to dictate the platfonn, the nominee, and run the 
106 
~ole party, even before he is back in it.• How some of the 'stand pat• 
RepUblicans of the 'Old Guard' hated Roosevelt, for to them his perfidy of 
1912 was still very fresh in their minds, yet they had to face the fact 
as it was in 1916. As one delegate from Massachusetts expressed it: "If it 
shall appear that there is no alternative to Roosevelt and victory or some 
other nominee and division and defeat, then it may be taken for granted that 
the •regulars' of Massachusetts will prove neither stubborn nor rebellious. 
107 
It will be 'Anything to Beat Wilson at Chicago." However, if it was to 
be the Colonel because of his drawing power, then it must be with the control 
108 
of the party in the hands of the 'Old Guard'. One of the first moves 
made by this Republican group to accomplish their purpose was to draw up a 
"••• platfor.m containing a ringing declaration of the attitude of the 
109 
Republican Party toward Americanism., preparedness, and the tariff." By 
espousing the two oauses closest to the heart of the Colonel, the wily 
politicians hoped to outsmart Roosevelt and force his followers, first, to 
agree to the principles written into the platform and then "00 accept any 
man nominated upon it. 
That the 'Old Guard' was unwilling to support Roosevelt unless forced 
llC 
to do so was true yet they were really not favoring Hughes as their candidate. 
106. New York Tribune, April 7, 1916; and~ Christian Scienoe Monitor, 
April 111 1916. 
107. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 1916. 
lOB. Ibid. -
109. New York Tribune, April 29, 1916. 
110. New York Tribune, April 23, 1916. 
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With many in the Republican group the Justice was a second choice and if he 
1f8.S the only one who could defeat Roosevelt, then all was well and good. 
HoW"ever another candidate, one of their own group, and wi. th ID.a.ey" this was 
Root, was preferable. If, as events developed, their allegiance to Hughes 
111 
became unnecessary, they were ready to cmnge their allegiance. Continuing 
to be non-committal the members of the 'Old Guard' looked forward to the 
events at the Convention for the final results. 
Of the • favorite sons • little need be said. The common opinion was 
that their names would be eliminated after the first ballot. While it was 
true that at maey of the State Conventions the name of the leading oi tizen 
was proposed as a candidate for the Presidency, yet these political figures 
had little influence outside of the native state. One editor expressed the 
current opinion that the old idea of each state proposing a candidate was 
112 gone. In more recent elections the dynamic men, leaders in the nation's 
limelight, overshadowed the state choices. 
As the month of April came to a close, only a rash prophet would fore-
cast the evenbs of June. The Republican Party was stilldisorganized, but 
hopeful of a harmonious reunion. In order to win, the party must unite, 
unite on a platform and on a candidate presenting a sharp contrast to the 
113 
candidate and platform of the Democratic Party. The Republicans had hoped 
to win as a result of the unpopularity of the Dsuocratio administration but 
this probability had become remote. The Democrats, according to one writer, 
111. New York Tribune, April 3, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, 
IpririT, 1916. -
112. Editorial: "A Bad Year· For Favorite Sons." The Nation, April 13,1916, 
113. Editorial: "The Republican Dilenma." The Ne'i'Repu'61io, April 29, 1916, 331. --
~·----------------------------------------~ 
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,ere forestalling Republican criticism of governmental affairs by adopting 
a more active Mexican policy. by increasing the anny and the navy. and while 
the Democrats were not able to propose definite convictions concerning 
114 
affairs across the waters, neither were the Republicans. Therefore, the 
Republicans were not able to use criticism of the Aaninistration as an 
effective means to attain victory as they had previoualy planned to do. The 
Republicans needed an aggressive leader and a sharp issue and they oould not 
get it unless they were willing to pay a high price, concluded this editor.115 
In the weeks before the Convention one 'WOUld expect to find definite 
alignments being made, a closer harmoey o.f the three factions. efforts being 
made to subordinate the hopes o.f each group in order to bring victory to the 
party to 'Which• in the final analysis. all groups gave their allegiance. 
However, this was not the true picture. May was only a repetition o.f the 
previous months with each group .fighting .for the advantage point, each 
unwilling to give in one iota. each claiming to have the perfect nominee, 
a.nd each confident; that victory was theirs. 
During the month the amount of printed matter devoted to the forthcoming 
political event; both in the periodicals and newspapers increased in volume 
and in intensity. All attention was .focused on the question: Who "WOuld be 
the Republican candidate? During the month those papers and periodicals 
~ich favored Roosevelt as the Presidential nominee published his speeches, 
lauded his viewpoints, extolled his character, and did everything within 
~heir power to promote his candidacy. The principles .for which the Colonel 
114. Ibid. 
115. "i'bid. 
-
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stood were clearly and forcibly reviewed and summarized into four cardinal 
points, namely, first, for a revision of the tariff' scaleJ second, for a 
government honestly and efficiemtly administered; third, for a definite 
116 
program of preparedness J and fourth, for a strong foreign policy. 
Vigorously and consistently during the previous twenty months the Colonel 
had enunciated his viewpoints in regard to Mexican and European af.t'airs, 
the very ideals which for years had been in full accord with "••. the best 
traditions and prevailing sentiment of the Republican Party, 11 wrote one 
117 
staunch Independent Republican. Another believed that the Colonel was 
the only candidate who could put up an effective and significant opposition 
118 
to the Democratic administration. 
The Co~onel because of his speeches and announcements from his home 
in Oyster Bay was continually in the limelight and the attention paid to 
him was summed up as being indioative of his popularity. There can be no 
doubt but that they who were working for him left no stone unturned to 
accomplish their purpose. Leagues and organizations were formed to further 
his causa, a cause which in the opinion of his critics was on the ebb until 
119 
the Colonel began his nationwide speaking tour. One of the most important 
organizations formed was called the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League whose aim 
116. The Christian Science Yon11x>r, May 31, 1916; William McDonald, "Why 
JraEbllcan Party; Needs Mr. Roosevelt." The Outlook, May 10,1916, 88-92; 
Theodore Roosevelt, "No Pigtails for Uncle Sam." The Independent, May 22, 
1916, 273; and "Roosevelt, Hughes, or ?"Tiie Indepenaent, May 
15, 1916, 231. ---
~17. McDonald, loo. cit., 90. 
~18. Editorials"""""Rep'Ubrican Debt to Mr. Roosevelt.".!,!:!!!,! Republic, May 20, 
1916, 52. 
~19. Editorial: "The Race Between Hughes and Roosevelt." Current Opinion, 
June, 1916, 275. 
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1'18.S to express and crystallize public opinion in the behalf of Roosevelt as 
120 
a presidential candidate. This league sent a long letter to the Colonel 
explaining the purpose of the organization which, of course, was to further 
the nomination of Roosevelt. In the Colonel's reply he stated to the organi-
1ation that he earnestly approved of its work but that his nomination would 
have to be made with a full understanding that it meant "••. hearty indorse-
ment of the principles for which I stand," and he again reiterated his 
121 
attitude toward preparedness and peace. A queer situation, indeed, when 
a man endorsed the wrk of an organization the purpose of which was to 
further his nomination when up to the moment the man had not signified his 
willingness to be a candidate for the nomination. Of course, after the 
letter was published in the papers many believed that it was tantamount to 
an avowal of his candidacy and that he was desirous of obtaining the nomin-
122 
ation from both the Republican and Progressive Parties. 
Other organizations under the leadership of business and professional 
125 
men were formed to aid Roosevelt in his political campaign. The "WO~en, 
too, under the leadership of Harriet Vittum banded together to further the 
cause of Roosevelt since he, in the previous month, had made known his 
124 
willingness to sponsor the Federal Suffrage Amendment. Labor, although not 
organized into official groups, had given evidence of aligning its votes 
120. Editorial: ~anted- A Statesman." The Outlook, May 31, 1916, 250; 
"Issues and Men." Current Opinion, June 1916, 381; The Christian Science 
Monitor, May 10, 1916; The Daily Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1916; and New 
York Tribune, May 16, 1916. -
121. rn:e-cEristian Science Monitor, May 12, 15, 1916. 
122. Tne Chicago Daily Tribune, :May 12, 1916; and New York Tribune, :May 12, 
1916. --
123. New York Tribune, May 9 1 22, 1916. 
124. The ChiCago Daily Tribune, N.ay 22, 1916. 
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with the Colonel. labor was expressing oonfidence in him and was confident 
that he would, if' elected, do everything in his power to push the social 
125 
justice planks of' 1912. Seemingly, men, women, politicians, business men, 
and labor groups were eager to see the i'orm.er President stand once more on 
the portico of' the 'White House. 
Naturally, many opposed Colonel Roosevelt. The 'Old Guard', the 
ultra ... conservative Republicans, and that group of' the citizenry which might 
126 
be termed Gennan ... .America.n did everything to lessen his cmnces of' victory. 
This last group had indicated its unwillingness to support the Colonel 
because in his speech in st. Louis he had openly condemned certain groups of' 
German-Americans i'or attempting to shape American politics and he had 
127 
vehemently denounced all Americans in the hyphenate group. Lastly, it 
was reported that those Progressives in the Vfest, who were lukewarm in their 
attitude toward preparedness, had lessened their enthusiasm i'or Roosevelt 
128 
because his views on the subject were too extreme i'or them. 
During the month of' May the Justice continued to be non ... committal in 
regard to the political situation. Those who di si'avored his candidacy 
continued their opposition on the several scores already mentioned, always 
stressing their main points - that no one knew the views of' the Justice. His 
129 
supporters answered this charge. One editor, in defending Hughes wrote: 
125. New York Tribune, May 24, 1916. 
126. 'i50dd~4; editorials: "The Republican Turning Point." The Nation, :!l..e.y 
4, 1916, 472; "Nobody For Hughes." The North American Revfew, :Me.y,l916, 
647; and The Chicago ~a;!Y Tribune,lla'y 36, 1916. 
127. The ChioaFD811y Tri une, June 1, 1916; and The Christian Soienoe 
~tor, June 1, l9l6. ---
128. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, May 21, 1916. 
129. Editorials: "Silence of' Justice Hughes and Its Ei'i'eots." Current Opinicn 
June 1916, 5; "The Republican Party." The North Americe.n_Review, June 
1916,803; "The Republican Debt to Roosevelt." The New Republic,May 20, 
- 1916, 52 --
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"It is for his demonstrated quality, not for his unkno'Wn opinions that so 
rns.!r/ Republicans in so many parts of tm country have been turning to him 
130 
for their best hope this year." The personality of the Justice, his 
impeccable claracter, and his splendid public record were of such a nature 
as to inspire the con1'idence of the voting population. 
"Vfe, the People, care more for what a man is than for what he says," 
131 
stated another. Did it matter so much that Hughes remained silenb 
seemed to be the view of these editors. Suppose no one knew his attitude 
toward the disturbing affairs in Europe? Since the Republican Party had not 
issued a party plank on that question perhaps a nominee was vdse to remain 
silent on the issue. Suppose Mr. Hughes had not given out a statement as 
to the program he would adopt toward international affairs if elected? 
Neither had the other nominees adopted so foolhardy a task. Perhaps the 
silence of the Justice was not so great a detriment to his cause. 
Over and over again the papers and periodicals stated that Hughes was 
the popular choice of the people; that they, the voters, were interested in 
electing a "••• man brave, wise, honest, independent, and strong enough to 
132 
grapple successfully with whatever issues may arise. 11 Or as another 
writer phrased it 
• • • the people were contident that Mr. 
Hughes would not fail to meet any situation 
involving our Nation's dignity and honor 
with an intelligence, a oourage, a spirit 
and a disregard of consequences to himself 
equal to that of Mr. Root, or of Mr. Roose-
velt or of any other livin .American.l33 
o. 
131. 
132. Ibid. 
ug es an T e Progress ves. e Na on, May , , • 
"Nobody For Hughes."~ North Aiiierican Review,May 1916, 
133. Editorials: 
news found: 
" 
"Hughes-Why. "~~r rg~:h:~egt1May 29, 1916, 329; similar ~ughes and t o • The Nation, May 26,1916,529; 
n 
38 
one periodical made an interesting report of the favorable attitude of the 
voters toward the candidacy of Hughes as expressed by them in letters sent 
134 
to twenty nine leading newspapers throughout the country. Early in May 
one leading Democrat wrote: 
The Roosevelt tide has receded and that 
of Hughes is advancing. Roosevelt has 
overplayed his hand and the reaction has 
set in. He may be nominated but it does 
not look like him today.l35 
Polls taken in Congress and in legislative and political groups in various 
sections of the country reported results in favor of Hughes yet the limita-
tions of these polls were so evident that the results gave scant indications 
136 
of the will of the voters. 
While the supporters of Roosevelt were claiming victory for him the 
friends of Hughes were making the same claim for the Justice. Those who 
argued for the nomination of Hughes favored him because they were of the 
opinion that he was the most popular choice among all classes of the nation~ 
that he had proven himself a highly efficient executive and competent 
leader, that he would act as a harmony candidate who would heal the breach 
137 
of 1912 and reunite the Republican Party~ that the people wanted him 
because he did not want to run, and that "• •• on issues growing out of the 
39 
.A.lthough the views of Hughes remained unknown it was assumed that the Justice 
vrould not consider an invitation to l-eave the bench and make a campaign for 
the Presiden~ if he were not as strongly opposed to the policies and 
139 
methods of President Wilson as was Roosevelt. 
However, granted that Hughes had a. good chance of winning the nomin-
ation the question still remained, Would he accept the nomination? While 
his silence had been interpreted to mea.h his acquiescence, yet it was 
generally agreed that he would withdraw from the contest or refuse the 
nomination if an "••. unseemly struggle for delegates occurs in which a 
Justice of the Supreme Court would be made to appear as a contestant" wrote 
140 
one political writer. It was believed that if Roosevelt opposed him the 
141 
Justice would withdraw. 
Early in May the group knovm as the 'Old Guard' came out into the open 
and entered the campaign in an active way. Opening headquarters in the city 
of New York they set about to accomplish their purpose, namely, to dominate 
the Convention in June, to have their candidate or one who was agreeable to 
them nominated in Chicago, and to defeat the Democrats in November. Elihu 
Root was their choice as the Presidential candidate even though they were 
aware that although he was popular and well received in the East, be was 
looked upon with disfavor by the voters of the territory west of the 
142 
Allegheny Mouta.a.ins. During the first months of 1916 the 'Old Guard' had 
138. "A Ballot of Republicans in Congress." The American Review of Reviews, 
June 1916, 726. --- --
139. Ed.i toria.l: "Need of a Positive Attitude." The .American Review of 
Reviews, June 1916, 648-649. 
140. ~e Chicago Daily Tribune, May 23, 1916. 
141. The Christian Science MOnitor, May 31, 1916. 
142. The Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribune, 
May 7 ,1916; and New~ Tribune, May 4, lS,J:'S, l916. 
~---------~40 
been confident that any Republican candidate would be victorious in the 
election in November, but it had been the opinion of many that this attitude 
143 
was a sheer bluff. The 'Old Guard' must have been aware that oilly 
Roosevelt or Hughes could defeat President Wilson. However, defeat of the 
Democratic administration and a victory for the Republican Party was their 
sole goal. They well knew that it was absolutely necessary to have the 
votes of the Progressive group apd in order to be assured of this they had 
announced a straightforward platfor.m thereby hoping to secure the support 
of Roosevelt and the Progressives whom they felt were more anxious to defeat 
the Democratic administration than to enter the political arena as a third 
144 
party. If they oould eliminate Roosevelt as a contender for the Presi-
dency and at the same time be assured of the support of the Progressives 
they hoped to convince the Convention that Elihu Root muld be the man to 
145 
bring victory to the Republican Party in November. To attain their end 
they had maneuvered and manipulated, had pitted Hughes against Roosevelt, 
hoping thereby to eventually eliminate both men and to be able '00 put up 
146 
their own candidate. 
However, when it became so evident that the voters of the nation were 
showing a decided interest in both Roosevelt and Hughes, the'Old Guard' 
became so concerned that secret conferences were held and plans were re-
organized. Since they were unwilling to accept Roosevelt their only alterna-
tive was to be content with Hughes. However, if Roosevelt could be elimin-
143. New York Tribune, May 15, 1916. 
144. Editorial: "Roosevelt and the Progressives." The North American Review, 
June 1916, 801; New York Tribune, May 24, 19l"B";and The Christian 
Science Monitor, May"S'r," 1916. -
145. New York Tribune, May 2, 1916. 
146. "E'Crrtor1a1"i'""'Wli'"o1s Back of Hughes, the People or the Old Guard?" Current 
0 inion June 1916 32 
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ated and Hughes did withdraw, the stage would be set to their liking, yet 
if Hughes did not withdraw they would be forced to accept the Justice 
"••• with appropriate relief in escaping Roosevelt but with misgivings of 
147 
the future..," was the opinion of one newspaper man. The 'Old Guard' 
seemingly was alarmed. With the Convention so near and with the poli tioal 
situation practically the same as it had been at the outset they could be 
definitely sure of only one thing, namely, they were quite certain of the 
support of the delegates from the state of New York and this was a point in 
their favor, for w.i thout the support of the pivotal state of New York it 
148 
was felt that neither Roosevelt nor Hughes could win the nomination. 
On the eve of the Convention the Republican Party was definitely 
divided into three factions, each with its chosen candidate, each working 
desperately to assure victory for its chosen leader. MOst assuredly the 
delegates and political leaders must have entrained for Chicago with mixed 
apprehensions as to the outcome of the Convention. 
147. The Chicago Daily Tribune.., May 23, 1916. 
148. New York Tribune, May l5, 24, 1916. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROGRESSIVE AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS 
Before considering the interesting subject, the political conventions, 
a survey of the nation as to political thought and economic conditions 
seamed to be in order. A review of the newspapers and periodicals of May 
and June had led one to believe that the people~ the actual voters of the 
nation, were not extremely interested in the conventions nor in the election 
in November. More space was given to other news items, mainly to the 
disturbing affairs in Mexico and in Europe. ~ither these, by their very 
nature, were of more vital concern to the people or else the citizenry, 
having the 'steam roller' efforts of 1912 still fresh in their minds were 
aware that the political leaders of the parties would run the Conventions 
to suit their ovn1 plans. Then, too, the primaries had failed to play the 
part expected of them, owing to the fact that neither Roosevelt nor Hughes 
1 
had permitted his name to be placed on these state primaries. Throughout 
the nation and especially in the Middle West there seemed to be a feeling of 
apathy, a lack of interest in the approaching political Conventions to be 
2 
held in Chicago. 
l."Issues and Men." Current Opinion, June 1916 1 380. 
2. Fred Davenport. ''Political 'Ihinking in the Middle West." The Outlook, May 
31, 1916, 266-269; editorial. "Is the Country in a Heroio~od." The 
American Review::.£ Reviews, June 1916, 650. 
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The reasons for this feeling were not difficult to find. The nation 
was experiencing an era of prosperity, was enjoying the benefits derived 
3 
43 
£rom high wages and flourishing business conditions. The general consensus 
seemed to be that business was striding forward at a great pace; wages were 
increasing rapidly; workers were in great demand, in fact, the demand over-
balanced the supply; domestic consumers were buying heavily; and the nation 
4 
and the workers were benefiting from an era of increased prosperity. 
Whether this prosperity was real or would disappear with the cessation of 
5 
the war in Europe was a mooted question. However, a prosperous, well-fed 
nation of people was not likely to become overwhelmingly interested in a 
political battle. 
The voters may have been disinterested b?t not the throngs which 
traveled to Chicago to view or to participate in the political drama that 
was scheduled to begin on June 7. Days before the doors of the Coliseum 
opened for the Republicans and the portals of the Auditorium swung back to 
welcome the Progressives the lobbies of the Michigan Avenue hotels were 
thronged with the politically minded; not only with the important leaders 
whose sincere hope it was that a conciliation between the members of the two 
parties oould be effected, but likewise, with the lesser political figures 
6 
who may or may not have known what it was all about. 
----·---------------------------------3. Editorials in The Christian Science MOnitor, May 5, 12, and 28, 1916; 
editorial: "An~a o£ High Prices." The American Review of Reviews, May 
1916, 533-535. --- --
4. Editorial: "The Golden Egg." The New Republic, May 27 1 1916, 79-80. 
5. Theodore Price. "American Busines"S'"'as Af'fected by Peace and Preparedness~' 
The Outlook, May 24, 1916, 225-229. 
6. The Chicago Daily Tribune. June 1-6, 1916; and Chicago Examiner, June 
1-6, 1916. 
On the eve of the Conventions several writers expressed their view-
points as to the emotional attitudes of the delegates and their political 
parties. One wrote: 
The Republican Party is f'i ghting within 
itself for its soul, for a policy and 
a leadership of national altruism and 
power i'ul Amari cani sm. 
44 
Another stated that the party was "••• disunited, distracted, and demoral-
is ad ••• " and was " ••• without any definite policy or coherent program •••• " 
7 
while a third saw the whole situation as an example of 'Republican :f'umbli~ 
In the week prior to the opening of the conventions the newspapers 
were filled with articles favoring the nomination of Justice Hughes and 
impetus was given to his cause by the announcement made by the Executive 
Committee of the Progressive Party. It reported that the Progressive Party 
was ready to support the Justice on two conditions, first, if the Republican 
Party absolutely refused to nominate Colonel Roosevelt; and second, if the 
Justice made a declaration of his principles immediately upon his acceptance 
of the Republican nomination and that these principles proved him to be in 
sympathy with the principles of Americanism for which the Progressives under 
8 
Roosevelt's leadership had been fighting. While the friends of Hughes 
viewed this announcement as a good omen, those less friendly interpreted 
it otherwise. It was known that the Justice was not likely to make any 
public statements until after June 13, at which time he was scheduled to 
make reports on important cases before the Supreme Court and since the 
7 • "Eve of Conventions." Viewpoints of various newspapermen as given in 
Current Opinion. June 1916, 380. 
a. George Harvey. Editorial: "The Republican Party." The North American 
Review, June 1916, 802; similar statement in Chica~Herald, June 5,1916; 
and The Christ a Science Monitor 5 
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progressives had definitely stated that they would not take him unless he 
did express his views it was believed that the Progressives were hoping, 
9 
therefore, to force the Republioans to take the Colonel. 
A friendly spirit was exhibited between those working for the Justice 
and t~hose working for the Colonel, a spirit that resulted in several con-
10 
ferences at which both groups outlined their aims. While the Progressives 
clearly stated their aims, their principles, and their loyalty to Roosevelt 
as the Presidential candidate the Republioans were less oommital, stating 
only that it was their hope that if the Republican Party adopted a sincere, 
straightforward platform and nominated a man "••. equal to the important 
tasks which will confront the next President ••• " the Progressives would lend 
11 
their support. The Republican leaders agreed to send a copy of their 
party platform to the Progressive leaders and both parties agreed, at these 
informal meetings, to consider the possibility of a oompromise candidate 
12 
other than HUghes or Roosevelt. About this time rumors to the effect 
that Roosevelt was definitely committed to the idea of running as third 
party candidate if the Republicans refused to nominate him began to be oir-
oulated but they had no foundation for at no time had Roosevelt made a 
d 13 irect statement to that effect. 
9. The Chicago Dail~ Tribune, June 51 1916; and Chicago Herald, June 51 1916 
lO.Earnest Abbott. Postscript." The Outlook, June 7, l916, 356; New York 
Tribune, June 5, 1916; The Chicafo Daily Tribune, June 3, 1916:-These 
conferences included su~epubl can leaders as: B. Penrose, J.Dwight, 
wm. McKinley, Charles Rilles, and Senator Lodge; also such Progressive 
leaders as: George Perkins, Oscar Davis, and George Meyer. 
ll.Editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1916; similar state-
ments in: The-chicago Daily Tribune, May 29 and June 6, 1916. 
l2.New York trrbune, June 6, 1916. 
l3.New "ff'rlC Tribune, June 5, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, June 51 
l916; The- Chica~o Daily Tribune, May 29,19l6; "At the Chicago Conventions" 
~~ RepublfO, June 7, 1916, 164; and Oscar K.Davis, Released for 
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These conferences while promoting an amicable spirit between the two 
political parties caused strife within the Progressive ranks for those 
more radically minded were greatly disturbed by the actions of their leader, 
George Perkins, because in their opinion he was making too many efforts to 
placate the Republicans. On June 6, seventeen state delegates met and 
informed Perkins that they had not come to Chicago to be •supinely 
acquiescent• in what the Republicans might wish to do and it was their 
opinion that the Progressive Party should conduct its convention without 
14 
reference to the Republican convention. Governor Johnson of California, 
likewise, issued a statEment to the effect that "••. he was not in favor 
of dickering with the Republican chiefs on any basis but the nomination of 
Roosevelt. There is but one logical outcome to the situation confronting 
the Republican and Progressive Conventions. It Mr. Wilson is defeated or 
ought to be defeated it will be on the clear out, definite issue of pre-
paredness and Americanism. This issue has been made by one man - Theodore 
15 
Roosevelt.'' Perkins had the double task of making friendly overtures to 
the Republican leaders and, at the same time, restraining the wishes of the 
more radical Progressives who preferred party defeat to a fusion with the 
16 
Republican group. 
Publication, Houghton Mifflin and Co., New York, 1925, 449. 
14. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 6, 1916; similar viewpoints expressed 
rn-New York Tribune, June 5, 1916, and Chicago Sundal Herald, June 4, 
19ls:-
15. Chicago Sunday Herald, June 4, 1916 
16. Chicago Sunday Herald, June 4, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 6, 
7, 1916; and ~ ~ Tribune, M:ay 29-;'T916. 
47 
The 'Old Guard', the group which because of its overwhelming power 
had controlled the Republican Convention of 1912, was in Chicago and, in 
the opinion of some of this group was determined to rule the Convention of 
17 
1916. 1~ether it could or not was problematic. In the first place it 
was at a disadvantage because it could not advance a popular candidate, and 
the one prominent figure, Justice Hughes, it was unwilling to sponsor 
18 
because it knew it could not control him. Just what plan or program 
the 'Old Guard' intended to adopt at the Convention was never revealed by 
its leaders, at least, not officially to the press of the day. Though 
silent, and non-committal these leaders nourished a slim hope that if they 
could play Roosevelt against Hughes, the convention might be split in two, 
thereby offering the 'Old Guard' the opportunity to bring forth as an 
alternative their candidate, Elihu Root, or one of the more popular 
19 
'favorite sons.' If the above events came to pass then it could be justly 
said that the 'Old Guard' managed the Convention, however, one old member 
of this seasoned political group expressed the opinion that the delegates to 
20 
the Convention of 1916 could not be managed. This Convention was differ-
ent from the one held in 1912 not only because a majority of the delegates 
had come uninstructed but also because of the nine hundred and eighty six 
delegates present only one hundred and seventy five had been to the earlier 
17. Editorial: "Republioan Possibilities." The Outlook, June 7,1916,301 
18. ~·J also Chicago Herald, June 6 1 19l~The Christian Science Monitor, 
June 5, 1916. 
19. Abbott, loc.~., 419. Some viewpoints found in~ Chicago Dail{ 
Tribune, June 5, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 191 ; 
and Chicago Sunday Herald; June 4, 1916. 
20. Earnest AbbOtt. "The Progressives at Chicago." The Outlook, June 21, 
1916, 419. ---
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: convention and, therefore, the convention was less likely to be influenced 
21 
by the old leaders. Then too, the new method of selecting delegates by 
vote at the primaries, adopted in some states, had lessened the power the 
political leaders usually had exercised in the selection of the delegates, 
22 
although not as effectively as had been hoped. A scathing, bitter denun-
oiation of the 'Old Guard' was made by one, an admirer of Colonel Roosevelt, 
~ saw the Republican convention of 1916 as one that was definitely con-
trolled by the all powerful bosses of the party and he viewed the convention 
not as a body of men free to act as they were instructed or in the manner 
they deemed wisest but rather as pawns in a game, a game the plays of which 
had been quietly worked out by those unseen political leaders of the 'Old 
23 
Guard'. 
On June 7 the Republican National Convention was called to order by 
24 
the temporary chairman, Warren G. Harding of Ohio. Almost one thousand 
delegates from all parts of the nation were gathered to deliberate upon the 
selection of a Presidential candidate for their party. The group while 
divided as to its choice of a candidate expressed a feeling of unanimity on 
one point, namely, that the man chosen to be the candidate must be one who 
was a party man and the delegates were determined not to choose a man from 
25 
outside the party. These delegates appeared to the members of the press 
in several divergent roles, for while one called the assemblage a heartening 
21. Editorial "The National Conventions."~ North American Review, July 
1916, 1. 
22. Editorial "Chicago, The Political Focus." The American Review of 
Reviews, June 1916, 643. 
23. Editorial «Republican Possibilities." The Outlook, June 7,1916, 301-302. 
24. Daily accounts of this convention founarin The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
June 8-11,1916; Chicago Herald, June 8-11,1916; also consulted New York 
Tribune, June 8Qll, 1916; and The Christian Science MOnitor,Jun~l~ 
25. Fred Davenport. "Two Chicago Conventions." The Outlook,June 21,1916,419 
49 
sight made up of men who were "••• obviously of sires who held their 
26 
Freeman's Oath as no less sacred than their religious faith ••• ," another 
writer saw the convention as a group of serious, determined delegates, not 
•handpicked' but delegates who were "••• men of' substance and of assured 
party position who would have the party point of view, and who would not by 
s.ny manner of means be stampeded to anybody who was not a party Republican 
27 
" •••• 
Others viewed the delegates in a less favorable light, as a docile 
group composed of' "~ •• politicians great and small to whom party regularity 
28 
was the breath of' their nostrils •••• " or as "••• a gathering together of' 
distributed privileges, o£ tariff-protected manufacturers, business lawyers, 
and pillars of society from all over the union. It was the quintessence of' 
all that is commonplace, machine made, complacent and arbitrary in American 
29 Life;" or as a gathering of politicians who had not erased the disastrous 
30 
events of 1912 from their memories. 
On the first day of the Convention quietly and without much enthusiasm 
or fanfare followed the usual procedure of convention routine under the 
experienced guidance of such prominent leaders as Smart, Crane, Watson, 
26. 
Harold Howland. "The Conventions at Chicago." ~ Independent,· June 
19, 1916, 476; Walter Lippmann. "At The Chicago Conventions." The New 
Republic, June 17, 1916, 163; and Chicago~~. June 7, 1916.---
Editorial "The National Conventions." The NOrth American Review, July 
1916, 1. 
27. Davenport, loc.oit., 419 
28. Howland, lo~it., 476 
29. Lippmann,Toc.oJ.t., 164. 
30. P..obert Mccoriiifok."' "The Next President." ~ Century, June 1916, 161 
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garding, Penrose, and Lodge. Senator Harding gave the keynote address in 
which he stressed the need for forgetting the differences of 1912, for 
reuniting the groups, and for "••• rededicating here and now the Republican 
32 
party to the progress and glo~J of the Republic •••• 11 A long speech in 
which he covered such national problems as national defense, protective 
3 tariff, business conditions, national expansion, and foreign relationships. 
According to the newspapers the speech aroused little enthusiasm from the 
audience, a fine speech, polished and repolished, written so as to hurt no 
34 
one except President Wilson and a speech definitely aimed at peace. In 
the opinion of one reporter the speech, while splendid, was not outstanding 
and the reception given it by the delegates indicated that any chance that 
34 
Harding might have had of becoming the convention's 'dark horse' disappeared 
On the same day the Progressive Party opened its National Convention 
a.t the Auditorium.. The tone of its meeting was quite different from that of 
36 
the Republicans. The Progressive convention was 'all soul' wrote one, 
an assembly which was eager, alive, earnest, and as "••. solid a body of 
37 
idealists as ever assembled •••• " reported another. Not only was the 
convention different in spirit but also in purpose. The Progressive dele-
gates, uncontrolled and unbossed, were fired by a singleness of purpose; 
31. Meyers, 31. 
32. Republican Camp~ign Textbook, 1916. Issued by Republican National 
Committee, Washington, 19l6, 20. 
33. Ibid., 20-29. 
34. ~Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 1916; Chicago He~, June 8, 1916. 
35. Cliicago Herald, June 8, 1916. 
36. bavenport. loc.cit., 420. 
37. Earnest Abbott.-wprogressives at Chicago." The Outlook, June 21,1916, 
423. Same vim7 held by Davis, 449. ----
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they knew vmat they wanted and they proposed to get it. They were determi 
to nominate Roosevelt, and they were ready to put themselves behind him 
again and to wage another bitter, heartbreaking £ight on behalf of the 
38 
things he represented and in which they believed. 
On the first day the Progressives, too, followed the usual routine 
progrrun of a convention. Temporary Chairman Robbins delivered a brilliant 
and persuasive speech in whiCh he reiterated and reviewed the purposes 
39 
and the plans of the party. That the Convention solidly agreed with him 
and was enthusiastically in favor of Colonel Roosevelt was evidenced by the 
noisy and long de.monstration, lasting one hour and a half, which inter-
40 
rupted the keynote speech of Robbins. How to accomplish their set purpose 
caused a rift in the convention. One group, the irreconcilables, was 
enthusiastically determined to nominate Roosevelt, adopt a platfo~, and go 
41 
home without paying any attention to the actions of the Republicans. 
The other group led by George Perkins, realizing the importance of a reunion 
of the two factions if Wilson was to be defeated in November, counseled 
moderation and deliberation. It planned to arrange conferences with the 
leaders of the Republican Party hoping, thereby, to bring the two conven-
tions to an agreement as to the choice of a Presidential candidate. 
Officially the Progressives closed their first meeting without giving their 
sanction to these conferences, nevertheless, an unofficial meeting was held 
38. Howland, loc.cit., 4761 and Lippmann, loc.cit., 165. 
39. Meyers, 4n; C!ircago Herald, June 8 1 l'm;~e Chicago Daily Tribune; 
and Howland, Ioc.cit., 476. 
40. The Chicago Darfy-,ribune, June 8, 1916; Chicago Herald, June 8 1 1916; 
and AbbOtt, loc.cit., 424. 
41. Howland, loc.cit:-;-476; Abbott, loo.~., 424; ~Chicago Daily 
Tribune, June 7, 1916; and Chicago Examiner, June 7, 1916 
rr 42 
, that night. Nothing was actually accomplished for the Progressives 
continued to insist upon their candidate and while the Republican leaders 
quite definitely refused to consider him they did show a willingness to 
43 
discuss a compromise candidate wh? would be agreeable to both parties. 
In their second meeting the more radical Progressives again tried to 
52 
force the nomination of Roosevelt but Perkins prevailed upon them to wait, 
and finally these recalcitrants agreed to the selection of a committee 
composed of George Perkins, Charles Bonaparte, Horace Wilkinson, Governor 
Hirem Johnson, and John M. Parker, which group was to meet and confer with 
44 
a similar Committee from the Republican convention. The Progressive 
convention after tabling a report on their platform adjourned in order to 
give the joint Committee ample time in which to confer and again in the 
45 
evening the convention reassembled but accomplished nothing. 
The Republicans, in their meeting on Thursday, continued their routine 
schedule. First, approval was given to the seating of the delegates, then 
the temporary organization was made pennanent, and Senator Harding became 
46 
the Chairman of the convention. After the report of the Rules Committee 
had been adopted and while waiting for the report from the Committee on 
Resolutions several leading Republicans, Depew, Cannon, and Senator Borah, 
gave lengthy and 1 timefilling' speeches. Finally the convention adjourned 
tf. Chicago Herald, June a, 1916; and ~ York Tribune, June a, 1916. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Davis, 449; Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916; and ,!!:! Chicago Daily 
Tribune, June 9, 1916. 
45. Rowland, loc.oit., 476; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 91 1916. 
46. Accounts o"f""'"tliTs meeting fou'iid""in The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 
1916; and Chicago Herald, June 9, 19I'6. 
53 
until the afternoon at which time Senator Lodge read the platform for the 
party. This platform, while receiving the close attention of the delegates, 
tailed to arouse any controversial discussion and was unanimously adopted 
47 
by the convention. In the platform the Republican Party committed itself 
to a policy which guaranteed protection of every American citizen "••• in 
all the rights secured him by the Constitution ••• ," a policy in which the 
party, while denouncing the administration for the methods it had used in 
handling the Mexican situation pledged itself to aid in restoring order and 
maintaining peace in Mexico; and, likewise, reaffir.med its approval of the 
' Monroe Doctrine, and indicated that it favored those efforts which would 
bring the United States into closer relationships with the countries of 
48 
South America. The party went on record as favoring "••• an adequate and 
complete policy of national defense ••• , a sufficient and effective regular 
ar.my ••• ,"and a strong and well prepared navy, capable of defending both 
coasts. The plank on the tariff definitely reiterated the party's faith in 
a protective tariff "••• to American industries and American labor ••• " and 
stressed the need for a creation of a tariff commission. The party believed 
in "••• encouraging business and will seek to advance all American interests 
•••" and, therefore, advocated the building of an adequate, privately owned 
merchant marine. Other items favored by the Republicans included the 
control by the Federal government of the transportation system; the enforce-
ment of Civil Service laws, and "••• all Federal laws passed for the pro-
47. Ibid.; and Howland, loc.cit., 477. 
48. ~lican C~paign ~tOOOk, 1916, 48-52. The entire account of the 
platfor.m was taken from this source. 
tection of labor;" and "••• the extension of the suffrage to women but 
recognized the right of each State to settle this question by itself." 
54 
In conclusion the platfonn made an appeal to all Americans "••. to prove to 
the world that we are Americans in thought and in deed, with one loyalty, 
one hope, one aspiration ••• " and called upon the citizens to be true to the 
"••• great traditions of their common oountry and above all things, to 
keep the faith." 
The platform was clear and scholarly in tone and "••• showed an honest 
effort to include those policies of the Progressive Party that were 
possible of acceptance by all Republicans of whatever factions" wrote one 
49 
historian. Another WTiter, while expressing a like belief, felt that 
the platfor.m had failed to express views sharp and strong enough, and, 
therefore, it would be up to the candidate to put the necessary vigpr and 
50 
vitality into it. The plank favoring woman suffrage was considered a 
victory although only a partial one since each state was given the final 
decision in the matter which fact was, in itself, a noteworthy item since 
it was the first time a Republican platform had carried a "••• straightaway 
51 
state right plank." Universal training, prohibition, and arms embargo 
52 
were three planks which failed to be written into the platform. 
After the adoption of the platform Chairman Harding read the request 
fram the Progressive convention which invited the Republicans to appoint a 
49. Meyers, 420. 
50. Davenport, loc.cit., 422. 
51. The Chicago~IY:Tribune, June 9 1 1916. 
52. Ibid. 
-
0 CJII]Illittee which was to confer with a like committee from the Progressive 
convention. Being agreeable to the request the Republicans selected 
senators Smoot and Borah, William Murray Crane, A. Johnson, and Nicholas 
53 
Murray Butler to serve on the Joint Committee. Before the afternoon 
session adjourned the convention agreed to give voting privileges to the 
six delegates from Ha•vaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands which 
55 
increased the convention to 989 delegates and the necessary plurality for 
54 
a nomination became 495 votes. 
The CoiiDlli ttees from the two conventions met in a three hour conference 
55 
but failed to reach an agreement. The Progressives remained firm in 
their conviction that Roosevelt was " ••• the one man on whom the tvro parties 
56 
could unite logically and with hope of success," WTOte one reporter, 
and the Republicans refusing to consider him stated that no progress could 
be made until the Progressives were reaqy to eliminate him and were willing 
t d . th .bl • 57 o ~scuss o er poss~ e nom2nees. The Progressives were unwilling to 
commit themselves until they had reported back to their Convention, and, 
58 
also, until they had received a message from the Colonel at Oyster Bay. 
It can not be stated that all matters of' importance ware decided by 
the delegates in the convention halls. Too many group meetings of' the 
leaders before and during the conventions were held privately in the hotels 
53. Meyers, 420; and Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily 
Tribune, June 9, 1916. 
54. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916. 
55. Meyers, 420; Chicago EXaminer, June 9, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily 
Tribune, June 9, 1916. 
56. Howland, loc.cit., 477 
57. The Chicagp-nii!y Tribune, June 9, 1916 
58. Ibid. 
56 
80 that as one writer bitterly expressed it, the delegates were "••• but 
pawns and pieces ••• " and the real players were not at the Conventions but 
59 
at the Blackstone Hotel where the real game "... is being played." In 
one of these combined conferences there was proposed a suggestion that 
Colonel Roosevelt be invited to Chicago to address the conventions separate 
or at a joint session and to present a peace pact. It would be necessary 
however for the Colonel not only to declare himself out of the race for the 
nomination, but also ready to enter into an agreement on the selection of 
60 
a Republican candidate. William. Jackson, Republican from Maryland, 
acting upon his own initiative sent a telegram. to the Colonel in which he 
outlined the plan. Roosevelt in his reply to Jackson stated: 
In answer to your telegram., I can only say 
that the matter lies with the Republican 
Convention, and that if the Convention 
desires me to address it I shall be glad to 
do so. 
I very earnestly hope that the Republicans 
and Progressives assembled at Chicago will 
keep steadily in mind the gravity of the 
crisis not only for America but for the 
world, and the need that their action in 
dignity, foresight, and patriotism, shall 
rise level to the crisis. 
I hope their aim will not be merely to 
nominate a man who can be elected next 
Nove.mber but a man of such powerful character, 
steadfast convictions, and proved ability, 
that if elected, he will again place the 
nation where it belongs by making it true to 
itself, and therefore, true to all mankind.61 
59. Ernest Abbott, "Postscript." The Outlook, June 10, 1916, 356. Similar 
reports of group meetings founa-in Chicago Herald, June 8, 1916/ 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 9, 1916; and New York Tribune, June 
s;-1916. --
so. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 1916. 
61 • .!!:2. Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916. 
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The Colonel expressed his personalviews in regard to the policies of 
president ·Wilson and in his conclusion he carefully evaded a direct answer 
62 
to the question "Would he withdraw from the Presidential race?" 
In the session on Friday, the names of the various Presidential candi-
dates were presented to the Republican Convention; the names of Hughes, 
Roosevelt, and the 'favorite sons' vihich included Root, Burton, Weeks, 
Coleman, Dupont, Sherman, Fairbanks, Cummins, La Follette, and Governor 
63 
Brumbaugh. Before the balloting co~nenced the convention listened to a 
report from the Joint Committee but since the Committee had not reached a 
conclusion there was nothing upon which the Convention could £\ct. 
The voting began and the results of the first and second ballots 
indicated that the Convention did not know whom it wanted nor had it a 
Presidential candidate whom it was ready and eager to nominate. The second 
ballot differed little fram the first except that Governor Brumbaugh of 
Pennsylvania had withdrawn his name in favor of Roosevelt. The results of 
the ballots were: 
lst 
, 
Burton •••••••• 772 
Cummins ••••••• 85 
Dupont •••••••• 12 
Fairbanks ••••• 7~ 
Hughes ••••••• 25~ 
2nd 
7~ 
85 
13 
as* 324 
lst 
La Follette •••••••••• 25 
Roosevelt •••••••••••• 103 
Sherman •••••••••••••• 66 
·weeks •••••••••••••••• J.05 
Some scattering votes 64 
2nd 
25 
98i 
65 
79 
The group sponsoring Justice Hughes tried to force a third ballot but was 
blocked by the various factions backing the 1 favorite sons.' This situation 
quite pleased the 'Old Guard' for they were confident that if the vot:iing 
62. Ibid 
63. ll:eports of this meeting found in The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10, 
1916; Chicago Examiner, June 10, !9!6; Howland, loc.cit:;-475; and 
"The National Conventions." The North American Revfsw; July,l916, 2-4 
64. Ibid. 
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58 rr ~ ?[OUld remain scattered among the 1 fe.vorite sons' there would be a hope that 
after the sixth ballot the Justice would be forced out and then they could 
come forwe.rd. unite on a 'favorite son' or a 'dark horse', dominate the 
65 
convention and the nomination, reported one paper. The delegates realized 
the graveness of the situation. sensed that the only hope for success lay 
"••• in a union be~~een the warring factions of the party •••• " wrote one 
66 
reported. The Convention. therefore, decided to adjourn in order to allow 
the Joint Connni ttee the opportunity to meet once again and renew its dis-
cussions. 
Meanwhile in their Friday session the Progressive delegates had 
listened to the report of the Joint Committee and they felt encouraged not 
only because the Republicans had no candidate of their own to suggest but. 
also, because the Republican leaders had brought forth no arguments to ans-
67 
wer the claims of the Progressives for the nomination of Roosevelt. 
waiting to learn how the Republicans received the report of the Joint 
Committee the Progressives listened to a report on their party platform and 
68 
then carefully discussed it plank by plank. In an eloquent and forcible 
manner the platform enumerated the aims of the party and reiterated the 
69 
principles upon which it had been founded in 1912. It stated that the 
United States in its place among the nations of the world was subject to 
65. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10, 1916. 
66. Tile' Chicago Daiiy Tribune, June 10, 1916. 
67. Ernest Abbott. 11 The Progressives at Chicago."~ Outlook. June 21,1916, 
4"2"5. 
68. Howland, 1oc.cit., 476 
69. The folloWing-resume of the Progressive platform was taken from the 
Chicago Herald, June 9• 1916. 
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certain basic duties, namely: "To secure the rights and equal treatment of 
our citizens, native or naturalized, on land or sea, without regard to race, 
creed, or nativity; to guard the honor and uphold the just influence of 
our nation; and to maintain the integrity of international law." With so 
ma,ny of the European nations at war it was the duty of our goven2ment to 
seek to keep peace, but not a "••• peace at the price of submission ••• " for 
there must be "••• an unfaltering determination and a prepared ability to 
defendour rights and to fulfill our international obligations." Regarding 
the situa.tion in M:exico the platform stated that the disorders in our 
neighboring country had "• •• brought conditions worse than warfare ••• 11 and 
had weakened "••. our national self respect." One of the foremost national 
concerns was the "••• adequate provision for the common defense ••• " and 
that this task should be shouldered by those who had an "••• undivided 
allegiance to America ••• ," a determination to keep "••• America's great 
heritage and traditions unfal terlng in the first place." In order to 
further this plan for preparedness there must be a navy restored to "••• at 
least second rank in battle efficiency; a regular army of 250,000 men;" 
"••• a system of military training adequate to organize vdth promptness 
•••" and "••• behind that first line of the army and navy a citizen soldiery 
supplied, armed, and controlled by the national government." 
Once again the Progressives wrote down their principles of social 
justice, namely, the passage of a child labor law, the extension of the 
workmen's compensation law, and the removal of the artificial causes of the 
high cost of living. In order to further the cause of social justice it 
would be necessary to insure prosperity for both business and industry. 
60 
ThiS could be done by the regulation of business "••• so as to promote its 
growth and prosperity ••• " with a just distribution of its returns and a 
healthy expansion of foreign trade. The Progressives favored the conserva-
tion and and development of our natural resources; the reestablishment of a 
merchant marine; the development of interstate national highways; the 
establishment of a "••• a new standard of governmental efficiency through a 
complete civil service system ••• ;" the creation of a permanent, expert 
tariff commission with a view of intelligently and scientifically adjusting 
of the tariff, so as to build up rather than to destroy American business; 
and a protective tariff which was esse~tial to the nation's prosperity. 
Th~platfor.m was not a proposal of new principles but rather a plea that 
there be an urgent and immediate performance of these principles by the 
citizens of the nation and by their leader who should be a man capable of 
directing the execution of these national needs. 
On the issue of suffre.ge for women the platform stated: 
We believe that the women of the 
country who share with the men the 
burdens of the government in times 
of peace and make equal sacrifice in 
tii11.es of war, should be given the full 
political right of suffrage.70 
One significant incident in the reading of the platform was the pro-
posal of a plank favoring Prohibition. vVhile the Progressives after some 
discussion rejected the plank they did so not because they opposed the 
proposition but rather because they were fearful that such a plank would 
distract the attention of the voters from the real, paramount issues of the 
70. Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916 
7l 
political crumpaign. However when the members of the Convention were 
asked to indicate their personal belief in Prohibition a great majority 
72 
arose. 
61 
At the evening session the Progressives continued to do little but 
listen to reports by telephone of the actions of the Republican Convention. 
This procrastination angered Governor Johnson who in a passionate speech 
stated that he was not in accord with the plan of waiting, that he felt 
that the delegates had an "••• obligation to keep the Progressive faith 
intact •••• " and therefore he was in favor of the immediate nomination of 
73 
Roosevelt. While the Progressives were eager to nominate their candidate 
yet they were earnest in their desire to give the Republicans every chance 
0 0 'T4 
for considering Roosevelt as a candidate. Their hopes were bolstered 
when they learned that Brumbaugh had retired his name in favor of Roosevelt. 
After the Republicans had adjourned, following their second ballot, the 
Progressives, too, adjourned. 
Again on Friday night the Joint Committee met and after hours of 
discussion was unable to reach an agreement. By this time it had become 
evident that the Progressives would not give up Roosevelt and the Republican 
had, seemingly, quite decided upon the Justice. The Republicans were con-
fident that Roosevelt would not under any circumstances head another third 
Rarty ticket, confident because, in the opinion of one historian, they had 
n. :Bowland, loo.oit., 476; Ernest Abbott, "The Progressives at Chicago. II 
The Indepenaenf; June 21,1916, 426; The Chicago DailX Tribune, June 10, 
!9I6; and The Christian Science Moni":tOr, June 26, 916. 
72. Ibid. -
73. CliiC'ago Herald, June 10, 1916 
74. Abbott, loc.c~t., 426. 
75. Ibid. -- --
-
62 
76 
been furnished with information to that effect; and so, in their opinion, 
there vms no need to consider the Colonel as a fUsion candidate. 77 
Very early on Saturday morning affairs began to take more definite 
shape. At five o'clock theProgressive members of the Joint Committee 
received a message from Roosevelt in which he restated his views as he had 
expressed them in his telegr~ to Senator Jackson and to the surprise of 
many, the Colonel suggested that the name of Senator Lodge be offered as a 
78 
compromise candidate to both Conventions. The Republicans of the Joint 
Committee, likewise, cwne to a decision, namely, to present the name of 
. 79 
Justice Hughes to the Progressive -convention. 
When the Republican Convention convened later in the morning all 
hopes of reunion with the Progressives were gone and affairs moved rapidly. 
Roosevelt's communication suggesting Senator Lodge as a compromise candi-
date was tabled and the names of one 'favorite son' after another were 
80 
withdra,vn. At the end of the third roll-call the ballot indicated that 
Justice Hughes was to be the Presidential nominee for the Republican Party. 
The results were: 
Hughes ••••••• 
La Foll~e •••••• 
Lodge ••••••• 
Roosevelt •••••• 
Some scattered81 
94~ 
3 
7 
1~ 
On the next ballot the choice was made unanimous. Immediately after the 
nomination of Charles w. Fairbanks as the nominee for the Vice-Presidency 
ihe Convention adjourned. 82 
s. Davis, 449. 
77. Henry Pringle, mheodore Roosevelt,Harcourt,Brace & Co.New York,l931, 586 
78. lodge II, 486. Letter of Roosevelt to Conferees of Progressive Party, 
June 10,1916. 
~ Christian Science Monitor, June 12,1916. 
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Between the late hours on Friday and the morning hours on Saturday 
the majority of the delegates had swerved their allegiance to the Justice 
and no satisfactory written explanation for their sudden and overwhelming 
change of attitude could be found. "It seemed like a landslide or a stamped 
but it was more serious and thoughtful, with more of' deliberate purpose and 
conviction i'or great accomplishment than a mere stampede can imply," was 
83 
the opinion of' one historian. Another felt that the delegates had done 
the thing they had not wanted to do "• •• and their only consolation was that 
84 
the one thing they dreaded more had not been forced upon them." The 
Republicans had conducted their awn convention, nominated their own oandi-
date and, seemingly, had been little influenced by the presence or the 
tactics of the Progressives. Although they had been polite to them, and 
had attended the joint conferences, nevertheless, they had ignored the 
85 
Progressives was the opinion of' one historian. Yet that was not the true 
picture, for although the Progressives had been unable to convince the 
Republicans to accept: Roosevelt, still the "• •• nomination of' Hughes was in 
86 
itself a concession to progressivism," stated another writer. The 
Republicans were cognizant of the fact that victory in November would be 
impossible without the support of the Progressives and so they wisely chose 
not just any Republican but an able, independent candidate and, also, wrote 
80. Accounts of this meeting found in Chicago Sunday Herald, June 11, 1916; 
The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June ll, 19lo; The Christian Science Monitor, 
J'Uiie 12, 1916; Harold Howland, "The ConventTOiis at Chicago." The 
Independent, June 19, 1916, 480; and Meyers, 423. ---
81. Ibid. 
82. cnrcago Sunday Examiner, June 11, 1916. 
83. Newton Wyeth, Republican Principles and Policies, The Republican Press 
Company, Chicago, 1916, 217. ---
Howland, loc.cit., 480. 
Bishop II-;--:41-2-
Li mann 164 
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their most progressive platfor.m since 1860 with the hope that many of the 
£our million progressive voters of 1912 would line up with the Republican 
87 
£orcas in 1916, was the view expressed by journalists. The critical state 
o£ affairs in the nation and in the world, the widespread antipathy toward 
Colonel Roosevelt, and the inability of the followers of the various 
•favorite sons' to unite on one man were given as the reasons Why the 
Republicans finally chose to nonunate Justice Hughes as the candidate who 
88 
could best unite the divided forces of the Republican Party. 
Meanwhile at the Auditorium amid much excitement and emotional stress 
89 
the Progressives were continuing their Convention. The assemblage had 
learned that early in the morning Roosevelt had sent his message to the 
Joint Committee suggesting that Senator Lodge be considered as a compromise 
90 
candidate. The delegates resented the suggestion, could not understand why 
Roosevelt had made it; and so they tabled the suggestion, likewise, the one 
made by the Republican con£erees that the candidacy of Hughes be considered 
91 
by the Progressives. Once again the Conventionwaited in order to learn 
just what action was taking place at the Republican Convention. The Pro-
gressives, while extremely anxious to nominate their own candidate wanted 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
"Roosevelt." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 402; editorial: "A Word of 
Thanks to Mr. Roosevelt." The World's Work, August 1916, 371; 
"Rise of Hughes in PoliticS:W The AmeriCan Reviev1 of Reviews, July 1916 
3; and"The Nomination of HugheS:W The Nation, June:l5, 1916, 135. 
Ibid. -
Accounts of this meeting found in Ernest Abbott, "The Progressives at 
Chicago." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 423-427; Harold Howland, "The 
Convention"S'"at Chicago." The Independent, June 19, 1916, 475-480; 
Chicago Sunday Herald, June-11, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribuna, June 
11, 1916; The Christian Science 1~nitor;-June 12, 1916; and Joseph B. 
Bishop, Theoaore Roosevelt and His 'rime - As Shown in His Own Letters, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1920, 412. ----
Lodge II, 486; and The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 11, 1916. 
Howland, loc.cit., 478; and The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 11, 1916. 
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to make sure that they had kept faith with Roosevelt and had allowed the 
other Convention an opportunity to consider the Colonel's last proposal. 
When they were informed that the third ballot was being taken at the Coli-
seum the important question was put to the Progressives and at twelve 
thirty-one~ just two minutes before the Republicans had officially hominated 
Justice Hughes, the Progressives by acclamation chose Theodore Roosevelt as 
92 
their Presidential candidate. The Convention then adjoun1ed and at 
Three o'clock eagerly reassembled to receive a telephoned message from the 
Colonel. For two hours there was suspense while the routine of the Conven-
tion continued. Speeches were made, John M. Parker of Louisiana was nomin-
ated as candidate for the Vice-Presidency, pledges were subscribed to the 
campaign fund, and finally Roosevelt's reply was read. It stated: 
I am very grateful for the honor you have 
conferred upon me by nominating me as 
President. I can not accept it at this 
time. I do not lmow the attitude of the 
candidate of the Republican Party toward 
the vital questions of the day. Therefore, 
if you desire an immediate decision I must 
decline the nomination. But if you prefer 
it 1 I suggest the. t my condi t"ione.l refusal 
to run be placed in the hands of the Pro-
gressive National Committee. 
If Mr. Hughes' statements, when he makes 
them, shall satisfy the committee that it is 
for the interests of the country that he 
be elected they can act accordingly and 
treat my refusal as definitely accepted. 
If they are not satisfied they can so notify 
the Progressive Party and at the same time 
confer with me and then determine on whatever 
action we may severally deem a~~ropriate to 
meet the needs of the country. 
92. Abbott, loc.oit., 426; and The Chicago Sunday Tribuna, June 11, 1916. 
93. Bishop Ir;-412; and "A Presidential C~didatE; Nominated." The American 
Review~ Reviews, July 1916, 12. 
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It vvas not the unqualified acceptance they had dared in their exalta-
94 
tion to expect. "It fell like lead upon their exuberant spirits," wrote 
one reporter while another stated: "The foundations of their faith seemed 
95 
" svrept away • • • and it was a tragic sight to see an assemblage so crushed. 
They adjourned. Many left the Convention halls puzzled, disheartened, 
96 
overwhe~ned, and some were bitter, ever so bitter. Those who tried to 
justify the actions of the Colonel claimed that eventually the delegates 
97 
.auld appreciate how wise and foresighted the Colonel had been. That 
Roosevelt acted as he had because of the crisis facing the country, because 
of his intense hatred of the policies of Wilson's administration and his 
98 
keen desire for its defeat was the opinion of another. Once again the 
Progressives were split asunder for some of the MOose leaders, it was 
believed, would follow the Colonel while others, the irreconoilables, were 
99 
determined to keep the party intact. One Progressive leader appreciating 
that his FS-rty vms doomed said "••. we still have an opportunity for service 
in supporting Justice Hughes. I believe the great majority of the rank and 
100 
file of the oountry will fall in line." 
While it was believed that Roosevelt's action sounded the death knell 
for the Progressive Party yet high praise was given to the Colonel. Roosevel 
had ah~ys been a splendid leader, enthusiastic supporter of the party's 
94. Howland, loc,oit. 480 
95. Abbott, loc.oit., 426. 
96. ,ihe Chicago SWiday Herald, June 11, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribune, 
JUne 11, 1916; and The Christian Science M~tor, June 12, 1916. 
97. Howland, loc.cit., "48'0" -
98. Abbot~, loo.cit., 420 
99. ~ Chicarc; 15a'fly Tribu~, June 12, 1916; Chicago ~xa.miner, June 11,1916 
P.Orman Ray, An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics 
Charles Scribner's Sons, NewY<Ork, 1924, 34; and AbbOtt, loc.oit., • 
• Henry A. vVhi·te quoted in~ Chicago Daily Tribune, June 'i2; I9I6. 
principles~ and loyal to his followers; 
presented an opportunity to further the 
• but when the events of the hour 
"• •• true cause of Progressivism 
••• 
" he did not hesitate to accept the situation regardless of the effect 
101 
it might have upon himself was the opinion of one editor. The Colonel 
had to make sure that the hopes of the Progressive Party lay rather with 
67 
the support of the Republican candidate than with an insistence upon his own 
candidacy on a third ticket. In this editor's opinion~ Hughes in his 
letter of acceptance had enunciated the same principles for which Roosevelt 
had been so forcibly preaching and, therefore~ every sincere Progressive 
102 
could actively support the Justice. Similar viewpoints were taken by 
103 
those who openly approved of the decision made by the Colonel. 
The spectacular decision of Roosevelt did not piSS without some 
measure of censure being heaped upon the Colonel's head and upon the leaders 
of the party. "While it was felt that Roosevelt bad declined skillfully 
yet he had done so "••. without a note of comradeship for the men and women 
104 
who had adored him," wrote one who had been present a-t:; the Convention. 
In his opinion the leaders had fooled the delegates, had been unfair with 
tham~ had tried to use the Progressives as a threat and a bluff to force 
Roosevelt upon the Republicans~ and "••• everyone seamed to realize the 
105 
emptiness of the threat except the naive Progressive delegates." Granted 
that the Convention of the Progressive Party ended in an unexpedted manner 
lbi. Editorial: -The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 12~ 1916. 
162 • Ibid. 
103. Abbott, loc.oit., 426; editorials: "A Word of Thanks to }Jr.Roosevelt." 
The Worl"d'S Work, August 19ih6, 370; "What Was Demonstrated at Chicago." 
'Tile Independent;' June 19,1916, 473; and"The End of Armageddon." The 
ffierary Digest, July 8~ 1916, 94. --
104. Lippiruann, loc.cit., 165. 
105 Ib" --• J.d. 
-
yet the most sincere praise was given to that highly motivated body of 
106 
delegates for the service they had perfor.med to the nation. By their 
68 
presence in Chicago they had forced "• •• the issues of supreme moment upon 
a reluctant Republican Party and a dormant people," and without them the 
Republicans might l~ve seen fit to choose some one less desirable than 
107 
Justice Hughes, WTOte one who believed in Progressive principles. 
Immediately upon receiving the notification from the National 
Republican Convention that he had been nominated as their Presidential can-
didate Justice Hughes sent his letter of acceptance to the Chairman of the 
Convention. It read: 
I have not desired the nomination. I 
have wi shad to remain on the bench. But in 
this critical hour of our national history 
I recognize that it is my paramount duty to 
respond ••• and to that call in this crisis, 
I can not fail to angwer with the pledge ofall 
that is in me to the service of our country. 
Therefore I accept the nomination.l08 
In the body of his speech Hughes stated very clearly and convincingly 
that he "... stood for the fir.m and unflinching maintenance of all the 
rights of .American citizens on land and sea ••• ; " that he " ••• desired to 
see our diplomacy restored to its best standards ••• ; " that he stood for 
"••• Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose; for a patriotism that is 
single and complete ••• ; " that he believed " ••• in making prompt provision 
106. The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1916. 
107. &bbott, loc.oit., 427. Similar viewpoints expressed by Howland, loc.cit. 
480; and Lippman, loc.oit., 419. 
108. Republican Campaign Te~ook, 1916, 30. A complete copy of Hughes' 
speech of acceptance found in Appendix A. 
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109 
to assure our national security." He continued: "We are devoted to the 
ideals of peaoe ••• We have no policy of aggression, no lust for territory, 
no zeal for strife." Hughes believed that the nation should be prepared 
industrially and economically as well as in military matters; that there 
should be a wiser and more fair readjustment of the tariff'; that the 
prinoiples of the civil service laws should be enforced; and he declared 
tbat he fully endorsed the platform of the Republican Party. In conclusion 
he wrote: I have resigned my judicial office and I am ready to devote myself 
110 
unreservedly to the campaign. 
To President Wilson the Justice WTOte: I hereby resign the offiee of 
111 
A1sociate Justice of the Supreme Court ot the United States. As briefly 
and as courteously the President accepted the resignation. 
Hughes, in his letter of acceptance, did more than acknowledge his 
willingness to became the Presidential nominee for in it he clearly and at 
great length stated his position on all the vital questions of the day iD. 
IUoh a manner that it was believed the Progressives would find no f'ault with 
112 
his enunciations. His acceptance pleased many f'or it was believed that 
the combination of' Hughes and the Progressive Republican Party platform would 
attract many of the Progressive voters, would reunite the factions, and 
113 
would make the outlook for 1916 a bright one. 
109. Ibid. 
110 J 1'6Id:. 
111. Chi'Ca11a.o Examiner, June 11, 1916; and.!!!! Chicago Daily Tribune, June 11, 
. 1916. 
112. 'Editorials: The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1916; The Chicag<> 
Daily Tribune, June 12, 1916; and "The National Convention"i:"" The North 
lmerican Review, July 1916, 4-7. 
113. Ibid. 
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on June 26, the Progressive National Committee met and disoussed at 
great length the letter which they had received from Colonel Roosevelt. In 
it he expressed his refUsal to became the Presidential candidate for the 
PrOgressive Party and in it he gave his wholehearted endorseme:rxt to the 
oandidaoy of Hughes. In this letter Roosevelt praiaed most highly the men 
and women who had. served as members of the Progressive conventions, lauded 
the ideals to which they had subscribed, and reviewed the splenclid work of 
the party "••• in awakening the public to a better understanding of the 
114 
problems of social and industrial welfare." Regretfully he faced the 
tact that the people of the nation were, evidently, unprepared and unwilling 
to accept a new political party. Therefore the Progressives while not 
abandoning their convictions must face "••• the situation and endeavor to 
get cut of it the best that it can be made to yield from the standpoint of 
115 
the interests of the nation as a whole." In this long letter the ColoDel 
in his usual stinging manner criticized the Democratic leaders and President 
Wilson for their handling of foreign affairs and, ·beli•ving that Wilson and 
hia party should not be given the opportunity to govern the nation for 
another four years, the Colonel appealed to the Progressives to consider 
only the welfare of the mtion and to nominate the man whose integrity was 
the highest and who morally and intellectually was fitted to be at the 
Dation t s helm. 
114. Republican Campai~ Textbook 1916, 33; ~ugnes, Roosevelt, Union." 
The OUtlook, July , 1916, 53~. A copy of this letter may be found 
inAppendi:x: B. 
115. Ibid. 
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The Committee after tive hours of discussion and oratory fina.lly 
deoicled by' a vote of thirty-two to six to endorse the candidacy of Hughes 
and directed the Executive Committee of the Progressive Party to ally itself 
. orith :Mr. Hughes • campaign and to do all in its power to aid in his 
116 
election. Once again George Perkins had to resort to maneuvering for 
the minority group, led by John Parks-, being of the opinion that this 
cCQII!d ttee had no right to turn the party over to Hughes, retuaed to a.ooept; 
117 
the resolution. 
The actions of Roosevelt received favorable commendation from both 
newspapers and periodicals. It was felt that if the majority of the Pro-
gressive voters paid heed to the plea of Roosevelt then Wilaon and his 
118 
party would be doomed. Once again high tribute 1m.s bestowed upon the 
Colonel by those who felt that his decision resulted f~ an unselfish 
desire to place the interests and welfare of his country above his cma 
119 
political fortune. To the Republican leaders his letter came as a. 
heartening note for they appreciated that Roosevelt in taking the broader 
Tiew and in sponsoring the man for whom he had never expressed a heartfelt, 
personal admiration 1m.s proving himself worthy of his splendid reputation. 
!hey more than welcomed his cooperation. 
116. New ~ Tribune, June 26, 1916; The Chicago Ia~ly Tribune, June 27, 
l916; and The Christian Science MOiiftor, JWle 2 , 1916. 
117. Ibid. -
118. ~es, Roosevelt Alliance.• The Litera~ Digest, July 8, 1916, 57. 
119. Editorials: The Chioa~ Daily Tribune, June 27, l916; "Mr. Roosevelt's 
Funeral Oration." The ation, June 29, 1916, 687-688. 
120. Editorials: The Cli!'Oago Daily Tribune, June 27, 1916; The Christian 
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By his refusal Roosevelt delivered a mortal blow to the party he had 
rounded. The problem which it faced was a diffioul t one to solve. While 
the party had no Presidential 08Jlciidate, yet Parker cominued to be the 
Jl()ntinee for the Vice-Presidency; while the na.tio:aal organization was 
£11nctioning yet many of the state groups had disbanded and had merged with 
121 
the Republican forces, in most instances. These irreconoilables, who 
telt that the betrayal of Roosevelt was cowardly, were detennined to meet 
122 
again and to outline their plans for a campaign by the Progressive Party. 
Their numbers would be augmeuted by those groups who, prior to 1912, had 
been Democrats and by those western Progressives who oould not agree with 
123 
Roosevelt on preparedness. But in the opinion of most writers the 
influence that the Progressives would exert in November would be negligible, 
although it was agreed that their 'revolutionizing spirit' would oontillue 
124 
to be felt no matter to what political group they tinally became pledged. 
On the day of the meeting of the Progressive National Committee Hughes 
sent two messages, one to this Committee &lld one to Roosevelt. His teleg~ 
to the Committee was a long one in whioh he expressed hia sincere apprecia-
tion for the Progressive endorsement and proceeded to give them an extended 
125 
statement of his views o:a the current questions facing the nation. The 
message indicated that the Republican candidate was definitely tor adequate 
preparedness and that the hyphenates need expect no quarter from him. In 
121. Ray, 34; and ~r. Roosevelt's Funeral Oration." The Nation, ·June29,1916, 
687. -
122. Ibid. 
123. ""'HUghes-Roosevelt." The Literary Digest, July 8, 1916, 57J and The 
Christian Soienoe Monitor, June 27, 1916 ---
124. WHugbes, Roosevelt, Union." The Outlook, July 5, 1916, 534; and 
~. Roosevelt's Funeral Orat1on." The Nation, June 29, 1916, 687-88 
125. Republican Campaign Textbook, ~,-s9"; ,!!f! Chioag.2_ Daily Tribune,June 
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1108t em.phatio tel'DL8 he oritioized the Democratic administration and gave 
}ds endorsEillent to some ot the measures which the Progressives had advocated. 
10 vigorously. By' his appeal he hoped to convince the Progressives that 
they' and the Republicans were finally united in the common cause to promote 
natioJIB.l honor, national security, and national eti'ioienoy. In his oriti-
oism of Wilson's administration he pointed out the mistakes that ha4 been 
made, condemned the DEillooratio officials tor their failure in Mexico, and 
eonoluded his appeal with the statEillent: 
I am deeply appreciative ot your endorsement. 
I find no diti'erence in platform or in aim 
Whioh precludes the most hearty oooperation 
and the most oomplete unity. It is within 
the party that the liberalizing spirit you 
invoke can have the widest and most eti'ecti ve 
influence. I solioit your earnest effort tor 
the common cause.l26 
In his letter to Colonel Roosevelt, the Republiean oandidate not only 
thanked the former Progressive leader tor his endorsement but also aske4 for 
his cooperation in the ensuing campaign and expressed a desire to meet w1 th 
127 him at an early date. Two days later these two leaders dined together 
and discussed the great political questions i'aoing the nation. To the news-
paper reporters they gave out the statement: We talked very tully over all 
128 
matters and are in complete aooord. Roosevelt in a letter to Senator 
27, 1916; and New York Tribune, June 27, 1916 
126. Ibici. - -
127. 'Re"Pliblioan Camp.ign Textbook 1916, 40. Copy ot the letter may be found 
in Ippend!X c. -
128. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 29, 1916; similar statem.ent in New York 
l'rlbune_, June 29, 1916; and~ Christian Soience Monitor, June'29,'1'9!'6'. 
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LOdge expressed himself as being satisfied with the Viewpoints taken by 
gughes and believed that the candidate in his campaign would stand for the 
129 
JDOre important issues of the Progressive Party. 
129. Lodge II, 486. Letter in Roosevelt to Senator Lodge. June 29, 1916. 
CHAPTER III 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE REPUBLICANS IN 
THE CAMPAIGN 
The active politieal campaign did not immediately begin in July. Time 
.as needed by the political leaders. ample time in which to line up their 
torees. to organize their workers. to outline their program. to conciliate 
aad b~d together those of the Progressive group who had returned to the 
Republica.D fold; and time in which to watch with clear • sharp eyes the ever-
shift~g. complexion of foreign and domestic affairs for oonditions across 
the sea might affect both the policies and the program of the Republica. 
Party". 
Hughes and his followers tully realize« that their problem of oustiag 
the Democratic Party from office was a very clifficult one for the party in 
power has always had the advan. tag eo us position. To oo nvince the oi tiz enry 
that for the best interests of the nation the Republican Party should be 
returned to the White House was not to be an easy task for the differences 
between the two political parties were aot espeeially marked. Charles Evans 
Hughes and Woodrow Wilson by their very characters and nature offered 11 ttle 
tontrast or argument. Too mAnf agreed that these two men were of the 
highest moral character • had long political records which had earned them 
the respect of the nation. that they had given evidence of their ability as 
75 
leaders and of neither could it be said that he was 'incompetent' or 
l 
76 
tde,Dgerous.' Likewise1 the party platforms offered little opportunity :f'or 
political disagreement for their similarity rather than their contrast was 
2 
the notable feature or, as expressed by one editorial, their differences 
in respect to domestic issues were less marked than ever before in our 
3 
political history. rhis editor felt that both party platforms demagogical 
declared for progressive labor legislation; both relegated the issue of 
equal suffrage to the states; both advanced the developnent of the merehant 
marines, the one by subsidies, the other by gover.tmlental ownership; neither 
proposed changes in anti-trust laws; both held forth helping haDds to 
agrioul ture; neither group had nade satisfactory statemettbs ia regard to the 
problem of national preparedness; and on the tariff issue their tiffereD.oe 
4 
was of degree only. Seemingly, the Republican Party had become "... more 
radical aDd the Democratic Party more conservative than usual, with the 
result that they had reached substantially common ground" was the editor's 
5 
eonolusion. Another writer found nothing in the RepublioUL Part7 to 
inspire the voter, saw in it a political straddle which on one hand made 8.11 
appeal to the large number of people who held resentment against Presideat 
Wilson for allowing the Germans to insult our nation while on the other hand 
1. Editorials: "How Campaign Will Be Fought." The .American Review of Reviews 
August, 1916, 143; "Political Pledges." TheNorth American Review, 
August 16, 1916, 166-171; fhe World's Wor£;" "Why Hughes Siiould Be 
Eleeted." August 1916, 369; and "Independents and the Campaign." rhe 
Nation, July 6, 1916, 51. ---
2. Editorials: "Hughes Problem in the Campaign." The World's Work, July 1916 
243; "Independents and the Campaign," July 6, '!91"6, 51; "Pratl'orm.s." 
The Independent, July 10, 1916, 44. 
s. ldi"toriai: "Political Pledges." fhe North American Review, August 16,1916 
166-171. ----
4. IbU .• 
s. 11;'I1. 
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~de a diplomatic effort not to offend "••• the large number of voters who 
6 
were 'Willing to pay this price to have maintained peace." 
With domestic and inter-national affairs in rather a critical state 
the political situation before the people revolved not around the usual 
cli:f'terances of party policies but rather was more aonoerned with the quality 
7 
o£ leadership as portrayed by the parties and by their ohoseD. oaniidates. 
fbe question of Whether Wilson or Hughes should be placed at the he~ of 
the government seemed to be more important than outlines of the oampaiga 
8 
tor the respective parties. Since the viewpoints and policies of President 
Wilson aDd his followers were known to the voters it became the foremost 
problem of Hughes to enlightea the citizens as to his staad on the questioas 
9 
before the public. The Republican Party through its nominee 110uld have to 
make known its stand on military preparedness, international diplomacy, 
and om our relations with the Latin-American countries. 
During the politioal lull in July the Progressive Party was in the 
limelight. Both the Republicans and the Deaocrats realized that the passing 
of the Progressive Party did not mean the exbinction of the Progressives 
aad each political group was competing with the other in offering hostage 
10 
to the Progressive vote. HOw best to conciliate and placate those Repub-
6. Editorial: "Hughes' Problem in the Campaign.• The World's Work, August 
1916, 243. ---
T. Editorials: Ibii.; "Independents and The Campaign." The Nation, July 6, 
1916 .. 51; an(l""""'1oll tioal Campaign." The .Amari ce.n Rev!ii of Reviews, 
August 1916, 143. - -
a. Editorials: "Political Pledges." The North American Review, August 16, 
1916, 166-171; "Hughes' Probl~inLthe dampalgn.w The Worrd•s Work, 
August 1916, 243; and "How the Campaign Will be Fought," The Aiietican 
Review of Reviews, August 1916, 143. ---
9. "W'ReoaTlof Judge Hughes." The World's Work, August 1916, 397-410; and 
Paul Kellog, "Items in Interna'€Iona! PO!Tcy." ~ Nation, August 3,1916, 
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110ans who had become followers of Roosevelt in 1912 was the problem facing 
gugheS and his ];arty. Therefore. one of their first moves was to include 
siX prominent Progressives in the Republican National Campaign Committee 
ot eighteen and Hughes let it be known that it was his hope that looa.l 
~paign boards following the example of the national board wguli taolude 
11 
other Progressive men in their local campaign organizations. Hughes and 
hiS aids realized that it would be diffioult for members of the Progressive 
PartY' to line up with men whom they had been fighting for four years aa.d 
10 every effort was made to make their return less diffioult. To the 
Progressive conference being held in California Hughes sent a telegram 
expressing his appreoiation of the support that he was receiving from Pro-
r;ressive leaders in that state and voioing his earnest desire for a reunited 
12 
party. During the month the oa.use of the Republicans was given aided 
a.eouragement by the public a-batement of former Senator Albert J. Beveridge 
ot Indiana. a foremost leader in the revolt of 1912, who stated that be not 
only would support Hughes but that he was willing to take the stump in the 
13 
DOminae's interest. By his reconciliation the Republican leaders were 
t;reatly enC<luraged for they felt that the state of Indiana would swing to 
~he Republican column aad each addition to their side increased the solidar-
10. "Bidding for the Progressive Vote." The Literar,r Digest, July 22,1916, 
175. -
11. These Progressives were: George Perkins, Oscar Strauss, Chester Rowell. 
Herbert Smith. James Garfield• and Everett Colby as found in The Chicago 
Tribune, July 6, 1916, and New York Tribune, July 18, 1916. ---
12. !!.'he Chicago Sundl* Tribune. Jul'YT, 1916. 
13. '!artoria1: The C istian Science Monitor, July 21, 1916; and The Chicago 
Daily Tribuni; July 26, l9l6. ----
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14 
itf of the party r8l'lk:s and the front it would. present to its opponents. 
on the same day on which Roosevelt issued his statement to the Progressives, 
perkins issued a statement; that he and his aids had lined up for the 
election of a Republican Senate which action would have far reaching effects 
in that it would tend to make the contest for the Senatorial seats clear 
out between the Republicans and the Democrats and, oonsequsntly, make it 
tar easier for the Republicans to gain the nine seats necessary for party 
15 
eontrol of' the Senate. 
Not all the Progressives had meekly returned to the Republican fold. 
JfaDY, angered by the methods used at the National Convention, ba4 indicated 
16 
their intentioll of lining up under the banner of' the Democrats, whieh 
IUpport Dem.ooratio Chairma:a McOormiok announoed would be sufficient; to make 
17 
the re-election of President Wilson a certainty in November. A third 
group of Progressives under the leadership of John M. Parker had issued a 
statement that the Progressive Party would hold a conference in Indianapolis 
on August 3 at which time would be considered the question of whether or not 
a eon:vention should be called to oom.plete the party's national ticket. 
Parker and others were of the firm opinion that the nation should be made 
aware that the Progressive Party was determined "••• to oonti:a.ue the fight 
18 
tor those principles which we have so strongly advocated," and only by 
14. The New York Tribune, Jaly 21, 1916. 
15. l'Drd.' JUly 22, 1916. 
16. Editorials: The New Republic, July 15, 1916, 261; "Campaign Plan," 
The Amerioan,-evi-ei o? ReViews, August 1916, 14SJ "The Progressive Vote, 
l'ni Utera~ Digest,"'""J"ul-y 22, l916, 175; and "The Progressive Vote and 
the ReSlllt. The Nation, July 6, 1916, 17. 
17. "The Progressive Vote and the Result," The Nation, July 6, 1916, 17. 
18. The New York Tribune, Jaly 13, 1916. SiiDI!'ar statements found. in 'l'he Chroy ~iii Trib\iiie, July 29, 1916; and ~e Christian. Soienee MOiiftor, 
'J'uiy 7, 9 • -
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_.ucing a formal party ticket. though probably a futile one. could the f'orm.er 
followers of Roosevelt indicate their adherence to their principles and 
19 
purposes. 
Dllrin.g the month Hughes was very busy holdi:ag conferences with the 
officials of the Republican National Committee. with the members of the 
Republican National Campaign Committee; and wri tixlg his formal speech of 
aooeptance. to be delivered in Carnegie Hall on July 31. Busily he worked 
~athering data, faots. and statisties which would serve as smm1nition for 
20 
his attack on President Wilson and the Democratic admiDistratioa. His 
three-fold task of placating the for.mer Progressives upon whose vote it 
was conceded the election would hinge. of conciliating the irate regular 
forces of the Republican Party. aJ:Id at the same time. of preparing a bold, 
torcef'ul program to serve as an attack upon the party in power was, indeed., 
a mighty weighty problel'll. By choosing outstanciing Progressives to serve on 
the National Committee he appeased the spirits of' that group, yet his choice 
rebuked the f'oroea or the 'Old Guard' only four of their members bei:mg 
21 
eeleoted. Hughes, it was believed, thus indicated his unwillingness to 
allow the 'Old Guard' to run the campaign. However, conferences 'With 
former President William Howard Tart and Senator Albert B. Fall gave evi-
dence that Hughes planned to call upon the leaders of the Republican Party 
22 
to aid hlm in his campaign...;•----------------------
19. Ibid. 
20. '!heChio~o Daily Tribune, July 21. 1916. 
21. ""lR"dding:for the Progressive Vote." The Literary Digest,July 22, 1916, 
175; and New York Tribune• July 11, Ms. 
22. The ChicaFliil"iY Tribune, July 27, 1916; and New York Tribune, July 1, 
ms. - - --
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On the evening of July 31 in Carnegie Hall in New York City', Hughes 
23 
ga'V'e his foraal speech of acceptance. Great erowds tillecl '\;he hall not 
oJllY to hear the nominee• s speech but likewise to see the oaniidate• • 
erstwhile opponent, Colonel Roosevelt, whose presence at the meeting had 
been assured. Technioally it was the to rmal accepta.Dee of Hughes as the 
presidential nominee, but actually it was the 'love feast' of the reunited 
Republicans and Progressives and this bit of human interest was an added 
attraction to the meeting. The long speech ot the nominee was a masterly 
indictment of the national administration, a statesmanly message to the 
,Aaarican people in which the major emphasis was plaoed upon the issues 
taoing the nation and as suoh would serve as an outline or syllabus tor the 
political oampe.ign. While Hughes earef'ully presented his viewpoint on the 
-.ny problems ot the day he nainly stressed three which were: our relations 
with Mexico, our European complications, and the problem of national pre-
paredness. Taking up each issue he, in a pun.gent manner, showed just where 
he thought the Wilson administration had tailed and just where he stood 
on each particular question. 
Speaking on the pressing situation on the Mexican border Hughes 
labeled our efforts to settle the problem as "••• a contused Chapter of 
24 
blunders.• In his opinion the administration had not helped Mexico but 
rather by its actions and vacillating cxmtradictory policy had succeeded in 
23. Accounts of the speeoh fbund in: Editorials: "Mr. Hughes' Campaign 
Outlined." The World's Work, September 1916, 483-483; ''Mr. Hughes 
Accepts." ~Indepetide~August 14, 1916, 212-213; Mr. Hughes States 
the Issue."""1.'lie outlook, August 9, 1916, 827-828; New York Tribune, 
August 1, 19!'6;' and The Chicaf?l Dailt Triblme, August l,T916. · 
24. Republican Campaign :riXtbook, 9a6, 4 
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a].ienati~~g the friendship ot our southern neighbors. This was regrettable 
sinee the United States had no polioy ot aggression toward Mexico, had no 
desire tor any part of' her territory, but rather on the contrary, our 
25 
:oation wished her to have "••• peace and stability and prosperity." 
g0wever, Hughes stated, that the United States expected Mexico, even while 
disturbed internally, to protect the lives and property of' .Amerioall citizens 
26 
and "••. to protect our border from depredations." Only by adopting a 
oonsistent polioy-, only by convincing Mexico that our gover:rml8nt proposed 
•. •• to insist in a flrm and candid manner upon the performance of' 
international obligations," Hughes oontinnei would a basis tor friendly 
27 
relations be established. 
More briefly Hughes touched upon the oomplication.s arising from the 
warri~~g situation in Europe. He promised a f'i:rm and efficient foreign 
policy and by implication he interred that our dif'tioulties with Germany 
and England arose tram the blundering diplomatic policy adopted by the 
Democratic regime. It was his viewpoint that 
ll. Ibid. I 8. 
26. I'bid. 
27 • "'15'iet. I 8 e 
28. 1'6'l"d. 8 • _, 
• • • had this gover ment by the use of' 
both informal and formal diplomatic 
opportunities lett no doubt that When 
we said ttstrict accountability" we meant 
precisely what we said, and that we should 
unhesitatingly vindicate that position, 
I em confident that there would have been 
no destruction of' American lives by the 
sinking of' the Lusitania • • • Moreover, 
a f'irm American policy would have been 
strongly supported by our people and the 
opportunities tor the devetopment of' 
bitter feeling would have been vastly 
reduced.28 
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On the paramount issue of the day, national preparedness, the candidate 
spoke at great length. He stated anphatically that he believed the size of 
the regular army was inadequate, as was demonstrated by oonditions on the 
M~ican border, ~nd not only should the ar.my be increased in size, but also 
that there should be a "••• first citizen reserve subject to call •••" 
whioh should be 
29 
authority." 
n 
••• enlisted as a Federal anny and trained under Federal 
The second part of his speech was confined to domestic affairs and 
beo~e a rather partisan political discourse on such topics as labor 
problems, agriculture, the tariff, economic readjustment after the war, 811d 
30 
110]118.n suffrage, reported one paper. Much attention was paid by the 
nominee to the perplexing situation that wuld be inevitable after the 
cessation of' war in Europe. His most constructive proposal, in the opinion 
of one editor, was the proposal of 'What Hughes called "••. an organization 
of peace ••• " in which he advocated "••. an international tribunal to decide 
controversies susceptible of judicial deter.mination; conferences of the 
nations to formulate international rules, to establish principles, to 
modify and extend international law so as to adapt it to new conditions; 
the development ~f instrumentalities of conciliation ••• " and behind this 
international organization, if it is to be effective, must be the 
of the nations to prevent resort to hostilities before the appropriate 
31 
agencies of peaceful settlement have been utilized." Concerning the 
tariff the nominee took the usual Republican attitude of protection and 
29. Ibid., 12. 
30. New York Tribune, August 2, 1916. 
31. '11Mr. Hughes Accepts. • ~ Independent, August 14, 1916, 212. 
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tound the attempts of the Danooratio Party at tariff reform a failure. He 
turther accused the administration of inefficiency, extravagance, waste, 
and of violating the sound principles of civil service. He briefly stated 
ldS belief in woman su.t':f'rage for in his judgment efforts to defeat this 
32 
.avsaent would be unsuccessful. 
Editors of magazines and newspapers in reviewing the speech offered 
conflicting opinions on sections of the speech but the general tone of their 
reactions seemed to be one of either frank, open disapproval or one of 
33 impartiality. One editor wrote: "The speech of acceptance of Mr. Hughes 
was a disappointment to most Progressives, to many Progressive-Republicans 
34 
•• •• Y another remarked that the candidate in his opening paragraph had 
said.: ''We come to state in a plain direct mamer our faith, our purpose, and 
our pledge," which pledge, the editor felt, Hughes had not kept for his 
speech "•. • consisted chiefly of a clear and forceful sta tem.ent of the 
35 
reasons why the President should not be re-elected." Another editor, 
while agreeing that the speech would make an effective campaign document, 
stated: 
~. Republican Campaign Textbook 1§16, 17-18. 
33. Editorials: w.Mr. Hughes' Campaign Outlined." The World's Work,Septemher 
1916, 483; the Nation, August 3, 1916, 96; ~Hughes Accepts," The 
Independent, August f4, 1916, 212; ~y Hughes Finds Wilson Wantiii;" 
1h8 Litera~ Digest, August 12, 1916, 336; "The Hughes Acceptance,• The 
New Re~ublio, August 5, 1916, 4; ~r. Hughes States the Issue," The---
'tJutloo , August 9, 1916, 827; and New York Tribune August 2, 19!6.' 
34. E'clitorial:''Mr. Accepts," ~ ~ 14 1916, 212. 
Editorial: "Mr. 
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! 1aok of constructiveness seemed to be the chief fault of the address aDd 
the editors in their reviews emphasized this grave shortcoming. Hughes in 
,. oomprehensive and impressive fashion had not told what he woultl do if 
elected President but had devoted two-thirds of his 8000 word speech to 
criticism of the administration. On several issues Hughes failed to tell 
explicitly what he would do if he were placed in the White House. This was 
quite evident in the section where he spoke on our relations w.i th the 
JJ~.tions of Europe. While promising "... a firm and efficient foreign 
policy • • •" and intimating " ••• that he 110uld be more drastic against &.Dy 
English interference with our trade •••• " he failed to state what the irastie 
aee.sures would be, reported one editor, and this same viewpoint was 
37 
expressed bw the other editors. 
For his stand on the issue of the hyphenates the candidate was 
eritioized severely. It had been hoped that he would utter a decisive worCI. 
on German-American intrigue in our politics but his speech supplied that 
4egree of vagueness which it was believed would enable the German-Americans 
38 
to endorse it and continue their campaign against President Wilson. ~ 
TOters were disappointed because Hughes bad stressed so briefly such impor-
tant issues as the tariff and the Democratic extravagances which Republicans 
1n New York felt Y«>uld be the big issue of the campaign, reported one 
39 
tditor. Critical though they were of the speech the editors in the main 
36. 
1916, 483. 
Ibid; similar views taken by the editorials: "Mr. Hughes Accepts," The 
lUQependent, August 14, 1916, 212; and The Nation, August 3, 1916,-sG. 
Ibid. ---
mrt'orials: The Nation, August 3, 1916, 96; and !!!!, ~ Tribune, 
August 2, 19!'6':'" 
New York Tribune, August 2, 1916. 
-----
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agreed that while the speech had its drawbacks it had helped to clarify the 
:tssues and if supplemented as the cam);8ign went on w.1. th affirmative and 
. 
10nstructive proposals it would serve as a strong attack upon the record of 
40 
the administration. 
Three prominent weekly magazines, while not openly critical in their 
reViElW'S, of the speech, were not laudatory in their remarks and left the 
41 
reader with the impression that they were reserving their opinions. One 
eiitor felt that Hughes did wisely in making 'Anti-Wilsonism' the Republican 
issue for, in his opinion, it was the one issue that would unite the dis-
00ntented groups and the one way ". •. of avoiding any dangerous oommi tment 
42 
on any issue which will seriously divide the Republican vote." The second 
editor gave a clear, detailed review of the speech but he neither criticized 
43 
nor praised it. In the article of the third magazine was found not a 
rerlew of the speech but a consensus as expressed by the editors of the 
prominent newspapers of the country. Some of them 11'8re enthusiastic about 
the speech, some were critical of portions of it, and others were less 
44 
impressed. 
lb. Editorieis: "Mr. Hughes :Cam:taign Outlined." The World* s Work, September 
1916, 483; ~.Hughes Accepts," The Indepenaent, August~ 1916, 212. 
and New York Tribune, August 2, 1"§16. 
41. Editoriars:-''Wliy Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting." The Literary Digest, 
August 12, 1916, 336; "The Hughes Acceptance," "Tni New Republic, August 
5,1916, 4; and~. Hughes States the Issue," T~outfook; August 9,1916, 
827. -
42. Editorials "The Hughes Acceptance, tt The New Republic, August 4, 1916, 4. 
43. Editorial: "Mr. Hughes States the IsS'Ui,'11"'""flie Outlook, August 9, 1916,8 
44. Editorie.la "Why Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting:-".!§! Literary Digest, 
August 12, 1916, 336. 
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one Mid-western newspaper was wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the 
speech, viewing it not as "••• a partisan document ••• " but "••• as a 
statesmanly message to the American people •••" and expected that it would 
beoa.me an outline for the campaign "••• which it may be hoped will be one 
ot constructive debate, clarifying public thought and concentrating the 
.American will on a course of definite and unvacillating policy in :f'oreign 
45 
and domestic af:f'airs." This newspaper reported that the speech had made 
profound impression in Washington Where Republican leaders were jubilant 
believing that Hughes had put Wilson on the de:f'ensive and would keep him 
there. 
Theodore Roosevelt publicly praised the speech of Hughes, assorting 
that it was an admirable speech and that Hughes was right. The former 
President was especially pleased with the manner in which the Republican 
46 
oandidate had exposed the folly of President Wilson's Mexican policy. 
On the day follo•ving his speech of acceptance Hughes again attracted 
the attention of the nation by issuing a statement in which he declared 
himself in favor of an amendment to the Federal Constitution granting the 
47 
right to vote to the women throughout the nation. While the Republican 
Party had rather sidestepped the issue, the nominee came out squarely in 
favor of woman suffrage and this action was important for it was known that 
45. Editorial: The Chicago rily Tribune, August 2, 1916 
46. New York Tri'Du'ne, Augus , 1916; The Chioaio Da.ilz Tribune, August 1, 
!9i'6; and 11Why Hughes Finds Wilson-wfi"nting. The Literary Digest, August 
12, 1916, 335. ----
47. The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1916; The Chicago Da.i~y Tribunt 
Iugust 2, 1916; and New Yorli Tribuna, August 2,~6; "Mr. Hug es 
His Stand on Sutfrag"i';"" 'Tlle"I.;iterazi Digest, August 12, 1916, 337; and 
The Nation, August 10, 1916, 117 
----
the votes of women would be significant in the fall election. The action 
of Hughes would gratify the women in those states in which women suffrage 
._,8 already in practice. It was a known fact that one-fifth of the total 
vote cast for the Presidency and one-third of the votes necessary to elect 
t;he President would come from the suffrage states whose total votes of 
Jrl,nety-one would be important in the necessary majority of 266 in the 
48 
Blectoral College. Women throughout the nation were pleased by the 
88 
DDminee' s statem.e:rrli and keener interest was stimulated in the conference of 
the National \"Vomans' Party which was to be held in Colorado Springs on 
49 
.August 10. 
On August 3 the swan song of the Progressive Party was heard. The 
leaders of the party in their conference in Indianapolis came to the conclu-
lion that since Roosevelt had declined the Presidential nomination and since 
in many states the Progressive Party organizations had disbanded that any 
effort to choose another nominee 'WOuld be unwise. However in every state 
'Where there was an organization the name of John M. Parker, as nominee for 
50 
the Vice-presidency, would be placed on the ticket. Veh~ently these 
supporters of the Progressive principles in a public statement denounced the 
actions of the Progressive National Committee, held on June 26, as a breach 
of' trust and from Indianapolis came the announcement that a conference of 
48. Suffrage states were: Illinois, California, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, 
Idaho, Washington, Kansas, Arizona, Montana, and Nevada. New York 
Tribune, August 2, 1916. --
49. Ibid. 
50. nrt'orial: "Progressives at Indianapolis. 11 The Nation, August 10,1916, 
119; and~ Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4,1916. 
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progressive leaders to consider the ways and means of continuing the 
51 
PrOgressive Party would meet attar the election in November. However, in 
the opinion of most thoughtful people the Progressive Party was dead and 
thiS conclusion was heightened a few days later when Ray Robbins, Chair.man 
of the National Progressive Convention, announced his intention of support 
the Republican candidate, Charles Evans·Hughes. Robbins stated that in his 
opinion the voters had viewed the Progressive Party not as a new political 
organization but as a mere expression of revolt against the actions of the 
Republican Party. The voters in the primaries of 1914 and 1916 had in 
ove~helming numbers abandoned the Progressive Party. Therefore, Robbins, 
believing in the "••• character and courage of the nominee of the Republican 
52 
Party •••" was willing to enlist under the leadership of Hughes. This 
announcement brought joy to the hearts of Republican leaders for it was tel t 
tbat the sentiment of Robbins was typical of the belief of the majority of 
53 
Progressive voters. 
During the first week of August the Republicans opened their active 
~ign for the election of Charles Evans Hughes. The campaign program 
which faeed the candidate was a long, arduous one. On his first speaking 
trip Hughes planned to start in Detroit, travel to the Pacific coast by 
the way of Chicago and Minneapolis, return by the ·southern route, speaking 
51. Ibid. 
52. New York Tribune, and The Christian Science Monitor, August 6, 1916. 
Editorials: ''RS.Yinond ROl>'bins and The Progressives." The Outlook, August 
16, 1916, 882; and "Robbins Endorses Hughes." The NatiOn, August 10, 
1916, 118. ---
53. Ibid. and editorial: "Robbins Endorses."!!:! Independent," August 14, 
'I'9'rn', 215. 
in Kansas City, St. Louis, Lexington, Kentucky, and reach Portland, Maine 
54 
90 
on September 7. The purpose of the trip was to lay the general foundation 
tor the Republican campaign before the American people, to outline the 
important issues of the crumpaign, to allay all feelings of bitterness among 
the radicals of the Progressive Party, and, as was expressed in one paper, 
Hughes intended to explain what he would do "••• if elected, in the way of 
having constructive legislature passed to meet economic conditions that the 
66 
country will have to face after the war." 
In Detroit on August 7 the opening gun of the Republican campaign was 
fired. Hughes spoke to six groups and his comments were enthusiastically 
66 
received by the men and mmen of' that industrial city. In all his 
addresses he severely criticized the Wilson adninistration for its disregard 
of the Civil Service regime, for its disregard of' the rights of Americans 
abroad, but his main attack was against the administration's failure in 
handling the Mexican situation. He agreed that our nation had a right to 
demand certain things of' Mexico but there was a proper way of' demanding 
them. In one speech he said: 
We should have insisted on the protection 
we are entitled to from a government that 
performs the f'umtions of a government. 
We could have said we would not recognize 
Huerata if his gover.nment could not discharge 
these functions. But it is another thing to 
wage war upon an individual and try and take 
control of Mexican affairs. 
54. New York Tribune, August 2, 1916. 
55. Ibfd., and. similar statan.en:t in The Chicaff Daily Tribune, August 4,1916 
56. Accounts of the speeches found iru-Tne ChiOe.go Daily Tri'&me, August a, 
1916; and New York Tribune, August r,-1916; and The Christian Science 
Monitor, August a, l9l6. Editorial: "Mr. Hughes and His Camp:~.ign." 
!he Outlook, August 16, 1916, aao. 
The administration did a very wong thing 
in abandoning its international attitude 
and in taking an attitude no international 
lawyer could understand. They said to 
Mexico: 'We do not want to meddle with 
your affairs but we will not let Huerata 
be candidate for President.t67 
As a consequence of the administration's policy, Hughes said, the 
91 
Mexicans were confused as to our attitude and protested, feeling we were not 
sincere, especially after the advent of the 'punitive' military expedition 
into Mexico • 
Hughes intimated that if he became President he would adopt a just 
position toward Mexico, state it establish the justice of our nation's 
cause, and "••• let the Mexicans understand once for all that we do not 
intend to meddle with their affairs, that we desire that they shall perform 
their obligations to us, w protect our citizens, to protect them. justly 
in the enjoyment of their lives and property; that they will perform the 
guarantees that they have given us, and then we shall have peace and happi-
ness. If they can establish a stable governmeJ.It, we will do all we can to 
68 
support it." Hughes pledged, if nominated, that he would see to it that 
• ••• all the rights of the United States are safeguarded and the name of 
the United States in administration, in policy and execution is honored 
69 
throughout the world. n· 
While his remarks were enthusiastically received by his audiences, 
newspapers on the following day were not in agreement on the speeches. Some 
67 • The Christian Science Monitor, August 8, 1916. 
68. New York Tri'6Uiie, August 8, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 
8,1916. -
6S. New York Tribune, August 8, 1916; and~ Christian Science Monitor, 
XuguS'tlr, 1916. 
•ere agreeably impressed, felt that Colonel Roosevelt could have done no 
better, while another felt that the statements of Hughes of how he would 
GO handle the Mexican situation had not been strong enough. 
92 
On the following day in Chicago, the Republica.B. candidate by his manner 
and by his eloquent speeches made a favorable impression on his audiences. 
He won the support of the people, although he jolted many political leaders, 
by his announcement that he bad dedicated himself to the "•. • cause of 
.American government;, not for Ifl,rty expediency, not for friends, not for 
Gl 
political support, but for the American people solely." Once again the 
major portion of his speech was an attack on President Wilson's policy towa 
Mexico and his listeners voiced their approval of the ~4idate's statement 
that he stood for a "••• consistent policy that will make Mexico and every 
62 
other nation respect the United States." While it was to be noticed that 
he made no effort to expound his program for .fulfilling this aim he did 
vehemently state that the policy of President Wilson had come dangerously 
near to involving the United States in war. 
Another statemem which 'WOn the approval of the people was his direct 
appeal for scientific efficiency in governmental affairs, for the use of 
the merit ~stem, and for the fitness of the men placed in the diplomatic 
aervice. He proposed to put an end 1x> the practice of displacing competent 
60. Ibid.; The Chicago Daily Tribune, August a, 191GJ and an editorial: 
""Mi:" Hughes and His Campaign." The Outlook, August lG, 19161 880. 
61. The Chicafo Daily Tribme, Augu"ie9, 1916; and The Christian Science 
ll0ni'€or, ugust "9, 1916. -
62. Ibid. 
9S 
Jllen because of a change in the administration. He proposed to handle the 
public's business in a businesslike way and. it was f'el t this his past recor 
,.ere indicative that he would do that very thing. He also stressed the 
..aste and extravagance of the Democratic administration, aD. administration 
Jll()re wasteful than any other administration, and he emphasized the great 
need for protecting American industry from the demoralizing competition of 
63 
cheap foreign labor. 
While in Chicago Hughes had an opportunity to display his ability as 
a party leader. Here as well as elsewhere during the campaign months the 
bickering and squabbling among the local politicians made for an irksome 
situation for the Presidential nominee. HOwever, to the surprise of' many 
Hughes avoided becoming entangled in the local situation and by his appeal 
for loyalty and harmony he anphasized to the members of' the Republican Party 
the need for wholehearted cooperation within the party if success was to be 
64 
theirs in November. 
In the twin cities on the next day he again held his audience by his 
vehement denunciation of the a<hinistration, adding little to what he had 
already stated in his earlier speeches. However, he devoted some time to 
substantiating a previous statement in which he had declared that the Demo-
crats had been guilty of forcing out of office a competent man in the 
65 
Census Bureau. In reply to Secretary Redfield (Democrat) of the truth of 
63. Editorials: The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 9, 1916; New York Tri bum, 
August 9, 1916; "Deserving Democrats and Republican Critics~ Litera 
Diiest, August 26~916, 4S5; and ''Mr. Hughes and His Campaign.T'"flie 
Ou look, August 16, 1916, 881. -
64. 'The chicago Daa~ Tribune, August 9, 1916; !!! York Tribune, August 9, 
1916; and The istian ~cienoe Monitor, August--g;--1916. 
66. E. Dana Durand, Director of Census Bureau. 
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thiS accusation Hughes had produced a letter fra.m the ousted man as proof. 
The incident had been taken up by the newspaper and the Republicans were 
using it as evidence that Hughes definitely favored the Civil Service 
1ystem. and the appointment of men to govermnental positioa who had special 
66 
training and ability, regardless of partisan considerations. 
In these Middle-Western cities Hughes forcibly drove home his denun-
oiation of Wilson's Mexican poli~ and anphasized the nation's dire need 
of a more adequate preparedness program, citing the lamentable efforts of 
the national guards to protect Americans on the Mexican border. The 
enthusiasm with which this statement was received disproved the belief that 
the Middle-West, being far removed from the dangers of invasion, was not 
1n favor of a reasonable preparedness program for Hughes' denial that the 
American people were "••• too proud to fight" brought a thunder of applause 
67 
from his audience. 
During the following four days, oontiming his westward tour across 
the Dakotas, Montana, and Idaho the nominee made frequent speeches, many 
from the rear platfonn of the train, and others in the cities of Fargo, 
!lorth Dakota; Billings and Butte, MontanaJ and Coeur D'Alene, Idaho. 
Forcibly and clearly he continued his denunciation of President Wilson, 
hammering away at the administration's failure, shortcomings, incompetence, 
extravagances, inefficiency in its foreign policy, failure to protect 
66. The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 10, 1916; New York Tribune, August 10 
T9'I6; The Christian Science Monitor, August YO; I'9!6; and editorialsa 
The NatiOn, AUgust 17, 1916, 142; "Camtaign Controversies." The Ind.e-
pendent, August 21, 1916, 261J and "The National Campaign." "!'he Ou'tiook, 
August 23, 1916, 937. ---
67. New York Tribune, August 10, 1916. 
-----
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~erioan rights; stressing the need for an expert budget system, for a 
progrwn of reasonable preparedness "••• both of the heart and the individual 
to meet any danand made in the upholding of the honor of the nation ••• " 
' 68 
and, lastly, reviewed the value of establishing a protective tariff. 
A short, concise statement of his beliefs was summed up in the brief 
speech he made before several hundred people at Mandan, MOntana reported one 
69 
editor. Here Hughes aaids 
I propose, if elected, that men appointed 
to the o :t'fiee shall be fit for the office 
to which they are appointed. I propose 
that the government shall be economical, 
not wastefully and extravagantly administered, 
and I propose that the American name shall be 
honored throughout the world, because we 
firmly stand for every American right.70 
A new note, one of sectionalism, was added to his speeches. In his 
attack upon the spoils system Hughes elaborated upon the sectional control 
of the Democratic Party in Congress, pointing out that the disproportionate 
representation of the South in the chairmanships of important committees 
in Congress gave that group the controlling power, and he concluded by 
stating that the Republican policies, on the other hand, were for the 
71 
"••• benefit of the entire nation." 
68. The Chica'C Dait{ Tribune; August 11, 1916; New York Tribune, August 11, 
19!6; The hris an Science Monitor, August IT; I'm'; and editorials: 
"Appea!Iiig to the West. w The American Review of Reviews, September 1916, 
254; "The National Campaign." The Outlook, luiUst 23, 191~, 937; and 
"The Campaign." The Independenc;-August 21, 1916, 260. 
69. Editorial' "The Campaign." The Independent, August 21, 1916, 260. 
70. Ibid. -
71. ~York Tribune, August 13, 1916; and similar statements in The 
mll=istra'n Science Monitor, August 13, 1916; and editorials The-Nation, 
August 17, 1916, 142. -
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While the nominee's views on national defense were well received by 
the people, to a greater degree, in fact, than had been expected by the 
political leaders, yet his attacks upon the spoils system and his stand for 
efficiency in gove~ental affairs, seemingly, had made a deeper impression 
on the citizenry of the inland country was the opinion of two magazine 
72 
editors and of the newspaper writers. 
·At the end of his first week of actual campaigning the nominee and 
his IS-rtY were enthusiastic about the maDJl.er in which 'the people had 
received Hughes and his program and a confidence that the Republican Party 
would sweep the country in November was expressed. The enthusiasm expressed 
by the women in those states where their vote would be of vital importance 
and the keenness with which the erstwhile Democratic state of Montana 
received the Republican candidate added to the hopefulness of the Republican 
73 
cause. The straightforward, sincere, and vital presentation of the 
Republican case against the Democratic administration was so telling as to 
change the "••• President and his advisors from complacent, contented 
office holders to anxious, apprehensive politicians" was the opinion of 
d•t 74 one e ~ or. 
While his admirers were congratulating Hughes his critics were berat-
ing him. In their charges against him "they stated ~hat while he was very 
72. Editorials: "Deserving Democrats and Republican Critics." The Litera~ 
Digest, August 26, 1916, 435; "National Campaign." The Out!O'Ok, Augus 
23, 1916, 931; The Chicago Daill Tribune, August ll::r!', i9io; New York 
Tribune, August-r!-15, 1916; an The Christian Science Monitor:-August 
ll-15, 1916. 
73. New York Tribune, August 13,14, 1916; and~ Christian Scienoe MOnitor, 
Augu~3,14, 1916. 
74. New York Tribune, August 14, 1916. 
-- . 
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thOrough in his attacks upon the policies of the gover.runent he, in turn, 
offered no real, constructive policies in the program he was presenting to 
75 
the voters. To this charge Hughes answered that the points enunciated 
in his speeches were "••• the fundamentals of oonstruotive policies which 
76 
this nation is facing today." 
Arriving on the Pacific Coast the Presidential nominee turned the 
emphasis of his speeches from domestic problems to international policies. 
In Tacoma, Washington, before a crowd of 15,000 he "••. explained em.phati-
77 
cally his attitude toward the protection of American honor and rights" and 
his manner of hammering home his remarks made it apparent that he intended 
them as his real message to those who greeted him on the coast, was the 
78 
opinion of one newspaper writer. Hughes declared that the doctrine of 
protecting Americans on our border was a good one and that he believed in 
genuine. He stated: 
I do not think that in making it real we 
will encounter the dangers of war. But I 
would not shirk war if it came with the 
performance of our obvious duty in the 
protection of American rights. In the 
protection of American citizens under inter-
national law we do not endanger our peace -
we conserve it. 79 
oontinued that "••• there is no peace permanently secure to you 
unless you have the respect of the nations of the 80 earth." However, he 
"Mr. Hughes on Tour." 75. Editorials: The Nation, August 24, 1916, 164; 
The New R~ullic, August 19, 1916, 56. 
76. The' Chris an Science Monitor, August 15, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily 
"T'rlbune, August 15" ,"!916. 
77. 1ew York Tribune, August 16, 1916. 
78. 'lbfd-:--
79. Editorial: "National Campaign." The Outlook, August 23, 1916, 931; and 
New York Tribune, August 16, l916;and The 'Christian Science Monitor, 
Iugustl6, 1916. -
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believed that since all the nations were desirous of our friendship there 
.,.ould be no danger of war if the Americans made it evident that they meant 
,.nat they said and were prepared to back up their statements. While the 
remarks of Hughes were more 1nilitant than before yet they were received 
enthusiastically by the largest audience he had addressed since his speech 
81 
of acceptance. 
In the same speech he expressed his hope that the United States would 
play a part in the international peace organization~ in the establishment 
of a World Court for it was his aim that the United States be known as a 
nation of people that did not desire trouble and was not aggressive but 
"••• let it be equally known that we are a people who will not stand trit'-
82 
ling with our known rights, or rights of American citizens." This view-
point, likewise, was well received by his listeners. 
In this speeoh and in others on the next day in Portland, Oregon, he 
spoke of other matters. First, of the responsibility our government had to 
the Philippines, as a national obligation which we had assumed and were 
bound to d~soharge, as one which we could not rightfully abandon, as the 
83 
Democrats were planning to do. To the business men he spoke of the need 
of re-organizing our entire government and our national industries in order 
to be ready to faoe the struggle which would ensue after the war was over, 
when Europe would make every efforb to regain its lost commerce. Following 
81. New York Tribune~ August 16, 1916 
82. New York Tribune, August 16, 1916; The Chicago ;>a%lz Tribune, August 17, 
ms; and editorial: "Progressives incampaign. he Independent, August 
28~ 1916, 292. ---
83. Ibid. 
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thiS line of thought he stressed his belief in the need of a protective 
tariff' which W>uld build up and maintain American industry tor the Democrats 
since their advent in office had done nothing to reduce the high cost o£ 
living. In a speech before 3,000 woman who applauded him for his views on 
equal suffrage he expressed the same views as he had stated to the business 
84 
In California Hughes had the misfortune to arrive in the midst o£ a 
bitter factional fight between the regular Republicans and the Progressives 
who had lett the Republican Party under the leadership of Governor Hiram 
Johnson in 1912 and who had returned to it with him after the tassing of the 
Progressive Party. In 1910 Californian politics had been notoriously 
oorrupt and boss-ridden and Johnson had been elected governor upon a strong 
ref'o:nn ticket. In 1916 Johnson was a nominee for the United States Senate. 
being opposed to him, they tried to eliminate him from 
state politics and openly had announced their intention to wreak vengeance 
upon the Progressives whom they charged with deliberately attempting to 
S5 
wreck the party. 
The advent of' Hughes on the scene brought the state political diff'icul-
into the national limelight and placed Hughes in a dilemma. He thought 
84. New ~Jribune, August 15,16,17, 1916; The Chio~o Dailz Tribune, 
Iugust 151 16,17, 1916; and The Christian ~ence nitor, August l51 16, 
17, 1916; and an editorial:--rii'ppeaiing to the West." The American Review 
of Reviews, September 1916 1 254. ---
85. Acoounts of the political situation in California found in editorials: 
"Progressives in the Campaign.a The Independent, August 28, 1916, 292; 
uThe Nation, August 24, 1916, l6"6;New York Tribune, August 18,21,1916; 
Tnechioago Daily Tribune, August 18,2i';-l916; and The Christian Science 
MOnitor, August 1s,21, 1916. 
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to satisfy both groups by declaring his neutrality in the looal fight but 
thiS attitude of his disappointed not only the followers of Governor Johnson 
tor they had hoped that the Presidential nominee would publicly endorse 
their claims but also the regular Republicans who had announced their 
86 
unwillingness to declare a truce. Hughes had expected the support ot 
both groups. The Republicans had warned him that if he did anything which 
might be construed as endearing Governor Johnson they, the conservative 
87 
Republicans, would throw their vote to Wilson. Governor Johnson and the 
Progressives while openly endorsing Hughes were disgruntled, annoyed 
because they had been relegated to minor positions in the receptions and 
speaking program arranged for Hughes. The newspapers and magazines agreed 
situation while a looal one, might have far-reaching effects. 
Two editors, skeptical of the outcome, felt that the non-recognition ot 
Governor Johnson would make the Progressives feel that they had not received 
the recognition due them and as a consequence, these editors believed there 
might be a serious deflection of the progressive Republican vote in favor 
88 
ot President Wilson. A newspaper wri tar, believing that the appeal of 
Hughes for harmony in national politics would serve to unite both groups, 
was confident that California would add to the Republican victory in 
89 
November. A third attitude was taken by an editor who in the previous 
86. Ibid. 
8 7. "''b!d. 
critical of the speeches of Hughes. This editor, while 
88. 1CI'ftorials: The Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1916; and~.!:!!! 
Republic, August 26, 1916, 77 
New York Tribune, August 19, 1916. 
-----
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expressing the belief' that the Republicans and Progressives would unite to 
elect Governor Johnson as Senator failed to give his opinion as to the stand 
90 
the Progressives ~uld take in the Presidential election. All in all it 
,as a very baffling political entanglement which Hughes. the most interestecl 
partY• had to encounter; and yet. his hands being tied• he could really 
make no effort to solve the problem. 
In his speech in San Francisco. Hughes addressed a large audience and 
to them he presented the same salient points which he had uttered in his 
previous speeches in the Middle West, dwelling on the necessity of a tariff 
refor.m. on Mexico and the protection of Americans and American interests 
abroad. on the need of a preparedness program, and on the need f'or efficien-
a,y in gover.nmental affairs. His audience listened attentively but showed 
little enthusia~, applauding his declarations for military preparedness 
91 
but showing little approval of his stand on the Mexican problem. 
The day following this speech the Progressives who took their politics 
seriously voiced their disapproval of the stand taken by Hughes that local, 
92 
t'aotional tights were not the concern of' the Presidential nominee. While 
the Progressives were willing 1xl abide by the truce, yet they indicated 
quite definitely their desire that Governor Johnson 'Who was campaigning in 
southern California should be invited to preside at a later political meet-
ing in the southern part of the state. 
90. Editorial: The Nation, September 7• 1916, 212. 
91. New York TribUne, August 19. 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor. 
lugu8IT9, 1916. -
92. Ibid., August 20, 1916. 
-
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The next important address was made in Sacramento on August 21. Here, 
in later speeches in the state, Hughes made a definite appeal to the 
progressive vote. For the first time he claimed the support ot that group 
and anphatically repeated his approval ot several policies upheld by 
Go'Vernor Johnson, 'Whom, as yet, he had not met. Hughes, speaking ot 
r 8tandpatism' placed it in the same category with demagogy as things not to 
be desired in America. He preached the Progressive 'social justice' 
doctrine, demanded conservation ot women and children, talked about 
e££ioiency in governmental affairs, and condemned the practice ot allowing 
special privileges at the expense ot the people. He won the people ot 
southern California by his assertions on the Mexican situation, a problem 
93 
olose to the hearts of these citizens near that border. First stating 
that he was a man of peace he forcibly said "••• but I recognize the 
necessity of compelling recognition ot our acknowledged rights as a means 
ot forcing peace ••• We lost the esteem of Mexico as soon as we tailed to 
adequately protest against the killing of American citizens ••• but I am 
ready to lay down my lite to protect the nation's honor at any time such 
94 
aacriti ce may be demanded. " 
The results ot his campaign in the pivotal state of California were 
IWDned up with conflicting results. Both Republicans and Progressives 
&greed that he would carry the state, although his visit had failed to unite 
96 
the hostile groups. The failure of Hughes to meet and confer with 
9S. New York Tribune, August 22,23,1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
Augu~2,23, 1916. 
94. New York Tribune, August 23, 1916. 
95. 1'6rd;--
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Go'V'ernor Johnson irked the hearts of the Progressives. One newspaper 
reported that this group had felt slighted and md begun to question the 
96 
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genuineness of the progressivism of Hughes. His refusal to do anything 
to recognize the Progressive Party and his failure to indicate clearly his 
stand on many of the Progressive issues might oost him, this editor 
believed, not only the support of the rank and file of the Progressives in 
california, but might also impair the faith of the Progressives through-out 
the country in the genuineness of his policies and his economic liberalism. 
His speeches in the state fell short of those specific pledges to political 
and economic regeneration that the Califbrnian Progressives wished to hear. 
It was true that the people of California had attended the political meet-
ings in large numbers, yet their response to the speeches of Hughes had not 
been overly enthusiastic. One newspaper reported the meetings as being 
more in the nature of deliberative assemblies rather than the usual politica 
97 
meetings. While Hughes had made an impression upon the voters by his 
discussions on the tariff and the Mexican situation yet there remained 
among the many independent voters in the state a strong sentiment for 
98 
President Wilson. 
The Republioa.n leaders in the East, while definitely worried about the 
complaints of the Progressives in California announced that the tour of 
the Republican Presidential candidate in California had been a success and 
from all indications the election in November would bring victor,y to the 
99 
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Starting eastward. speaking in the states of Nevada. Utah. Wyoming. 
and Colorado. Hughes delivered many speeches in which he again and again 
refute the Democratic criticism that he was tearing 
100 
down the policies of the President and offering none as substitutes. 
Hughes. however, maintained that his ideas were constructive and gave as 
~ples his Mexican policy, his attitude toward efficiena.y in governmental 
his stand on military preparedness, his belief in a protective 
tariff. and his proposed program for a world court. The people in these 
western states greeted him cordially and the Progressive and Republican 
leaders assured Hughes that these states ~uld add to the Republican victor.y 
in November. especially as the women of these suffrage states were working 
101 
wholeheartedly tor the Republican candidate. 
Yet on August 25. in Greeley. Colorado, in a typical speech Hughes 
administration. He said: 
Our opponents said they would reduce the 
cost of living. They haven't. They said 
they would stand for the merit system. 
They have shamelessly betrayed the merit 
system. They said they were tor the main-
tenance of constitutional rights of American 
citizens throughout the world. They le.:f't 
our citizens to be murdered and their property 
to be destroyed right here in Mexico, close to 
our own boundary. They did say they were 
opposed to a tariff for protection. This they 
carried out with the resqlt that before the 
European war broke out unemployed men were 
walking the streets of our cities jobless, 
asking for work, and having to be fed by 
countless charitable organizations.l02 
Account of this part of the candidate's trip found in: The Chicago 
Daily Tribune, August 22-26, 1916; and New York Tribune~ugust 22-26, 
1916. --
101. New York Tribune August 25.1916. 
102. ~ Chi Tribune August 27 • 1916. 
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The next day in Denver the Republican delivered one of his 'Amerioa 
First and America Efficient' speeches, which concluded his western speaking 
tour• He had traveled through twelve states, had addressed one hundred 
and fi.fty audiences of over one-half a million voters and had expounded 
103 hiS beliefs and views on the problems facing the nation. 
For three weeks the citizens of the nation had beengiven the opportu-
nity to hear or to read and to digest the import of the Republican candi-
date's speeches. Whether the trip had been successful could not be agreed 
upon by the editors of magazines and newspapers. One editor maintained 
that the influence of the campaign 'b:>ur had been far-reaching and that the 
candidate had made a very favorable impression "••• by the simple device 
104 
of appealing to the reasoning powers of his audiences." However, the 
consensus of opinion on the part of the editors, seemed to be one of dis-
appointment. One criticism hurled at Hughes was that his attacks upon the 
administration were non-constructive, while same "••• assert them petty 
••••" although the same editor agreed that even the most far-sighted 
106 
candidate could not have been constructive about everything. In 
criticizing Hughes the editor wrote: 
Mr. Hughes' procedure has been to take up 
one act after another of the Administration 
and denounce it without reference to any 
fixed principles which would bring his 
attacks into hanoony and unity. Many hoped 
that the Republican nominee would translate 
Editorial: "Hughes Stumps the West."..!!:!! Independent, September 11,1916 
369. 
Editorial: New York Tribune, August 27, 1916. 
Editorial: 'Tile ration, August 24, 1916, 164. 
their own general dissatisfaction with 
Wilson's record into one fundamental 
criticimn as illuminating as a shaft of 
light.l06 
106 
To this editor's way of thinking the nominee had failed to arouse any deep 
teeling among the citizens of the nation and both friends and admirers were 
107 
disappointed in many aspects of the candidate's speeches. 
Another editor, while agreeing that Hughes had been well received by 
large and enthusiastic crowds and that the friendly manner of the candidate 
had dispelled the myth which pictured him as being cold, reserved, and 
108 
austere stated, nevertheless, that Hughes had not come up to expectations. 
The trouble (he wrote) is he has not told 
the American people positively and concretely 
just what he proposes to do if elected 
President. It is not enough to demonstrate 
President Wilson's sins of omissions and 
connnission. The American people know them 
already. It is not enough to promise to 
install efficiency in the gover.nmental service 
and to eliminate graft. Everybody knows 
Mr. Hughes will endeavor to do this ••• • The 
American people want to know what constructive 
program Mr. Hughes has to offer them. They 
demand of a leader demonstrations of leader-
ship.l09 
However, this same editor, a week later, praised Hughes for choosing 
to emphasize in his speech of acceptance the 'ranote and colorless' subject, 
the national budget. The editor felt that Hughes had courage and insight 
when he chose this topic, one which although very dull to the average Amari-
ean, was an issue fer more important to our national welfare than half the 
arty creeds as protection, preparedness or any other to ic which might so 
• I i • 
107. E"al'iorial: The Nation, September 7, 1916, 214. 
loa. Editorial: "An Anti-Campaign." The Independent, August 28, 1916, 289. 
109. Ibid. ----
-
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110 
easily attract the voter's attention. and enthusiamn. 
Another editor while reviewing the cwnpaign speeohes in a dispassionate 
fashion did express the opinion that the critics of Hughes in asking him to 
state what he would have done had he been the chief executive were demand-
int; more of the candidate than any human being could answer. Yet, in 
editor expressed the sincere hope that Hughes would expound 
111 
his views on our future international relationships. 
An impartial resume of political opinion as expressed by the editors 
of leadin g newspapers throughout the nation was given by a well known 
112 
It stated that the newspapers were reporting favorably on 
the campaign on the personality and character of' the Republican nominee, 
113 
and on the impression made on the people. by the candidate. The political 
leaders and party managers, according to press dispatches, were pleased 
of' the western campaign and were claiming certain victory 
California, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, W.innesota, North 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and a fighting chance in Montana, 
114 
and Colorado. On the other hand this magazine gave the political 
viewpoints of' several non-partisan or independent newspapers which were 
11 
decidedly unfavorable in their camnents on the success of' the Hughes tour. 
While one newspaper stated that "••• Republicans as a rule are disappointed 
in the campaign of' their nominee, Mr. Hughes," another editor felt that 
109. Ibid. 
110. mrt'orial: "The Real Service of' !h-.llughes." ~ Independent,September 
4, 1916, 324. 
Editorial: "The National Campaign." The Outlook, August 23,1916, 931. 
Editorial: "Has Hughes Won the West?rr-nie Literary Digest, September 9, 
1916, 593. ----
113. Ibid. 
114. "''b'!CT. 
115. 1'61d. 
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116 
gughes in the latter half of the campaign would be a different figure. 
A very glowing account of Hughes' campaign was given by a staunch 
117 
admirer of the candidate. He was of the opinion that Hughes on his 
•estern tour had accomplished much as was attested by the editorials in the 
DEI!loore.tic journals whose editors in their columns sought "••. to criticize 
118 
and belittle the candidate and his speeches." To the criticism that 
in his speeches had failed to hold the interest of the people because 
sameness of subject matter this writer replied that the fragmentary 
excerpts in the newspapers each day gave the impression of repetition "••• 
but it must be remembered in all fairness," he stated," that Mr. Hughes ·has 
119 
necessarily much the same general message to tell everywhere." In his 
opinion Hughes had planned to win the West and he had succeeded. 
This likewise was the opinion of a correspondent who had been a member 
120 
of the campaign party. In denying the hostile charges concerning the 
apeeohes of Hughes this writer stated very amphatical+y that the West had 
received the candidate very enthusiastically and that large, interested 
had attended his speeches everywhere. To them the candidate in a 
sincere, personal fashion had delivered his messages on the broad 
issues which faced the nation and his views more than satisfied his listen-
era, reported this correspondent. In his magazine articles he earnestly 
the stories co the aloofness of the candidate refuted the 
116. Ibid. 
117. Jacob Schurman, "Mr. Hughes' Trip."~ Independent,September 4,1916,342 
118. Ibid. 
119. I'bl"l. 
120. Trec!erick Davenport, "Across the Continent with Hughes." The Outlook, 
September 13, 1916, 88-92. Similar views expressed a week-rater, "Hughes 
and the People of the West," September 20, 1916, 141-146. 
oritioisms of the "••• hostile portions of the Atlantic press," and this 
.riter by his enthusiasm and sincerity gave the impression that the people 
121 
o:f the West l'«>Uld vote the Republican ticket in November. 
In the opinion of another editor the real political campaign had not 
109 
begun and just how it would develop remained to be seen although he believed 
that it would be "••• concerned with large issues of public policy and with 
national leadership in critical times," and that it would be decided upon 
122 
by the independent voter, many of them from the Progressive Party. 
That the members of the Progressive Party would play an important 
in the Presidential election seemed to be a well accepted viewpoint. 
This was evident by national interest displayed in the state elections of 
California. There, early in August, Governor Johnson won the nomination for 
the position as state Senator. This victory was viewed in various lights. 
The Progressives were jubilant; candidate Hughes sent a telegram of con-
gratulations to the victor and Republicans and Progressives hailed it as 
123 
"••• an omen of national victory for a reunited party," reported one writer. 
However, a Democratic paper saw in it a hope that the people of California. 
would vote for President Wilson because many Progressives were still rankled 
124 
by the behavior of the Republican candidate toward Johnson. The editor 
of a non-partisan newspaper while aware that the victo~J of Johnson was 
important, felt that "••• it -would be premature to undertake to say what 
121. Ibid. 
122. Editorial: "The Political Campaign. • The American Review of Reviews, 
August 1916, 143. Similar viewpoint fotlnd in an editorial:fn The World' 
Work, August 1916, 359. ----
123.~son's Victor.r," The Litera~ Digest, September 23,1916, 731J Similar 
views found in an e"ddtorial: The Admlnistration on Trial." The Inde-
pendent,September 11,1916, 369; New York Tribune, September,l916;-!he 
Chica&o Iaily Tribune, September 1,1916; and "The Field of PoliticS":"" 
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effect the California vote will have upon the vote in November." He 
inferrei that the Progressives, sinoe they were heartily eager to defeat 
126 
the Democrats would compromise and agree on Hughes. However, he brought 
out the fact that there were many Progressives who were disgruntled with 
Hughes not only because of his actions while in California, but also were 
displeased with his views on European and Mexican affairs. As a consequence 
they were earnestly working to convince the independeJII:; voters of the 
state that "••• a vote cast for Mr. Wilson will better express the social, 
economic, and political faith that is in them than a ballot cast for 
127 
:Mr. Hughes." 
While the Republican candidate was campaigning in the West, party 
leaders were busy in the East. It was planned that Fairbanks, after his 
notification on August 31, should make a whirlwind speaking tour, covering 
128 
practically the same ground as Hughes. Colonel Roosevelt, too, was to 
join the list of campaign speakers. After a meeting with Reptibli~ 
National Chairman Willcox it was announced that the Colonel would actively 
~paign for Hughes and although no definite schedule was announced other 
than his speech in Lewiston, Maine on August 31, it was reported he "WOuld 
129 
be used wherever he was most needed. This announcement plus the news that 
123. The Outlook, September 13, 1916, 64. 
124. wJohnson•s Victory." The Literary Digest, September 23, 19161 731. 
125. Editorial: The ChristlUUi Science Monitor, September 15, 1916. 
126. Ibid. 
127. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, September 15, 1916. 
128. New York Tr"i'6ii'zie, August 4, 1916 
129. New "YY?'£ Tribune, August 25, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
AuguSt'24, l9l6. -
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Albert Beveridge would deliver a speech in ChicagQ on October 5, and the 
nBW'S that Colonel Harvey, formerly a supporter of President Wilson, had 
indicated his ~llingness to campaign for Hughes started "••• joy radiating 
through the political circles and did much to push away some of the gloom 
clouds caused by pessimistic reports industriously circulated as to 
130 
conditions in the West, a reported one paper. 
Late in August the ~paigners met in Indianapolis to prepare plans 
tor launching an aggressive progr~ all over the country especially in the 
western sections which needed Republican attention. 'Americanism and 
National Efficiency' was to be the campaign slogan. Besides the candidate 
and Colonel Roosevelt suoh prominent speakers as Senators Borah and Harding 
were to deliver many speeches. Their efforts "WOuld be directed toward 
impressing the public that the campaign was not one of politicians or 
131 
localities, but of 'absolute nationalism' reported the papers. 
As the first month of the campaign closed the center of attention was 
directed toward the state of Maine. Both major political groups were con-
oentrating their energies there in the hope of winning a victory in the Pine 
state which was to hold its state elections on September 11. Maine was 
known as the barometer state and the trend of its early fall elections was 
usually indicative of the results in Nov~ber for the nation as well as for 
132 
the state, reported one editor. 
130. The Chicago ~ly Tribune, August 24, 1916. 
131. New York Triune, August 27, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
Augu'St""2"9, 1916. -
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As had been planned Colonel Roosevelt delivered his first real campaign 
speech in Lewiston., Maine on August 31. In reporting on the speeeh one 
editor said that the Colonel in his usual and characteristic fashion had 
133 
denounced the Wilson administration while another stated that the address 
.as an "••• appeal to the chivalr.y and oourage of' the American people ••• ;" 
and one in which the Colonel attacked the hyphenates, reported a third 
135 
The reviews of the speech indicated that the major portion of' 
the speech had been devoted to an attack upon the foreign policy of' Preo~·~~··~~ 
wilson declaring., as wrote one editor., "••• that the timidity and vacilla 
136 
o£ the President had brought indelible disgrace upon the country." 
Roosevelt in condemning the Danocrats for their slogan., ''Mr. Wilson Has Kepb 
Us out of War," cited that the 'peace' existing between the United States 
of' words only., for Roosevelt said: 
These are the words. Now for the deeds. 
During the war with Spain fewer Americans 
were killed by the Spanish than have been 
killed by the Mexicans during the present 
'peace' with Mexico. Moreover, when the 
war with Spain was thru, it was thru. But 
peace still continues to rage in Mexico.l37 
speech Roosevelt advocated an immediate increase of' the anny., the 
creating of' "••• a system of' universal., obligatory military service in time 
of peace, and in time of' war universal service in whatever capacity the man 
138 
or woman shall be judged most fit to serve the commonwealth." 
133. Editorial: "The Administration on Trial." ~ Independent, September 11, 
1916, 369. 
134. Editorial: "Roosevelt's Maine Speech." The Outlook, September 6,1916,14. 
135. The Christian Science Monitor, September-!, 1916. 
136. Eartoria1: "The Adiiiinistration on Trial." The Independent, September 11, 
1916, 369. -
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The Colonel appealed to the people and gave his reasons Why in his 
judgment it was a grave misfortune to re-elect Mr. Wilson. He attacked 
those who in his opinion were aiming to organize .Am.eriesn citizens along 
tpolitico racial' lines and stated that "••• every citizen voting this year 
shall consider the question fmm the standpoint of America and not from the 
139 
standpoint of any other nation." In conclusion he contrasted the two 
presidential candidates, picturing Hughes as a man of his "M.>rd and Wilson 
140 
as a man who had been tried and found wanting. 
The speech was doubly important because it not only was a clear 
indication of Roosevelt's views toward the fall election·but also showed 
that the Colonel was wholeheartedly willing to campaign for Hughes. It was 
believed that his active participation would have great influence in "••• 
keeping his fellow Progressives from straying off the ranch," reported one 
141 
editor. 
Meanwhile Hughes to his listeners in Kansas City, Missour, on September 
1 gave one of his usual speeches placing special enphasis on the need for 
protection in its broadest sense. On this topic he stood for the "••• 
protection of American lives upon land and high seas and foreign lands, for 
protection of workingmen throughout the country, for protection of all 
American industries, for protection of the Treasury from raids of job se 
142 
and reckless legislators." Hughes also appealed to the people to vote 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, Septenber 1, 1916. 
"Tiie Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 1916. 
I'brd. 
ECirt'orial: "The Administration on Trial." The Independent, September 
11, 1916, 369. ----
The Chicago Sunday Tribune, Septanber 2, 1916; and~~ Tribune, 
§eptember 2,1916. 
into office a Republican House of Representatives and Senate in order to 
143 
haVe an administration that would be able to achieve results. 
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Upon reaching st. Louis, the home of many Germ.a.n-.Americans, Hughes was 
directly confronted with the hyphenate problem and he met it in a direct 
manner by subscribing to the utterances of Colonel Roosevelt as expressed 
in his Lewiston speech. In the congratulatory telegram to the Colonel the 
Republican candidate said: "I heartily congratulate you on your speech at 
144 
Lewiston and warmly appreciate your support. • Later when questioned as to 
whether his telegram indicated his acceptance of the Colonel's views on 
the hyphenates Hughes replied: "The telegram may be taken on its face value. 
145 
I mean just what I said." Thus Hughes made it so obvious that he was 
against any foreign-born citizen who placed his allegiance to another 
country over his duty to his adopted land and that there could be no possibl 
146 
doubt of his meaning reported one paper. As one editor expressed it, 
the Ger.man-American group no longer had "••• a shadowy basis for a belief 
that he favors in the smallest degree their views upon our relations with 
147 
Germaey. Following up the subject Hughes stated that while he was not 
too proud to fight he believed that there would be no occasion for fighting 
~f our rights were upheld. The enthusiasm with which these straightforward 
utterances were received by the audiences in St. Louis surprised the politi-
148 
cal leaders, stated one newspaper. 
m. Ibid. 
144. ~Field of Politics." The Outlook, September 13, 1916, 63. 
145. Ibid. -
l4o. New York Tribune, September 3, 1916. 
147. Ecrrtorial: "Mr. Hughes and st. Louis. 11 .!!:! Nation, September 7, 1916j[4 
148. ~ ~ Tribune, September 3, 1916. 
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On the next day Hughes traveled to Nashville, Tennessee and his address 
there was noteworthy on several scores. One newspaper brought out the f'act 
that it was the first tim.e a Republican Presidential nominee had entered the 
149 
territory f'or campaign purposes. His hostile audience ridiculed, 
heckled, and jeered his speech in which he criticized the administration f'or 
its policies, argued f'or a protective tariff', and asserted, in a fir.m 
150 
manner, that he stood for the arbitration of all industrial disputes. 
This last issue was a new note in the campaign due to the signing by Presi-
dent Wilson on September 3 of the so-called Adamson law which had been 
hastily rushed through Congress in order to avert a threatened strike of' 
151 
railroad employees. The methods used in the passage of the bill were 
seized upon by the Republican candidate and criticized severely. Referring 
to this bill Hughes asserted that he stood for two things, first, "••• for 
the principle of' fair, impartial, thorough, candid arbitration; and,second, 
152 
tor legislation on facts according to necessities of the case •••• 11 To 
this statement his audience cheered and agreed but in the middle of the 
candidate's criticism of tho administration's Mexican policy one heckler 
shouted: "What would you have done?" To this Hughes quickly replied: "I 
153 
would have protected .American lives." There was no more heckling and one 
149. The Christian Science MOnitor, September 5, 1916. 
150. Review of' speech found in New York Tribune, SeptElllber 5, 1916; The 
Chicago_ Dail.z Tribune, September 5, 1916; and~ Christian Sci'ence 
Monitor, September 5, 1916. 
151. Bill signed on September 3, resigned September 5,1916. ~ Independent, 
September 18, 1916, 403. 
152. The Chicago Daily Tribune,September 5,1916; and !!! York Tribune, 
September 5, l9l~. 
153. Ibid. 
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nev~spaper writer reported that Hughes had turned "• •• an almost riot into 
a personal victory," and in his opinion whether or not the speech won a 
single vote for Hughes his audience had left the hall with a warm feeling 
154 
toward the candidate. Republiean leaders and ~tars were pleased by 
the candidate's 'flatfooted' declaration for arbitration in labor disputes 
and felt that he had siezed upon a weakness in the administration which 
155 
.ould develop into a patent issue in the national campaign. One editor 
stated that this speech of Hughes "••• may well prove to be the turning 
156 
point in his campaign." Not that the speech would necessarily determine 
the election, believed the editor, but rather that the candidate in this 
speech showed himself to be the man 'Whom the people had nominated, the man 
with f'irm principles, dauntless courage and of whom it oould be said that 
"••• not the power of wealth nor the pressure of populace nor the threats 
of labor-unions will swerve him from following the dictates of his clear 
157 
convictions." 
On the next day the crowds in Lexington, Kentucky were won over by the 
speeches of Hughes in which he again openly attacked the President for his 
railroad wage policy, for his humanitarian policy in Mexico, and for his 
158 
diplomatic appointments. It was reported that there was a possibility 
that the state of Kentucky might vote. "epublioan in the fall election due 
------------------···------------------154. New York Tribune, September 6 1 1916. 
155. Ibid., an~e Field of Politics." The Outlook, September 13, 63. 
156. Editorial: "The Issue of Character.~e Nation, September 4,1916, 251 
157. Ibid. 
158. 'ifEiVTYork Tribune, September 6, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
September 6, 19!'6. 
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to the fact that the Progressives in the state had indicated their willing-
159 
to endorse Hughes. 
On September 7 Hughes invaded New England in an effort to swing the 
state of Maine to the Republioans in the elections to be held on September 
ll• It was believed that the well known axiom 'As goes Maine. so goes the 
union' while unfounded• -would prove to have a psychological effect on the 
00untry at large and both major parties were anxious and deter.mined to make 
160 
a good showing in the voting in the state elections. The Republican 
oandidate toured the state speaking in many of' the smaller cities and giving 
his main addresses in Portland and in Bangor on the following day. In 
Portland his address followed the lines of' those previously delivered by 
161 
him. The high spot of' his speech was his attack on the President for the 
enactment of' the Adamson bill. In criticizing this so called eight-hour 
act Hughes charged that the administration had substituted "••• the rule of 
162 
force" for "••• the rule of reason." He objected very strenuously to 
the methods used in the passage of the bill and declared that if he had 
been the chief executive of the United States he would not have yielded to 
force exerted by capital or labor short of a "••• fair examination of their 
163 
facts and a knowledge of 'What the ease demanded." Further on in his 
164 
speech he stated: "This country must ne:v"er know legislation under oppression.: 
159. Ibid. 
160. Eariorial: The Nation, August 31; 1916, 192; and The Chicago Daily 
Tribune, September io. 1916. -
161. Accounts of speech found in The Chi~o ~bilz Tribune, September 8•1916 
and The Christian Science Monitor, eptem er a. l916. 
162. Ibid-;-
163. I'bl"l. 
164. Ibid. 
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Again he reiterated that he believed in the peaceful settlement of all 
grievances by arbitration and felt that the nation might "••• as well give 
up Democratic govermuent i!' we are not ruled by reason, if we yield to 
165 
force." In this address he also spoke on the grave need for protecting 
.American labor, for making preparations for the economic oonditions which 
would naturally arise at the end of the war in Europe, and on the need for 
166 
eaoh and everyone to work for the good of the nation, reported one paper. 
An interesting sidelight of the occasion was the presence on the 
platform of Raymond Robbins, former Progressive leader. In his address he 
gave his reasons for supporting the Republican candidate, namely, that he 
believed that Hughes ~uld carry out the ideals of the Progressive Party. 
The reception given these remarks indica ted the presence of many Pro-
167 
gressives in the audience. 
On the next day in Bangor the newspapers reported that Hughes again 
168 
developed in a vigorous faShion his opposition to the Adamson bill. 
In answer to his critics he made clear his attitude toward labor. He 
replied that he was a friend of the laboring man and that he would be tm 
first to give higher wages where the demand for higher wages was found to 
169 
be just after an examination of the facts. 
His speeches in this state were reported as having been more vigorous, 
more to the and this new zest ot the candidate and added 
165. Ibid. 
166. ~Christian Science Monitor, September 81 1916. 
167. The Chicago Daily TrThune, September a, 1916. 
168. Accounts of speeCh found in New York Tribune, September 9, 1916; The 
Chicago Dailt Tribune, Septem.ber--s;-1916; and The Christian Soia~ 
Monitor, Sap ember 10, 1916. -
169. Ibid. 
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cheer to the Republican leaders. However, manywere skeptical of the 
lf].sdom of making the Adamson law an issue, but Hughes being convinced of 
its import.ance continued to nake it the high point of his speeches as he 
campaigned in the New England states and in New York. It was reported that 
he had injected more vim and 'more vote-getting utterances' into his 
171 
addresses since he had first attacked the Adamson bill in Nashville. 
The results of the election in Maine ware an overwhelming victory for 
the Republicans for not only was a Republican governor elected but also two 
172 United States Senators and four Representatives. That the jubilant 
Republicans regarded this decisive election as indicative of what ~uld 
happen in the national election in November was reported by the newspapers 
173 
and magazines. Clearly the Progressives in Maine had united once more 
with the Republican forces and one editor stated that he believed this 
amalgamation was "••• as complete the country over as it has now been proved 
to be in Maine," and so to him and others the Chances of a re-election of 
174 
President Wilson were negligible. While many agreed that the election 
results proved conclusively that the Progressives of Maine had rejoined the 
Republican Party yet the editors of several nagazines and newspapers 
expressed the opinion that the merger in Maine was not indicative of a 
similar realignment in other states in the union especially in the doubtfUl 
175 
states of the West. 
170. The Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1916. 
171. NeW York Tribuna, September 9, 1916. 
172. NeW York Tribune, September 12, 1916; and an editorial: ~Nation, 
September 14, 1916, 247. 
173. New York Tribune, September 12, 1916; The Chicago Dailz Trib~t!,Sept­
ember-!2, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, September 12, 1916; 
"The Maine Election." The Outlook, September 20, 1916, 117 J "The 
Message from Maine." The Literarz Digest, September 23,1916, 727-29; 
and editori 1• ' Part " 
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Candidate Hughes ending his first transcontinental campaign tour in 
plattsburg, New York on September 12, expressed his gratification of the 
results in Maine. The returns convinced him, he stated, of the following: 
that the party was reunited; that the people were satisfied with his 
0e.mpe.ign methods; and that they approved and would endorse his views on the 
176 
Adamson bill. 
Another feather in the Republican cap was the announcement by the 
nationally known Progressive leaders, Gifford Pinohot, that he, following 
the example of Roosevelt and Robbins, had chosen to join the Repu:bl.ioa.n 
ranks. In his statement he gave his reason .for so doing and in conclusion 
stated: "I cannot vote for Wilson because I cannot trust him. He does not 
do what he says. Hughes does. Therefore, my choice is Hughes and I shall 
177 
work and vote for him." Approval of his stand was given by one editor 
who wholeheartedly agreed with him and firmly believed that many people 
178 
felt precisely as Pinohot did. 
Within the Republican Party there was a murmur of strife. Many 
members of the 'Old Guard' were not satisfied with the campaign, felt it 
lacked the vigorous spirit, believed that Willcox as National Chairman was 
not sufficiently aggressive, and asserted that the speeches of Hughes were 
Opinion, October 1916, 218. • 
174. Editorial: New York Tribune, September 12,1916; Th. e Chicago Dai~z T.ri-
bune, September""TI'; 1916; ''Maine Election." The 'Outlook, Septem ar-m, 
~. 116; and reports of the opinions of other newspapers found in: 
"The Message from Maine.n The Literary Digest, September 23,1916,727-29 
175. Editorials: "The Result in Maine." The Nation,Septem.ber 21,1916,271; 
The New Republic, September 16,1916:-T49; ~ine Exhibits a Reunite4 
Party." Current Opinion, October 1916, 218; and reports of the opinions 
of other newspaper editors found in: nThe Message from Maine." The 
Literary Digest, September 23,1916, 727-29. ---
176. New York Tribune, September 13 ,1916; The Chicago Da%ly News,September 
13'; 19I'lf; and The Christian Science MOiiTtor, Septem er 1"3";!'916 
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not the kind to win the election. In their opinion his tour of the 
west had been a failure. Hughes, however, quite satisfied with the way the 
o(llll.pEioign had been managed, met with Willcox and assured him of his confi-
180 
dance. 
Hughes having finished his first campaign 1x>ur immediately arranged 
for his seoond trip which would take him through the states of Illinois, 
181 
wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. On 
this tour he planned to speak in such leading cities as Milwaukee, Cleve-
}And, Pittsburg, New York, and Buffalo. Great results were expected by 
Roosevelt of Hughes' trip in the M1ddle-West, a section of the country 
182 
definitely Republioan in allegiance, reported one paper. The Republican 
leaders met and carefully perfected their plans. While confident of victory 
they anphasized the need of every political leader getting out and working 
hard, the need for arousing the political interest in every state which 
183 
was doubtful. According to the plans of Hughes he would continue his 
drive against the Adamson law, and at the same time he hoped to make it 
clear to the public that he was not opposed to the principle of an eight-
184 
hour law. The major business interests of the Middle West such as 
177. Gifford Pinohot, ~Vilson's Record Should Make Every Progressive Vote 
for Hughes." The Literary Digest, September 30, 1916, 852-53; and 
editorial: "P~ot for Hughes," The Nation, September 20,1916, 116. 
178. Editorial: "The Chicago Dailt Trioune, September 12, 1916. 
179. New York Trioune, Septe.mber3, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
September 12, 1916. --- " 
180. Ibid. 
181. TheChic,o rity Tribune, September 14,1916; and The Christian Science 
MOnitor, ep an er 14, 1916. 
182. raw York Tribune, September 19, 1916. 
183. Ibrd., September 14, 1916. 
184. New York Tribune, September 19, 1916. 
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£arming, dairying, shipping, and commerce were particularly interested in 
the subject of the Adamson act and, according to one paper, Hughes proposed 
185 
to remove the disguise from the measure and show it up for what it was. 
LikeWise, the Republican candidate would earnestly refute the Democratic 
slogan: ~ilson Kept Us Out of War," to argue that it would "••• have been 
186 
onlY a befuddling blunderer who could have pitched the country into war." 
Campaign speeches were to be made by many prominent Republicans. 
Fairbanks was to take the stump traveling westward through Oklahoma and 
)4i.ssouri, to be followed by Senator. Lewis. Taft and Root, also, were to 
~paign in October in support of Hughes. Beveridge was to cover the waste 
sections in order to arouse and convince the Progressives and to swing th~ 
187 
to the standard of Hughes. Roosevelt, too, was to speak in the West 
spots' where it was believed his fire and enthusiasm was 
188 
needed in order to turn the tide to the Republicans. The Colonel, 
reported one newspaper, was not as optimistic about the outcome of the 
election as some for he realized that a hard fight was ahead, that stronger 
efforts would have to be made in order to corral the Progressive vote in 
the Middle West and West. It was generally conceded, this paper stated, 
that the election " ••• would be determined by that large element of former 
Progressives who will return this year to one or the other of the two old 
parties and to bring this now floating element back to the Republican fold 
185. Ibid.,and The Christian Science MOnitor, September 19, 1916. 
186. New York TrrOune, September 16, 1916. 
187. The Clii'Oago Daily Tribune, September 19, 1916. 
188. NeW York Tribune, September 15, 1916. Similar viewpoint as expressed by 
lea~newspapers found in: "Progressive Leaven in the Republican 
Camp." ~Literary: Digest, September 30, 1916, 818-19. 
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is the task ahead of Hughes and his managers." 
Beginning his second tour in Springfield, Illinois, Hughes spoke 
123 
before a large audience. Here again he made the Adamson law the chief topic 
of his address. After pointing out the fallacies and weaknesses of the 
bill he denounced it, criticizing the manner of its passage. In his 
opinion there had been no need to rush the law through Congress, for by 
appealing to public opinion the threatened railroad strike would never have 
been called. He said: "I am satisfied there could have been no strike. 
We are still ruled by public opinion, and no administration need fear the 
190 
results if it stands firmly for essential principle." He pointed out 
that the bill did not establish an eight-hour workday nor did it have 
provisions that would tend to bring the eight-hour ~rkday into effect. 
Granted that the law did give an increase in wages to certain groups of 
railroad men and granted that this increase might have been justified by 
facts, yet the fact remains, he said, that "••• it has been forced upon 
Congress and the country by the President of the United States without 
prior inquiry, in the face of an appeal for arbitration, and at the cost 
191 
of the repudiation of that principle and the shame of the national Congres~" 
Wilson's excuse that a dire emergency existed which made necessary the 
passage of the bill, Hughes exposed as being false, because, he stated, the 
189. New York Tribune, September 8 1 1916. Similar view held by editor of 
The Nation, September 21, 1916, 268. 
190. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune, September 20, 1916; 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 26,21, l916J editorials: '~r.Hughe 
Oiltlie Eignt Hour Law." The Independent, October 2, 1916, 9; and 
"Hughes and Wilson." The~terary Digest, October 7, 1916, 874. 
191 • .!!!! Chicago Daily Tri'buiie,. Septeliiber 21,. 1916. 
situation had been developing for months and neither the President nor 
192 
124 
congress had done anything about it. In an appeal to all wage-earners 
he asked that they wisely consider all angles of the issue for in the end, 
he believed, all wage-earners would lose because of the means used in the 
passage of the bill. 
At the State Fair in Peoria, Illinois, Hughes won the approval of his 
listeners by his doctrine of protection. He saidJ 
We are devoted to the doctrine of protection •••• 
We propose that American rights w.i. th respect 
to life, property, and commerce shall be pro-
tected with respect to every nation on earth. 
We are for protection of American peace. 
We are not militaristic but we must be firm 
and unflinching and prepared in such a manner 
that none w.i.ll mistake either our disposition 
our our ability to maintain our just rights.l93 
He ridiculed the statement that others had kept us out of war and 
again said that only a 'blunder' could get the nation into war for no 
nation desired trouble with us. He stated: "It is weakne.ss and vacillation 
and permitting others to misunderstand us which brings us dangerously near 
194 
such an outbreak of resentment as may lead us to serious trouble." All 
matters he felt could have been handled in a diplomatic manner, but, he 
195 
declared, "••• we must be firm. We must be for America First." 
These addresses were well received by the voters in Illinois, reported 
196 
papers. Hughes had been more direct in his remarks and had driven 
home his points w.i.th telling effect. In this state he gained the enthusi-
astic support of the women Who were to vote for the first time. 
nz. Ibid. 
193. New York Tribune, September 20, 1916. 
194. Ibid-;--
195. Ibi<l. 
196. 1'Sfc!. 
The people in Wisconsin received the candidate and his views most 
197 
125 
enthusiastically stated the papers. In Milwaukee, notwithstanding the 
fact that his audience was largely made up of naturalized Americans, Hughes 
spoke directly of 'undiluted Americanism' and his 'straight fra.m the 
198 
shoulder' remarks were well received by his listeners. 
In his many speeches throughout the state he stressed as issues the 
199 
tariff, 'Americanimn,' Federal Reserve Law, and the Shipping Bill. 
Speaking on the failure of the Underwood Tariff he declared that only a 
protective tariff could preserve prosperity by safeguarding business 
interests and by keeping the wages up to the American standard. On the 
protection of American rights his remarks were the same as those in his 
previous speeches. Bringing the Federal Reserve bill for its place in the 
crunpaign against the administration he stated that the Democrats had hoped 
by its passage to gain friends from business interests. Yet Hughes main-
tained that the greater part of this valuable act of legislation had been 
taken from material supplied by a Republican Commission and a draft of a 
Republican bill. Therefore, it was really based upon Republican efforts 
200 
and upon Republican foundations. On the Shipping Bill ~ich the Democra 
called an aid to business and which Hughes declared a direct blow to Amari 
therefore, should be removed, he said: "It unjustifiably 
201 
introduces the government into the shipbuilding business." 
197. Ibid., September 21, 1916; and The Christian Science MOnitor, September 
~1916. 
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On the following three days Hughes carried his campaign into Indiana;02 
Before the voters of Richmond he spoke vigorously on the Mexican situation. 
ffe charged the President with having done everything that should not have 
been done in regard to Mexico and with having lett undone the things that 
should have been done. Hughes condemned him for having meddled with Mexican 
affairs in a way "••• which forfeited to us the esteem we should have 
enjoyed, and finally resulted in leaving Mexico to the ravages of revolution 
203 
without protection of our citizens or the citizens of any other country. 
His conclusions were based on the authentic information Which Hughes said 
he had received concerning the actual instructions given to John Lind, 
Ambassador to Mexico, in relation to Huerta and the Mexican Presidency. 
Hughes concluded that there was 
one way and one clear way to secure the 
respect of Mexico and of every other 
nation and to maintain our prestige and 
our influence; one way to be really helpful, 
and that is tor America to recognize the 
just demands of American citizenship and 
protect American lives and property throughout 
the world, and I stand here to say that so tar 
as I am concerned, it entrusted with the 
executive responsibility, !'·shall to the 
utmost of my powers maintain American rights 
on land and sea throughout the world with 
respect to all nations, as to American 
lives, American property, and American 
commerce.205 
204 
Throughout the state of Indiana, to the thousands who wildly cheered 
him Hughes contented himself with a review of his usual topics, hitting 
202. Accounts of campaign found in The Chicago ~ly Tribune, September 22-2 
1916; The Christian Science Monitor, Septan er 22-24, l916; and New 
York Trrbune, September 22-25, 1916. ---
203. EditOrial: "Mr. Hughes and the Administration. "The Independent, October 
2,9. 
John Lind had been authorized to state the following to a representa-
tive of another overnment: "Huerta will be ou h 
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hardest on Wilson's surrender of the principle of arbitration, on the fail-
ure of thetariff, on the betrayal of American rights, and on 'Americanism.' 
The last two topics were enthusiastically received and approved by his 
206 . 
audiences. Republican leaders, pleased with the candidate's campaign in 
Indiana, reported that in their opinion the three states of Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana were definitely aligned on the Republican side, and 
that the speeches and manner of the candidate had encouraged his political 
207 
li'Orkers. New impetus had been given to tile campaign. 
A critical editor, in reviewing this part of the campaign complained 
that the Republican candidate had devoted himself "••• largely to domestic 
issues and the Administration's Mexican policy •••" and had not undertaken 
"••• to any great extent, to carry on a campaign of education of the 
American people in the large questions of international obligations raised 
208 
by the European war. 
In the cities of Dayton, Cleveland, and Toledo Hughes continued to 
assail the President and the administration. His attacks upon the Adamson 
law were more severe. In reply to the President's defense of it Hughes 
declared that "••• there had been too much legislation just to get the votes 
of one set of men or another and that such action led to civil war and if 
209 
continued would cost the nation its democratic form of government •••• " 
that it is the preference of the President that it should be accom-
plished by domestic means if possible, but if it cannot be done by 
domestic means other means adequate for the purpose ~11 be resorted 
to." Editorial: The Independent, October 2, 1916. 
205. Ibid. -
206. Tlie"Chicago Dally Tribune, September 23,24,19il6; New York Tribune, 
September 23,2 , 1916. · --
207. New York Tribune, September 24,1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
September 24, l916. -
208. ¥~~torial: "The Presidential Campaign."~ Outlook,September 27,1916, 
continuing, he stated that he believed that those who engineered the 
passage of the bill never had thought of enacting an eight-hour day law, 
and the administration by this misnomer, had endeavored to confuse the 
210 
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public. Hughes and his campaign leaders believed, it was reported, that 
even in the industrial sections of Ohio where the labor vote was large if 
the "••• issue is presented properly the people - labor and all - cannot 
211 
tail to realize 'What this sort of legislation means." 
In Cleveland, Ohio, referring to President Wilson for the first time by 
name, Hughes challenged him to deny the charges he had made that John Lind 
212 
had been instructed to put out Huerta if he did not voluntarily get out. 
To the laborers in the steel mills of Pittsburg, to his audiences 
throughout his stay in that city the Republican candidate expounded the 
same points he had delivered in his speeches in the large cities on his to~ 
He placed special emphasis upon the need for protecting the industries of 
country and for u ••• a prosperity that is not based on a European war 
on sound policies which will protect industry when there is no European 
213 
war to give war orders." Hughes stated his belief that a policy should be 
adopted to insure work, security for the workingman, and, he stated, that 
214 
the Republican Party would insure that result. His audiences cheered 
209. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 26, 1916. 
210. 1'6Td. 
211. New York Tribune, September 27, 1916. 
212. 1'6I'd., and The ~hristian Science Monitor, September 27, 1916. 
213. ~Christian-Science MOnitor, September 28, 1916. other reports of the 
"S"p'eech found in: New York Tribune, September 2k, 1916; and ~ Chicago 
¥bi~l Tribune, Septem~28, 1916. 
214. • 
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biS statements and listened with equftl enthusiasm to his gospel of 
t.AJ:nerice.nism.' and then in 'extra volume' to his attack on the Adamson bill, 
215 
reported the n6Wspapers. In this city he addressed not only the Republi-
cansbut also the Progressives and Hughes learned from his party leaders 
that ninety per cent of the Progressives in Pennsylvania were working to 
216 
promote his success in November. 
An angered speaker faced the audience in Saratoga, New York 
217 
reported the papers. Hughes, incensed by the accusations of ex-
secretary of State, Richard Olney, that he, the for.mer Justice of the 
court had doffed his 1 judicial ermine 1 to appear in the "... motley garb 
of an ordinary seeker of office •••" defended his actions in running for the 
218 
office of the Presidency. The fo~er Secretary of State had spoken in 
of the President's actions in connection with the Adamson law and 
defense Hughes replied in strong ter.ms. He produced letters and 
telegrams which broke down the President's defense of the Adamson law, 
219 
especially on the point that a crisis demanded the passage of the bill. 
Hughes charged that the United States Chamber of Commerce had urged Congress 
and the President to investigate the railroad situation weeks before and he 
proved that they did have ample time and opportunity for inquiry but had 
220 
failed to use them. Again his stand met with the approval of the men and 
215. Ibid. 
216. ~Chice.go ~ly Tribune, September 28 1 1916 
217. llid., Septem er 29, 1916; and New York Tribune, September 29, 1916 
218. ~Chicago Daily Tribrme, Septembe~, 1916 
219. I'DTd.; and New York Tribrme, September 29, 1916. 
220. Ibid.; and l'lle cru=rstiin Science Monitor, September 29, 1916. 
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~men in the audience and it was felt that the Adamson bill would become a 
221 
political issue in the East. 
At this time critici&m was hurled at Hughes by the editor of a non-
partisan paper. It was his opinion that Hughes had made a mistake in 
222 
stressing in his speeches the Mexican situation and the Adamson bill. 
It was this editor's belief that the people had made up their minds on the 
Mexican question and were satisfied that the President had done well in 
keeping the United States out of armed intervention in Mexico. Secondly, 
public opinion, he stated, had accepted the eight-hour law as a just and 
rational measure and so attacks on it were ' equally impolitic.• He 
suggested that Hughes stress a safer and sounder topic, the tariff, because 
the administration could not refute it and the Republican candidate could 
uphold it without much opposition from the Democrats. 
At the close of his speech in Buffalo the Republican candidate ended 
his second campaign tour. The general opinion of his managers was one of 
223 
approval. It was felt that his tour had been remarkably successful, 
enough even to gratify the most skeptical and it was believed that Hughes 
on his second trip had made more progress than on his earlier one. Repub-
lican leaders stated that Hughes had put more force and energy into his 
addresses and had won the confidence of the people. He had visited seven 
221. Ibid. 
222. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 1916, and 
similar views-expressed on October 5, 1916. 
223. A review of second tour found in New York Tribune, October 2, 1916; and 
~Christian Science Monitor, Oct'Ober 2, l9l6. 
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states whose electoral vote of 178 was a large portion of the necessary 
266. Confidence was expressed that Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin 
could be counted as Republican states and that while Ohio was debatable 
the good impression made by Hughes in the State of' Indiana combined with 
splendid political organization there would bring that state to the Repub-
224 
11can column. New York, too, would add to the Republican score and the 
225 
prospects of' victory in New Jersey were hopeful. Hughes, the papers 
stated, had squared off' the· issues emphasizing the following three: the 
Adamson law, the tariff', and '.Americanism;' and he had forced President 
226 Wilson to abandon his plan of a 'front porch campaign.' 
Meanwhile Colonel Roosevelt again stirred the voters of the nation by 
hour address to the people of Battle Creek, Michigan on September 
The papers reported that the main points of' the Colonel's eaoquent, 
speech were: the Mexican situation, the President's foreign policy 
and the action of the President in connection with the Adamson law. Presi-
dent Wilson in a speech had predicted war if the election was won by the 
Republicans and to this Roosevelt replied: "Oust him and save the country.fi 
In his speech the Colonel pictured Wilson as a coward and as a man whose 
no good. He had termed the President "••. as a man of' furtive and 
shirting political maneuvers •••• " and as one who was as "••• cowed by the 
229 
big labor leaders as he was by Mexico and Germany." Roosevelt in this 
224. Ibid. 
225. "t'Eiic!. 
226. "!66a. 
227. ~speech and reports of it found in The Chica~o Sunday Tribune,Octo-
ber 1, 1916; and New York Tribune, October 1, 1 16. Reports or it found 
in editorials: "~Campaign.~ Independent, October 9,1916, 57; and 
"He Ke:pt Us Out of War." The Lfuraq Di§est, October 14,1916,933-934. 
228 • ..IW1 ChJ.oa~o Sunday Tribuna, October ,-1 16 
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speech f'ollowed his general indictment of' the President and his administra-
tion by specif'ic instances of' ~~eir f'ailures. One editor wrote that the 
speech was a fighting one, the f'irst of' a series and if' the pace of' this 
one was indicative of' those to follow it, it augured a 'calorie and inter-
230 
esting' campaign. 
A f'aw days later on October 3 a very interesting meeting took plaoe in 
the Union League Club in New York City when three prominent men, Theodore 
Roosevelt, William Howard Taf't, and Charles Evans Hughes, addressed a group 
231 
of Republicans. Ostensibly the purpose of' the meeting was to welcome 
the Presidential candidate but what attracted the attention of' the public 
of' the two f'ormer presidents. One editor reported: 
The real signif'ioanoe of' it, however, lay in 
the f'aot that many men who have dif'f'ered 
radically with one another on certain aspects 
of' domestic policy, and even more radically on 
certain questions of' political morality and 
methods of' political organization and control, 
found themselves drawn together by the question 
of' Nationalism, and particularly by that 
question as it has been raised by perils in 
our f'oreign relations. It was the principle of' 
Nationalism that was the common subject of' the 
three prinoiple speeches of' the evening.232 
Both ex-presidents, Taf't and Roosevelt, in their brief' speeches com-
mended the position taken by Hughes on the issues of' the day and "••• empha-
230. Ibid. 
231. Accounts of' the meeting f'ound in New York Tribune, October 4,1916; 
The Chioa~o Daily Tribune, O?tober 4, 1916; The ~hristi~ Science 
Eronitor, ctober 4, 1916; ed1torials: "Republican Rally at union 
League." The Independent, October 16, 1916, 94; "Tho Hughes Meeting." 
The Outlo~ October 11, 1916, 293; and The Literary Digest, October 14 
1]!6, 923. ---
232. Editorial:"The Hughes Meeting." The Outlook, October 11, 1916, 294. 
sized the importance of the forthcoming election to good Americans," 
233 
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reported one editor. Colonel Roosevelt in his address struck directly 
at the President's foreign policy. In referring to the rumor that the 
Ger.man Reichstag was considering Whether or not to resume its U-boat warfare 
Roosevelt declared: "And you can guarantee that there would be no debate on 
that subject if they knew that we had as President of the United States a 
234 
man who would not tolerate any action of that sort." The Colonel 
denounced President Wilson's actions as an "• •• invitation to foreign Powers 
to do whatever they wished because if he were in power they need not be 
235 
afraid." 
The most significant passage of Hughes' speech, according to one 
editor, was the one in which he answered President Wilson's declaration 
"••• that to the Democratic policy of peace the Republicans had only one 
236 
alternative to present, namely, war. This was the answer of Hughes: 
We have heard in recent days that the alternative 
of the policy of the present adninistration is 
war. I think the alternative of the policy of 
the present administration is peace with honor. 
I am a man devoted to the pursuits of peace. We 
cherish the ideals of peace. We entertain no 
thought of aggression, we are not covetous, we 
are not exploiters, but we are Americans and 
American rights must be maintained throughout 
the world. That is the cornerstone of our 
security, that is the essential basis of our 
peace. We ••. are not courting struggle, but I 
do say with all seriousness that we have been 
living in a period of' National humiliation.237 
233. Editorial: "The Hughes Meeting."~ Outlook, October 11, 1916, 294. 
234. Ibid. 
235. Editorial: The Literary Digest, October 14, 1916, 923. 
236. Editorial: "Republican Ra!ly at Union League." The Independent, October 
16, 1916, 94. 
237. ~Christian Science MOnitor, October 4, 1916. 
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More -s-pace was given in the newspapers to an account of the meeting 
of the three men than to their speeches. In commenting upon the meeting 
one editor wrote that it was the c~paign's 'best omen' for it indicated 
that "••• all forces of Republicans and Progressives are united in oppositi 
to the continuance of the shame this country has endured ••• 11 and a reunited 
party is marching on 
238 
traditions •••• " 
" •• dedicated to the preservation of America's best 
That President Wilson by statements regarding the Republicans and war 
239 
had stirred the nation was evident by the editorials in newspapers. 
By his speech in Carnegie Hall on October 5, Elihu Root hurled his 
challenge at the Democratic administration. To those gathered before him, 
Root, according to the newspaper reports, "••• arraigned the record of the 
present adm.inlstration in the most clear-out indictment of the campaign to 
240 
date." Root paraded before his listeners the important issues that he.d 
occurred during the Democratic administration and "••• showed with master-
ful analysis the unsatisfactory tennination of every negotiation for their 
241 
settlement," wrote one paper. He stressed the administration's failures 
at home and abroad, its 'scuttling of American rights' which resulted in 
238. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916. 
239. Editorials: The Chicago '!5aily Tribune, October 5, 1916; New York 
Tribune, October 3, 1916; and excerpts of editorials of newspapers of 
the nation found in "H.e Kept Us Out of War, 11 The Literary Digest, 
October 4, 1916, 933. ---
240. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916. Other accounts found in 
New York Tribune, October 6, 1916; and editorial: 11Republi can Argu-
ments:w-The Out!ook, October 18, 1916, 348. 
241. The Chic~ Da.ilyYribune, October 6 1 1916. 
the slaughter of many American lives by German submarines and Mexican 
bandits, the aaninistration's surrender to the railroad unions, and its 
242 
total inability to prepare the country against future dangers. 
Of the administration's policy toward Mexico Root stated that the 
Jllt\Dller of handling affairs with our southern neighbor had resulted in 
135 
making enemies of both Villa and Carranza and "••• no man in Mexico dares 
243 
to oall himself our friend." The speaker in expressing his views tovfard 
Germany stated: 
Root declared that 
Germany paid no attention to the bold and 
weighty declaration of thd American govern-
ment because upon her trained observation 
and the estimate of the character of the 
men who controlled the American government 
she judged that they had not the nerve, the 
courage and the resolution, to make their 
threat good ••••" and so Germany continued 
her program of sea. warfa.re.244 
" ••• if our govermnent meant what it said when it de-
cla.red it would protect its citizens it should have had the capacity to 
make Germany understand that it meant what it said and the Lusitania would 
245 
never have been sunk." 
Speaking of the eight-hour law Root called it a 'holdup,' a piece of 
legislation passed in submission to a threat and "••• if the attitude of 
our government under compulsion of the railroad brotherhoods is to be the 
attitude of the .American people we hold our lives at the mercy of the public 
244 
blackmailer." 
242. New York Tribune, October 6, 1916. 243. rud-:--
244. ~ChicagoDaily Tribune, October 6, 1916. 
245. ~d. -
246. Ibid. 
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His speech struck a new note of appeal, was a call to awaken the real 
247 
spirit of America which lay asleep was the opinion of one editor. 
,Another editor believed that Root 1 s speech had stirred the DEIIlo era ts, would 
£orca Wilson to give an answer, would minimize the President's play to the 
2 
hyphenates, and, all in all, would weaken the Democratic campaign program. 
As the ~paign swung into its final weeks criticism and praise were 
IDBasured out to the Republican Party and its candidate. Hughes was criti-
oized for the organization of his speeches, for according to one campaign 
manager the candidate repeated the same thing in all his speeches which made 
it very difficult for the press to report on them. As a result the candi-
date and his views received less space in the newspaper and secured less 
249 
publicity. The suggestion was made that the candidate use one issue in 
each speech, concentrate on it, for after all, the real audience was not 
the immediate group in front of the speaker, but rather the large group 
250 
of voters who read aooounts of the speech in the newspapers and journals. 
Another newspaper writer, while upholding Hughes tor his stand on the labor 
issue, was of the opinion that it would be more profitable for the candidate 
251 
to change to another is sue. 
A very comprehensive review of the eampaign up to date was given by the 
252 
editor of a leading newspaper. He brought out the fact that Hughes on 
!tz. Ibid. 
248. New York Tribune, October 7, 1916. 
249. New~ Tribune, October a, 1916. Similar view expressed by the editor 
or-~atlon, September 7, 1916, 215. 
260. Ibia;-
251. "TlieChristian Science Monitor, October 5, 1916. 
252. lrcf:ftorial: The Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 1916. 
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his third campaign tour would make a definite, personal appeal which the 
0~paign managers hoped would bring back to the Republican fold ~he voters 
.no had strayed away in 1912. This editor wrote: "The election in November 
'ffill hinge very largely on whether the Republican candidate succeeds or 
tails in his efforts to strike a keynote to which the Mississippi Vall~ 
253 
will respond." A review of the campaign revealed the fact that Hughes 
on his first tour had anphasized the faults of the amninistration's Mexican 
policy and was diverted .from this issue only by the enactment of the Adamson 
law which he vigorously attacked and continued to attack with vigor. In 
his earlier attacks upon the bill Hughes had taken an extreme view but 
later on he modified his language "••. so as to avoid the creation of an 
antagonism to his candidacy in the ranks of organized labor," wrote the 
254 
editor. Hughes in his later speeches attacked not so much the bill as 
the manner used in its passage. The editor .felt that on the Mexican issue 
Hughes md maintained with "••• growing rather than diminishing vehemence 
255 
his organized indictment of Wilson's policy." 
The campaign was given added impetus by the addresses mde by leading 
figures in political circles. Senator Lodge added the ~ight of his 
influence to the Republican cause, refuting Wilson and stating that the 
Republican Party did not advocate war. In fact, the party meant to keep 
peace "• •• but it does not mean to keep it by humiliation and the cowardly 
256 
abandonment of .Am.erioan rights," declared Lodge. Similar views were 
?53. Ibid. 
254. 1'brd. 
255. 1'6I'Cr. 
256. New York Tribune, October 8• 1916. 
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eXPressed by Senator Beveridge in his address in Chicago. He declared that 
the Wilson regime had been a !'utile effort and the Wilson Mexican policy 
257 
a 'malpractice of statesmanship.' The Republican managers having lost 
some of their confidence of victory in the Middle West prepared an extensive 
program of education. It was one 'Which would almost be a man to nan canvass 
of the voters in every line of industry, including the farmers, in the 
258 
crucial states of Ohio, Wisconsin, and Indiana. 
Starting on the JAst swing of his campaign Hughes spoke in Philadelphia 
259 
on October 1. Changing the tone of his speech he spoke not so much on 
domestic issues as on diplomatic and foreign affairs. According to news-
paper reports Hughes charged the President "••• with attempting to escape 
deserved condemnation by trying to make the public think the alternative of 
260 
his policy is war." Hughes believed that Wilson had not kept the nation 
out of war, for during the Democratic administration the nation had been 
261 
involved in a war, a war without honor. The candidate made it clear that 
if he were elected he would enforce .American rights on land and sea. He 
outlined the Republican program in two respects as follows: 
We do not propose to tolerate improper 
interference with American property, with 
American mails, or ~th legitimate commercial 
intercourse. 
No .American who is exercising only .American 
rights shall be ~ut on any blacklist by any 
foreign nation.2 2 
257. The Chica'o Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916. 
258. New York ribune, October 6, 1916. 
259. "'!bfd:;Dctober To, l916J and The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10,1916 
260. New York Tribune, October 10,---rn-16. 
261. Ibid-;--
262. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10, 1916. 
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!gain and again Hughes declared that had the American government left no 
doubt that when it said 'strict accountability' it meant precisely that, 
he was confident that there would have been no destruction of American lives 
263 
by the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' "Unfortunately," stated one editor, 
"such a statemenb left open to question just what Mr. Hughes himelf meant; 
by ' strict accountability,' and gave some support to the charges of persons 
politically unfriendly to Mr. Hughes that he was striving to hold the 
264 
support of German-Americans by a deliberate vagueness of statement." 
The speech, in fact, became the cause of a political controversy for, 
according to one paper, a leading political writer made the oharge that 
this speech of Hughes had been written under the auspices of a prominent 
265 
New York German newspaper. 
Three days later in Louisville, Hughes made one of the most brilliant 
266 
speeches of his campaign. One editor felt that this speech was "••• the 
most definite and significant statemenb upon the relations between the 
267 
United States and Germany which the candidate has yet given to the public." 
The editor stated that while the Republican candidate had on many occasions 
denounced President Wilson for "••• his weakness in handling the question 
raised by the German submarine issue •••• • yet he had never stated except 
268 in a general way what he would have done in the President's place. 
263. Ibid.; The Christian Science Monitor, October 10, 1916; and editorial: 
~t Mr;-Hughes Would Have Done." The Independent, October 23,1916, 
1~. --
264. Editorial: ~Vhat Mr. Hughes Would Have Done." The Independent, October 
23, 1916, 1~. ----
265. Editorial: The Nation, Dctober 19, 1916, 363. 
266. Accounts o~e speech found in New York Tribune, October 13, 1916; 
..!!:.! Christian Science Monitor, Octo berl'3, 1916; ~ Chioago Da.ily 
Tribune, October 13, 1916; and editorial: '~ihat Mr. Hughes Would Have 
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In the midst of the candidate's discussion on the maintenance of 
,AJnerica.n rights he was interrupted by a heckler who demanded, "What would 
269 
you have done when the 'Lusi tania' was sunk?" Hughes quickly answered: 
I would have had the State Department, at the 
very beginning of the administration, so 
equipped as to command the respect of the world, 
and next I would have so conducted a:t'i'airs in 
Mexico as to show that our words meant peace 
and good will and the protection at all events 
of the lives and property of American citizens. 
And next, when I said strict accountability, 
every nation would have known that that was meant; 
and further when notice was published with 
respect to the action threatened I would have 
made it known in terms unequivocal end unmistakable 
that we should not tolerate a continuance of 
friendly relations through the ordinary diplomatic 
channels if that action were taken. 
And the Lusitania, sir, would never have been 
sunk.270 
After the applause the candidate continued his speech, dwelling on 
the need for a protective tariff and on the •new freedom' advocated by 
27l 
President Wilson in 1912 and now transmuted, reported one paper. 
Reactions to this speech were varied. One editor disagreeing with 
Hughes believed that the severance of diplomatic relations as indicated by 
2$! 
Hughes would not have been sufficient to cause Germany to cease her program. 
In the editor' s opinion only a fear of war with us would have kept Germany 
273 
from resuming her 'policy of murder.' Another editor, while applauding 
Done." The Independent, October 23, 1916, 143. 
267. Editorial: '1ffiit Mr. Hughes Would Have Done." The Independent, October 
23, 1916, 143. - ---~ 
268. Ibid. 
269. ~Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1916. 
270. Ibid. 
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273. Ibid. 
141 
the oratorical mam1er of Hughes and while believing that southern Kentucky 
had become an admirer of Hughes expressed his opinion that in November the 
state of Kentucky would follow her usual practice of voting the Democratic 
274 
tioket. Nevertheless this editor felt as very significant the increased 
roroe of the candidate's appeal as demonstrated in his speech in Louisville. 
The high praise given to the address and to the man who made it by an 
275 
editor unfriendly to Hughes indicated the spirit and vigor of the address. 
All in all, it was regarded as quite certain, according to one paper, that 
Hughes had gained strength all over the country by his 'Lusitania' state-
276 
ment. 
Meanwhile Colonel Roosevelt again taking up his o~paign duties spoke on 
October 14 to the miners in Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania. In his scathing 
arraignment of the administration and its policies the Colonel spoke on the 
eight-hour law, and on the chaotic conditions in Mexico for which he held 
277 
Wilson, Gompers, and Carranza responsible was the report in the papers. 
The Colonel devoted most of his address to an attack on the Adamson law and 
the manner of its enactment which he contrasted with his ow.n actions in the 
278 
Anthracite Strike of 1902. While the Colonel believed in the principle of 
an eight-hour day and in labor unions, he believed the so called eight-hour 
aot was not right, that it could not be applied to workingmen in all branches 
274. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1916. 
275. Editorial: ~Nation, October 19, 1916, 364. 
276. New York TrTO'Une, Oc:Sober 14, 1916. 
277. ~CEICago Sunday Tribune, October 15, 1916; New York Tribune, October 
I5; 19l6; and The Christian Science Monitor, Oc:eober-!6~~6~ 
278. Ibid. -
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of industry, that the law was not just to the railroads and that "••• it 
was deeply prejudicial to the real and permanent interests of the laboring 
279 
JD8.n•" 
Roosevelt in his address stated that he was championing Hughes "••• 
because in every crisis Wilson by his public acts has shown that he will 
yield to fear, that he will not yield to justice, whereas the public acts 
of Hughes have proved him to be incapable of yielding in such a crisis to 
280 
any threat whether made by politicians, corporations or labor leaders." 
According to the papers this audience cheered the Colonel's fiery oratory 
in spite of the fact that President White of the United Mine Worker's Union 
281 
had declared the miners for Wilson. One editor, in reviewing the speech, 
praised Roosevelt for his remarks on the Adamson law but criticized the 
282 
Colonel for the abuse and insinuations he had hurled at the President. 
To the voters of Joplin, Missouri, Hughes selected the protective 
283 
tariff' as the theme of his address. With the end of the war would come 
the end of' 'Good Times,' he stated, and so he earnestly urged the nation to 
prepare innnediately for the economic oondi tions which would arise at the 
termination of' warfare in Europe. He viewed the current economic condition 
with apprehension, as one 'resting on sand.' That the exports of' the nation 
had jumped to a fabulous figure he agreed, but he pointed out that this 
279. New York Tribune, October 15, 1916. 
280. The Chr'istian Science Monitor, October 16, 1916. 
281. Ibid. -
282. Editorial: The Nation, October 19, 1916. 
283. The Chicago-suD.daz Tribune, October 15, 1916; and~~ Tribune, 
October 16, 1916. 
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trade was determined not by oondi tions of normal oompeti tion but by an 
abnormal want in Europe. When the war in Europe ended conditions would 
change and labor in this oountry would have to meet competition from Europe. 
Therefore, he stated, a protective tariff would be necessary and since the 
opposing political party did not believe in a protective tariff those who 
wished to see one in force would have to elect Republican leaders. 
In his two day campaign of the rather 'doubtful' state of Nebraska., 
Hughes according to one paper, addressed himself almost exclusively to the 
task of overcoming the apparent complacency of the farmers with Wilson's 
234 
policies. He spoke to them and received tremendous ovation when he 
assured them that legislation for their benefit would oontinue as it had in 
the past under Republican leadership if that group was placed in power. He 
charged. that the agricultural interests had received scant consideration 
from the Democratic Administration. On October 14 speaking in Lincoln, 
Nebraska, the land of Bryani~ and prosperity, he delivered a speech on 
285 
peace. To the Democratic charge that a vote for the Republican candidate 
meant a. vote for war Hughes said: 
Did you ever hear a more preposterous proposition? 
• • • • I am a man of peace. I have been spending my 
life in maintaining the institutions of peace. I 
desire in that way to promote interns. tional peace 
• • • • I do not desire petty wars: I do not desire 
war in Mexioo to satisfy personal vindictiveness 
against a disliked ruler. I do not like that kind 
of war.286 
284. New York Tribune, October 17, 1916. 
285. New York Tribune 1 October 15, 1916; accounts of the speech found in ~ChiCago Sunday Tribune, October 15, 1916; and editorial in Current 
Gpfnion, November 1916, 2'96. 
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I:Ie held that the correct policies meant peace, that "••. a correct policy 
287 V(ould keep America out of war." 
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In the many speeches throughout the state he discussed nearly all the 
issues of the campaign and the large crowds that came to hear him greeted h 
288 
enthusiastically and heartily endorsed his views. However, the people 
in Qme.ha while not very keenly concerned with the candidate's views on the 
eight-hour day law were definitely interested in what he had to say on the 
tariff. They approved his stand that "••• there was a need of a protective 
289 
tariff to insure the safety of American industry after the war." In this 
speech, according to the papers, Hughes had cause to answer a charge of his 
opponents who had inferred that his election might mean that an 'invisible 
290 
government' would be installed in the United States. Hughes told the 
audience that crowded the auditorium that as there had been no 'invisible 
government' in New York while he had been governor there would be no invisita 
government in the United States if he were President. 
On the next day in Sioux City, I~1a, hecklers offered Hughes the 
opportunity to answer several charges against him circula. ted by the Demo-
291 
cra.ts. To the question of whether or not he would repeal the Adamson law 
if he were elected Hughes an~ered at length. He carefully explained that 
it was impossible for any one to answer such a question and then proceeded 
to explain What he would have done to avert the railroad strike. Hughes 
287. Ibid. 
288. I'bid. 
289. ~Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1916. 
290. 10rd; New York TribUne, October 17, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
"55't''berl7, 1916; and editorial: "RepublicailCampign." The Independent. 
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If arbitration had bean refused I should have 
gone right to the American people. stated the 
facts and put the responsibility where it 
belonged •••• ! should at the same time have 
secured a commission of inquiry so impartial. 
so fair as to conunand the respect of the entire 
country, and directed public opinion to that 
end. There is no group of men in the United 
States that would have dared to hold up the 292 
instrumentalities of commerce if that were done. 
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In conclusion Hughes reviewed his record on labor and stated definitely 
an.phatically that he was not "••• the standard-bearer of any group or 
293 
set," but the. t he was desirous of serving " ••• the whoihe .American people." 
One editor believed that this speech showed clearly the differences between 
President Wilson and Mr. Hughes; that the record of Hughes indicated that 
his statements were 'solid truth' and not empty campaign talk and therefore 
"••• there ought to be no question Which man should be at the head of a 
government Which has never glorified surrender, in the case of the individual 
294 
or the nation." 
The next important speech by the Republican candidate was given in 
295 
Youngstown, Pennsylvania. Here, as in all his major addresses, Hughes 
criticized the administration for its foreign policy, for its claim that it 
had aided business, for the Underwood tariff, for its failure to observe the 
merit system, and for its extravagance in governmental affairs. In this 
speech the candidate devoted more time to a discussion of the nation's 
policy toward European countries. Secretary Baker in an address in Naw 
cago Daily Tribune, October 18• 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, 
October 18, 1916. 
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Jersey had compared in an uncomplimentary way the soldiers of George Wash-
ington to the bandits of Mexico. His remarks gave the Republican candidate 
an opportunity to reiterate that he meant what he md said at Louisville 
concerning the 'Lusitania' incident. He still believed that if he had been 
president the world would have been aware that he meant what he said and 
that the United States would have had "••• a reputation for fir.m and correct 
296 
policies. Therefore, the 'Lusitania' would not have been sunk." 
Thepapers reported that this speech had made a fitting climax to the 
Republican candidate's third western campaign trip, that he had hit straight 
297 from the shoulder, and that his audiences had been quick to respond to him. 
On this trip he had visited ten states, had made thirty-nine speeches, and 
had replied to the three questions of the Democrats which had threatened to 
be the most annoying. Hughes had declared what he would have done about the 
'Lusitania' incident, about the Mexican situation, and about the railroad 
298 
strike. 
The oandi date on his next and last campaign tour planned to cover the 
four important states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and New York hoping to 
299 
place them safely in the Republican column. Beginning in New York City, 
on October 24, he campaign all sections of the city, making'Americanism' his 
300 
theme. 
295. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune, October 20, 1916; The 
Chica~o D0ill Tribune, October 20, 1916; The Christian Science MOnitor, October 2 , 916'; and editorial: "Hughes 'lfebukes Secretary Baker," 
The Independent, October 30, 1916. 
296. '!'6!'d. 
297. I'b!'CT. 
298. ~ew York Tribune, October 21, 1916. 
299. Ibid.; and The Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1916. 
3oo. Accounts of the speeches found in New York Tribune October 25 
l:Ie declared that he was for an "••• .American policy in the service of 
301 
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American interests." He proposed, if elected, to have an administration 
which "••• while dealing with all nations on a basis of the most absolute 
302 
fairness, will maintain .American rights on land and sea." He declared 
that he desired the support of every true American Who stood for the 
principles expounded by him, and he did not wish the support of anyone who 
303 
had any interests "••• superior to that of the United States." 
On the next day, addressing the young voters gathered in the Academy 
of Music in Brooklyn he presented his entire case to them and to the people 
304 
of the nation. Five thousand young citizens who were votin~ for the 
first time crowded the hall to hear him and thousands of others jammed the 
streets outsidethe music hall. According to the papers Hughes appealed to 
these young people with "••. a vivid word picture of the kind of United 
States that young America hopes for ••••" and his address won for Hughes 
305 
"••• the most enthusiastic response of his crumpaign so far." The can-
didate made an ardent appeal to his youthful listeners who he felt vvanted a 
country respected throughout the world, a count~J that desired peace, a 
country prepared for every emergency, and a count~J administered in an 
efficient and businesslike manner. His speech, though long, was reported as 
306 
being exceptionally good, vigorous, appeal~Eg, and wi_t_t~y~·--------------------
The Chicago Sunday Tribune, October 25,1916; and The Christian Science 
MOnitor, October 26, 1916. 
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Accounts of the speech found in New York Tribune, October 26, 1916; 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 26, 1916; and The Christian Science 
MSnitor, October 26, 1917. 
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In Boston, Hughes was greeted by the largest, the most enthusiastic 
crowd of his New .l!:ngland campaign. The high point of his speech was his 
declaration of the road he would travel if he were elected. He said: 
There are the principles which mark it. An 
executive responsible to the whole nation, a 
cabinet chosen from our ablest men, a foreign 
policy that stands courteously but firmly and 
consistently for American rights, a flag that 
protects the American citizen in his lawful 
rights, wherever his legitimate business may 
take him, a preparation for trade competition 
which shall protect all groups of American work-
men, a goverrument supervision of business which, 
while functioning to prevent abuses, will act 
on the assumption that the average business man 
is honest, and, finally, a domestic policy which 
looks to industrial peace and cooperation, and 
not to industrial war.307 
In this address and in others given in the neighboring towns he spoke 
148 
clearly and in a straightforward manner which more than won the approval of 
308 
his audiences. 
In his four speeches in Rochester, New York, Hughes in the most emphatic 
and detailed fashion reviewed the econornic situation which faced the nation 
the people of the nation that they must prepare to solve the 
industrial problem which would arise at the end of the war. In his opinion 
the Republican protective doctrine was one means of solution.309 Continuing 
his tour he spoke in the cities of upper New York where he gave his usual 
310 
speeches. However, to the farmers in this region he especially stressed 
the tvro issues - the tarif£ and the Adamson law because the farmers were 
.Accounts of speeches found in New York Tribune,October 27, 1916; The 
Chicago Daily Tribune, October~,-r9!6; and The Christian Soience--
Mo:J;litor, October 27, 1916. Also editorial: 11The Hughes Campaign,., The 
Independent, November 6, 1916, 222. ---
308. Ibid. 
309. ~ 
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were interested in both~ They approved his views and it was reported trAt 
311 
this region of the pivotal state appeared well in favar of Hughes. 
On the same day there appeared in the papers a short statement in 
312 
which Hughes summarized the points on which he stood. Part of the declara-
tion was similar to his statements made in Boston. However, after outlining 
his conception of the Presidency he brought out the fact that President Wil-
son viewed it in a different light, viewed it as the position held by the 
•political leader and lawmaker of the nation.¥ Hughes had made this state-
ment of his views because he believed the people were entitled to know how 
he felt on the issues. 
On the following Monday Hughes entered the Middle Trest for a final 
313 
series of speeches to strengthen the loyalty of Ohio and Indiana. If the 
number of people who turned out to greet him in Ohio was indicative then 
the Republican leaders were justified in stating that a 'great tidal wave 
of Hughes sentiment 1 had begun in the erstwhile doubtful state. In Col um.bus 
and in the industrial sections of the state the Republican candidate stressed 
a.nd emphasized the nation's need for planning and preparing for the "••• 
314 
commercial warfare that will be the bitterest and keenest in history." 
Throughout the state of Indiana he stressed this point and reviewed his 
attitude on the leading issues of the campaign. The candidate was. so very 
The Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1916; editorial: "The Hughes 
Campaign. 11 The Independent, November 6, 1916, 22. 
310. New York TribUne, October 29, 1916; and The Christian Science MOnitor, 
Octooer-29, 1916. ---
311. The Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 1916. 
312. Ibid.; New York Tribune, October 30, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
October 30,--r9'16. -
313. Accounts of speeches found in New York Tribune, October 31,1916; The 
Chicago Daily Tribune, October~,-r9!6; The Christian Science Monitor, 
October 31~ 1916: also editorials: "Mr. Hu011As on '!Onh.,.,..~o of Arms." 
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pleased by the hearty greetings extended to him in the state that, in a pub-
lic statement, he assured the people of his confidence of a party victory in 
315 
November. 
The final week of the campaign was devoted to the state of New York. 
Speaking in Albany and in many cities in the Hudson River valley the candi-
316 
date did little but repeat hisprevious addresses. In his 'Whirlwind 
tour of Brooklyn he addressed three large groups, me.king his theme '.Ameri-
317 
canism.' 
At last came his final address in !&adison Square Garden in New York 
318 
City. The newspapers were filled with accounts of the speech. They 
reported that 65,000 people marChed in the monster parade which preceded the 
speech, a parade which was one 'continuous and tumultous ovation' for the 
candidate. When Hughes did reach the auditorium he was cheered for forty 
minutes by the 15,000 who had jammed the hall to hear his final campaign 
words. In his address Hughes covered all the issues that he had madepromi-
nent in the course of his campaign, laying particular stress upon 'American-
ism,' American rights, the tariff, 'war prosperity,' the Adamson law, the 
319 
administration's attitude toward business at home and abroad. The papers 
reported that although he talked on the same topics he set his "••• declara-
314. 
315. 
316. 
317. 
318. 
The Outlook, November 8, 1916, 526; and "The Hughes Campaign." ~ 
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New York Tribune, November 5, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune,November 
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New York Tribune, November 5,1916. 
tions off in determined, vigorous phrases so that the Garden throng kept 
320 
punctuating his speech with applause every few minutes.• 
In closing his address he stated: 
If I am elected President - and I expect to be -
we shall have an administration which has no 
interests but the interests of the United States, 
which knows no policy but the supreme welfare of 
the people of the United States. It will not be 
coerced by threat from any quarter. It will not 
be deflected by an alien machination. It will not 
be made to subserve any ulterior purpose •••• There 
is no hope for .America if American citizen a~here 
in the world is not as proud a title as a man Gall 
bear.321 
Thus, Charles Evans Hughes brought to a close his campaign for the 
151 
Presidency, a campaign which had lasted three months, had carried him into 
thirty-five states, an intinerary covering 30,000 miles which made it one 
322 
of the longest campaign tours on record. It was estimated that about two 
million people had heard his addresses and that he had been greeted by 
323 
probably five million more. One paper reported that the campaign had 
been the most strenuous for a Republican Presidential candidate for many 
324 
years. 
During the last month of the campaign Roosevelt participated most 
325 
actively and wholeheartedly in it. His part consisted of a twelve day 
tour of the middle and southwest and included addresses in Chicago and New 
320. New York Tribune, November 5, 1916. 
321. ¥bid.; and The Christian Science Monitor, November 6, 1916. 
322. lreW""York Tr!Oune, November 4, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, 
NOVe'iiib'er 6, 1916. -
323. Ibid. 
324. ~Christian Science Monitor, November 6 1 1916. 
325. 'fhe Chicago Daily Tribune, October 18, 1916; New York Tribune,Ootober 
1"8'; 1916; and Meyers, 424. - -
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York. Speaking first in Louisville, Kentucky, on October 18 he again used 
326 
the Democratic slogan, He Kept Us Out of War, as the text of his speech. 
In his usual vigorous fashion he flailed the President for his foreign 
policies and made it very plain that he wondered what 'outrage' would have 
to arise before the President would be willing to fight. Continuing his 
journey westward he stopped in Kansas City to chat with William Allen White 
327 
who assured him that Kansas would vote for Hughes. 
In Phoenix, Arizona, an unusually large number of people from the 
surrounding territory gathered to greet the Colonel whom they loved and 
328 
admired. To the people on the border he spoke of the lamentable mistakes 
made by President Wilson in his handling of the Mexican situation. Roosevelt 
forcibly told his listeners what he would have done, how he would have 
replied, and how he would have acted. It was his firm conviction that the 
329 
President's foreign policy had been "••• without plan or purpose." ~nile 
the greeting extended to the Colonel in Phoenix took on the nature of an 
'old home week' and the people enthusiastically cheered his remarks yet Re-
330 
publican leaders adnutted that Wilson would carry the state of Arizona. 
Two days later in Albuquerque, Roosevelt made Secretary Baker the center of 
his attack on the administration. The Secretary in his speech in New Jersey 
had made a comparison between the soldiers of the American Revolution and the 
326. New York Tribune, October 18, 1916 
327. The "'C'i1'ristian Science Monitor, October 20, 1916 
328. ACCounts of speech found in New York Tribune, October 22,1916; The Chi-
cago Sunday Tribune, October 22,1916; The Christian Science MonTtOr-,--
October 23, 1916; and editorial: "The Republican Campaign," The Indepen-
dent, October 30, 1916, 186. ---
329. ~York Tribune, October 22, 1916. 
330. The "ChhCago Sunday Tribune, October 22, 1916. 
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331 
and the Mexican bandits of 1916. Speaking of the Secretary, Roosevelt 
with unusual emphasis said: "The man who professes such doctrines is wholly 
unfit to stay in the Cabinet and the President who retains him is wholly 
332 
unfit to remain President of the United States." The crowd cheered his 
strong words. 
To the inhabitants of De~r who turned out in large, boisterous numbers 
Roosevelt repeated his now familiar condemnations of the Wilson administra-
333 
tion. One paper reported that in this speech the Colonel was at his 
334 
satirical best in what he called the 'sham' of the Democratic slogan. 
In Chicago Roosevelt's two speeches were centered around the issues 
of '.JI.meri canism,' loyalty, and preparedness. Although it was reported that 
efforts had been made "... to tone down the Colonel's doctrine of '.JI.Inerican-
335 
ism,' "he, in his speech, hammered away at the hyphenates as hard as ever. 
He stated that while he condemned the efforts of professional German-America 
people "••• to shape our policy in the interests not of the Uhited States 
but of Germany •••• 11 he would just as strongly condenm the efforts of any 
336 
large group of hyphenates. Sternly and at great length he showed the 
inaccuracy of the Dan.ocratic slogan, he appealed to the men and women of 
Illinois to vote so as to show that they put "••. duty and service and 
337 
national honor first." 
331. Secretary Baker denied that such a comparison had been intended. 
332. New York Tribune, October 24, 1916; and ~ Chicago Daily Tribune, 
October 24, 1916. 
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In Brookl~m and severaldays later in Cleveland, the Colonel gave a 
. . 338 
repetition of his 'searchingarraignment' of the President's fore1gn pol1cy. 
The papers reported that his remarks brought 'roar upon roa~of approval 
339 
from his audiences. 
On November 3 in Cooper Hall in N~l York City Roosevelt made his 
340 
supreme plea to his fellow citizens to vote for Hughes for the Presidency. 
He called upon the voters to place in the Vlhite House "••• the upright 
Justice, the fearless Governor of New York whose whole public record has 
been that of a man straightforward in his thoughts and courageous in his 
actions, who cannot be controlled to do what is wrong and who will do what 
341 
is right no matter what influence may be brought against him." 
Taking as his subject 'Our Nation's Crisis,' the Colonel admitted 
having criticized the President but maintained that everything he had said 
was absolutely 'accurate and truthful.' "I have criticized," he declared, 
"because I believe he has·dragged in the dust what was most sacred in our 
342 
past and has jeopardized the most vital hopes of our future." Then after 
adroitly pulling apart one of President Wilson's campaign speeches Roosevelt 
concluded: 
If we elect President Wilson it will be 
serving notice on the world, that the 
traditions, the high moral standards, the 
courageous purposes of Washington and Lincoln 
338. New YSrk Tribune, October 29, November 3 1 1916. Review of speeches given 
1n ~oosevelt Discusses the President."~ Outlook, November 8, 
1916, 528. 
339. Ibid. 
340. Aocounts of the speech found in Nmv York Tribune, November 4, 1916; 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 4, 1916; The Christian Science Moni-
tor, November 4, 1916, and editorial: "End of Republioa:m. Campaign, r~·--
have bean obscured and in their stead 
we have deliberately elected to show 
ourselves £or the time being a sordid, 
so£t, and spinelassnation, content to 
accept; any and every insult; content to 
pay no heed to the most flagran·t 
wrongs done to the small and weak; 
allowing our men, wor.J.an, and children 
to be murdered and outraged; anxious 
only to gather in every dollar that we 
can; to spend it in luxury, and "00 
replace it by any form of money making 
which we can follow with safety to 
our own bodies.343 
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The Colonel in this speech exhibited his bld time fire' stated one newspaper 
344 
and his large audience received his message with frenzied cheers. 
Roosevelt's last speech was given to the people of his ovm conununity 
345 
at Oyster Bay on the eve of the election as was his custom. One editor 
in reviewing Roosevelt's part in the campaign wrote that the Colonel had 
played as active a part in the campaign as had the candidate and that the 
346 
Colonel's speeches had been "••• more vigorous if less diplomatic." 
During the final weeks of.the campaign political leaders, party 
officials, prominent poli·bical figures, newspapers, and journals we~e very 
347 busy giving out predictions as to the £inal results on November 7. These 
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341. New York Tribune, November 4, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Trib~, 
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347. New York Tribune, October 15,16,20,21,24,29, November 5,6,7,1916; 
The~cago Daily Tribune, October 15,16,18,21,29,30,31, November 4,5,6, 
1916; The Christian Science Monitor, October 23,24,25,31, November 7, 
1916; ecri"tor~als: "the Republican C'ampaign," The Independent,October 30r, 
1916, 186; Current Opinion,November 1916,294.-:rrso 1130,000 Straw Votes,' 
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predictions varied £rom an assurance o£ oven¥helming success to skepticism 
and a feeling that victory would come only by a very close margin. Early 
in October it was forecasted that Hughes was sure o£ 210 votes in the 
Electoral College, Wilson certain o£ 149 votes and o£. the remaining 1921 
348 
Hughes must only obtain 56 in order to receive the necessary 266 votes. 
one newspaper editor felt that the Republicans would get the necessary 
number o£ votes by simply carrying the nor.mally Republican states and dis-
349 
regarding the doubtful states. The five states 'Which 1"J'ere most r~gularly 
placed in the doubtful column and which could ~ing the election one way or 
350 
the other were N'ew York, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio. The 
editor o£ a prominent weekly magazine listed the doubtful states as Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey whose combined electoral vote 
351 
numbered 127 which was nearly one hal£ o£ the necessary 266 votes. This 
magazine took a 'straw vote' o£ so,ooo subscribers in these states. 0£ the 
30,000 who replied Hughes received 17,938 votes, Wilson received 10,646, 
352 
and the miscellaneous votes totaled 11 236. In comparing the votes o£ 
these citizens with their choice in 1912 it was learned that the Republican 
Party in New York, New Jersey, and Indiana had gained £rom the opposing 
parties and in Ohio the Democrats had gained. In Illinois, the shifting o£ 
353 
the votes just about balanced. 
348. 
349. 
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While some Republican soothsayers saw a hope of victory in New York, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin very few were optimistic enough to place 
354 
the pivotal state of Ohio in the Republican column. That this state 
should be doubtful was one of the most surprising developments of the crun-
355 
paign reported one editor. Two explanations were offered for this 
situation. According to one report the farmers of the state were so pros-
parous, so contented and no one could tell whether they would be interested 
356 
enough to vote on election day. Another newspaper stated that the section 
of the state around Cleveland wasstrong for Wilson due to the fact that the 
357 
war industries of that community were enriching the inhabitants. However 
this editor believed that it was folly to forecast election results for 
while the politicians knew how the active partisan stood they could not 
358 
learn the political alignment of the silent voter. 
The final predictions as given out by the chairman of the Republican 
national Committee concluded that Hughes would receive 366 electoral votes 
359 
which number included the state of New York and Ohio. The Republican 
newspapers were not so optimistic. vVhile they predicted a victory for 
360 
Hughes they placed the number of electoral votes under 300. 
As the campaign drew to a close all efforts were bent toward impressing 
upon the voters that Charles Evans Hughes was the wise choice for the 
Presidency. Every possible means of approach was used - speeches, articles, 
354. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 30, 1916; and The Christian Science 
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pictures, cartoons, and advertisements. The daily newspapers carried 
detailed accounts of the campaign activities, reporting on all the speeches 
of the nominee and on the speeches and actions of the party leaders and 
managers. The weekly magazines kept their readers abreast of the news by 
giving resume's of the campaign tours and of the nominee's speeches. The 
monthly magazines devoted their pages to special articles on the main issues 
and problems of the campaign and to the progress of the campaign as a 
whole. A review of these articles presented a good, overview of the 
campaign. 
One magazine placed the situation before its readers in the for.m of two 
questions, namely: Which of the two great parties at this particular juncti 
in our progress as a nation is the better fitted and the more likely to 
render the highest public service? Secondly, which of the two designated 
leaders is the more certain 'to preserve, protect, and defend the constituti 
1 361 
of the United States? To these questions the editor of the magazine 
answered without a degree of hesitancy, the Republican Party and Charles 
Evans Hughes. In his opinion the Republicans being more capable, more 
experienced, were better suited to solve the'weighty problems facing the 
nation. 
A prominent Republican leader in a magazine article, gave his reasons 
382 
for sponsoring Hughes. It was his belief that our nation should prepare 
itself for the economic struggle in world trade which ~uld begin when war 
361. 'Editorial: "For President." The North American Review, October,l916,496. 
Similar view expressed in an~toria1 in The Independent, November 6, 
1916, 213. ---
362. William R. Willcox, Chairman of Republican National Committee. "Why 
Hughes Should be Elected." The Forum, October 1916, 430-438. 
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ceased in Europe; that our nation should adopt a foreign policy, one by 
which the American citizen was guaranteed protection throughout the world. 
Since the Republican Party stood for these principles and since Hughes by 
his record had proved his worthiness to high office, the Republican Party 
363 
and Hughes should be the choice of the people. 
In an eloquent call to the citizens of the nation Roosevelt briefly, 
oonci sely reviewed in a magazine article the faults of the Wilson adminis-
tration and WTOtes 
We cannot undo what has been done. But we 
can repudiate what has been done. We can 
regain our own self respect and the respect 
of other nations :for this oountry. We can 
put in povter an administration which will 
throughout its term of power protect our own 
citizens and live up to our national obliga-
tions.364 
Between the two candidates which should be .Placed at the helm :for the 
following four years, Roosevelt wrote "• •• the man who has been actually 
tried and found wanting,or the man whose whole career in public affairs is 
365 
a. guarantee of his power and good faith." Naturally, to Roosevelt, the 
answer was Hughes. 
An editor in expressing his views on the Presidential o~paign stated 
that the campaign had been unusual in that it had :failed to revolve around 
366 
one issue, in fact, it had spread to many issues. According to him one 
outstanding characteristic of the campaign had bean the emphasis placed on 
'S'a3. Ibid. 
364. 'Tn"8o"dore Roosevelt. "America Needs Hughes." The American Review of 
Reviews, November 1916, 577. Same declarations appeared as an adVer-
tisement in~ Literary Digest, October 28, 1916, 1133. 
365. Ibid. 
366. 'Editorial: "Interesting Features of the Presidential Campaign." Current 
0 inion, November 1916 293. 
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our foreign relations, especially with Mexico. The Adamson law and the 
tariff had been the only two domestic issues dominent in the campaign and 
"• •• even the tariff has been discussed almost entirely in its relations to 
the European war and the industrial effects likely to follow it •••• " he 
367 
wrote. In his opinion the campaign had centered mainly around the claim 
that the President had kept us out of war and the Republican's countercharge 
that it was not a question "••• between peace and war but between peace 
368 
with honor and peace without honor." 
Another editor reporting the campaign as having been clean, as having 
been conducted with unusual vigor by the major parties, declared that the 
369 
campaign, however, had not brought forth any clear-cut iss·ue. The three 
high spots of the campaign, as he vi~ed tham, were first, the Democratic 
record of legislation which the Republicans are 'chary of attacking' because 
of its 'unusual fullness and excellence;' second, the administration's 
foreign policy which had been so strongly attacked by Hughes and Roosevelt; 
and third, the Adamson law and its manner of passage which had received 
370 
thorough criticism from the Republican candidate. On the personal side, 
concluded this editor, Hughes had been a disappointment to many because he 
had been 'attacking and crit~cizing' and had not set forth "••• a big 
3?1 
constructive program of his crwn." However, at a later date this editor 
367. Ibid. 
368. l"Sici. 
369. Editorial: "Closing Campaign, 11 The Independent, October 30, 1916, 179. 
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again reviewed the polioital situation on the eve of the election. He 
characterized both candidates as being 'high minded' and 'fearless of con-
viction,' he reviewed the weaknesses of both the Democratic and Republican 
campaign programs and in his conclusion stated that it would be up to the 
372 
independent voter to decide the election. 
One editor viewed the political situation quite differently. He claimed 
that the campaign had been unusual for the reason that "••. the country its 
373 has recognized no platforms, no issues, no parties.• In his opinion some 
legislative acts of the Democratic term had been originally Republican and 
at least one, the banking and currency reform bill, had not been the work 
of either political pa. rty but rather "... the direct outcome of the study 
374 
and work of our financial and business leaders." By a careful, impartial 
review of the salient issues of the campaign this editor attempted to clar-
ify them for the voters and left them to draw their own conclusions and to 
decide whether Hughes or Wilson should be at the head of the government. 
Those editors critical of Hulibes and his campaign berated him on many 
scores but principally for his continued attacks upon the administration, 
without offering a constructive program, and for his failure, in the earlier 
375 
stages of the campaign, to take a definite stand on the hyphenate question. 
With the nearer approach of the election the politicians became busier 
but 'listlessness' still seemed to mark the public's attitude toward the 
372. Editorial: "The Independent Voter on November 7," The Independent, 
November 6, 1916, 213. ---
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campaign was the view of several editors, one of Whom reported that this 
376 
~iewwas held by other journalists. 
That the ~rogressives, the independent voters of the nation would be 
162 
the deteimining factor in the election was a fact most generally agreed upon 
by the political writers and observers. Both the Democrats and the Republi-
cans, with this in mind, earnestly and definitely worked so as to gain the 
support of this group of voters, both parties aimed to prove that their 
377 
candidate was the most progressive in viewpoints and in beliefs. The 
Republicans, citing the splendid record of Hughes as Governor of New York 
and as Justice of the Supreme Court endeavored to prove that their candidate 
378 
stood for real progressive principles. The Republicans after the Maine 
elections were quite confident that as the Progressives in Maine had returned 
to the Republican fold so would the Progressives all over the nation. 
According to one prominent Progressive the 'ignominious failure' of the 
President and the Democrats especially in regard to the Mexican situation 
and our foreign relations made it impossible for the Progressives to vote 
379 
for the reelection of Woodrow Wilson. 
Yihile writers and editors disagreed as to which issues or, if any, were 
the outstanding features of the political campaign yet during the Republican 
cwnpaign certain issues were stressed. The Mexican situation, our foreign 
376. Editorials: The Nation, October 26,1916, 385; Current Opinion,Novem.ber 
1916, 294; and The Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 1916. 
377. Jacob Schur.man,~y Progressives Want Hughes." The Independent, 
October 2, 1916, 14. ---
378. Ibid. 
379. Charles Bonaparte, ''Thy I Must Vote for Mr. Hughes." The Outlook, 
October 11, 1916, 332-333. 
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relations, the Adamson law, the role played by tl~ laboring group in the 
c~~paign, the economic conditions of the nation and the Republican attitude 
toward the tariff, the Federal Reserve law, and the part played by the women 
in the c~paign program. A review of these topics should help to crystallize 
the views, beliefs, and principles of the Republican Party as expressed in 
the Presidential cwnpaign of 1916. 
From early in August until the eve of the election Hughes and the 
Republican speakers and leaders made the Mexican question a paramount issue 
380 
of the campaign. This was the opinion of many writers and editors. 
A thorough criticism of Wilson's policy t~~ard Mexican affairs was outlined 
381 
by one staunch Republican supporter. Vlhile praising President Wilson for 
endeavoring to give the Mexicans what he deemed they needed - a constitution-
al government - this writer criticized the President for ignoring, first, 
the primary duty of a President which was "••• to respect the independence 
of other nations and to abstain from all interference with their domestic 
382 
concerns." Second, it was the right of the President "••• to secure 
protection for the lives and property of Americans lawfully resident under 
383 
foreign jurisdiction." Wilson, according to this writer, had violated 
"••. the sovereign independence of Mexico and interfered in her internal 
affairs," and he had failed to protect the lives and property of Americans in 
384 
Mexico. After summarizing our relations with Mexico during Wilson's term 
380. Editorial:'~exioo as a Dominant Issue." Current Opinion. September 1916, 
146; "For President~" The North Auericlm Review~ Octo'ber 31, 1916,481-
514; "li:exico as a Repu"66'rcan Issue." Tl'ie L1'te"rary Digest,August 19,1916, 
397; The Chicago ~ribune, September lg;-1916; and "Keeping Us Out of Wa~ 
The American Review of Reviews, November 1916, 473. 
381. "JaCob Scliurman, "wiison' s Mexican Failure." The Independent,October 16, 
1916, 103-104. ---
382. ~· 383. Ibid. 384. Ibid •• 104 
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e.s President the writer concluded: 
The nemesis of his unwarranted conduct 
has been the destruction of sane billion 
dollars' worth of American property, the 
impoverishment of thousands ot American 
citizens, the murder ot hundreds of American 
men, and the outrage bitterer than death of 
an uncounted number of helpless American 
women.3S5 
There appeared to be a unanimity of approval in Republican circles in 
386 
regard to Hughes• strong criticisn of Wilson's Mexioaa policy. One 
writer summarized the general opinion: "In disasterous consequences to the 
nation the vacillating and ineffective course pursued by President Wilson 
in dealing with the Mexican problem is without parallel in the history of 
387 
the Republic." As a consequence of our Mexican relations one editor 
wrote: "The united opposition now appeals to the countr'l.r 1x> dislodge the 
Administration upon the grounds of criminal blundering with respect to 
388 
Mexieo." 
Praise and criticimn were heaped upon the Republican candidate because he 
chose to make the Mexican diplomatic problem an issue in the campaign. 
Danocrats and independant newspapers criticized him tor stressing this issue 
389 
before the people, reported one editor. It was said in Democratic circles 
385. Ibid. 
386. VfeWpoints of newspaper editors as .found in~ Literary Digest, August 
19, 1916, 398. 
387. Editorial: The Chioafo Dailz Tribune, September 19, 1916. 
388. Editorial: "'TTr Pres dent. if The North .American Review, October 1916, 481. 
389. Editorial: "Mexico as a Repu'bi'Ican Issue. 11 The· Literary Digest, August l~ 
1916, 397. ---
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that Hughes was using the Mexican situation as a battle cry because t:he 
Republicans would be able to denounce it to their heart's content "••• withou 
offending any o£ those voters who might be sensitive to frank criticism of 
390 
the administration's foreign policy as applied to Europe." These Republi-
can ori tics pointed out that while Hughes fervently denounced Wilson' s 
Mexican poli~ he had "••• tailed to give the faintest outline of What his 
391 
policy would be it he were in power." 
To these criticisms Republican newspapers replied, according to one 
report, that the Maxi~ situation was a 'live issue,' one of "••• great 
importance to the welfare of this country and to Mexico," especially since 
"••• the inherent detioiences of President Wilson are revealed nowhere so 
clearly and so conclusively •••" as they are in the handling of our diplomaii 
392 
relations with Mexico. 
In meeting the cries of the opponents that the Republican candidate 
offered no constructive policy one editor pointed that Hughes in his speech 
o£ acceptance had clearly indicated his intentions of carrying out the 
393 
Republican diplomatic policies as outlined in the platform. of the pa~. 
Throughout the campaign the Republican nominee and his party in no un-
certain terms criticized the actions and policies of the Democratic admin• 
istration in regard to the foreign relations of our~try during the D~-. 
390. Ibid. 
391. Ibid. 
392. 1011. 
393. 'I<Ill'oria1: "The Campaign. 11 ~ Independent, August 21, 1915, 250. 
r ____________________________________ ~ 
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0 ratic term of otrice. While the criticism. of the ];arty in power was direct 
and often caustic the Republicans. on their part. found the task of deter-
mining their foreign policy a difficult one. While direct in their criti-
cisms they were very evasive in their constructive suggestions. When forced 
to give answer as to what they would have done or proposed to do • their 
replies usually were couohed in terms most general. 
The Republicu Party in ita platform stated: 
We declare that we believe in and will 
enforoe the protection of every American 
oitizea in all the rights secured to hfm 
by the Conati tution. by treaties and the 
law of nations. at home and abroad, by 
land and sea •••• We desire peaoe. the 
peace of justice and right. and believe in 
maintaining a straight and honest neutrality 
between the belligerents in the great war in 
Europe •••• The Republican Party believes 
that a fir.m, consistent and courageous 
foreign polioy • always maintained by Repub-
lican Presidents in accordance with .A1:J!e rican 
traditions. is the best, as it is the only 
trtte way, to preserve our peaoe and reatore394 
us to our right.:t.Ul place among the nations. 
One editor in reviewing the foreign polioy as stated in the Republican 
platfor.m expressed his belief that while more space had been given to it 
than in former years, yet the platform was less outspoken and less specific 
on the topic due to the tact, no doubt, that conditions in Europe had made 
it unwise for the political leaders to indulge in definite expressions of 
395 
~pathy and partisanship. 
394. Republican Campai~ Textbook 1916. 48. 
395. §Ci!'torial: "'The European Polioy of Alllerican Parties." ~Independent, 
October 23, 1916, 140-43 
Hughes in his speech of acceptance saida 
At the very beginning of the present 
administration. where in the direction 
of diplomatic intercourse there should 
have been conspicuous strength and 
expertness we had weakness and inexpert-
ness. Instead of assuring respect. we 
invited distrust of our competence and 
speculation as to our capacity for fir.mness 
and decision. thus entailing Ill9.ey' difficul-
ties which otherwise easily could have been 
esoaped.396 
Later on the subject of the maintenance of American rights he said: 
We are unreservedly. devotedly • whole-
heartedly for the United States. That 
is the rallying point for all Americans. 
That is my position. I stand for the 
unflinching maintenance of American rights 
on land and sea. 397 
He maintained that had our government lett no doubt that when we said 
167 
'strict accountability' we meant. precisely what we said then. in his opinion, 
there would have been no destruction of American lives by the sinking of the 
398 
'Lusi tania. 1 Hughes said: "Moreover, a firm American policy would have 
been strongly supported by our people and the opportuhi ties for the develop-
399 
ment of bitter feeling ~uld have been vastly reduced." He criticized the 
Administration for its laxness in protecting American property and commerce, 
400 
and stated that as a result of' this negligence the nation had suffered. 
396. Jacob Schurman. Addresses of Charles Evans Hughbs. G.P. Putnam's Sons. 
New York, 1916, 10; and RepUDlican Campaign Test ook 1916 • 4. 
397. Retublioan Campai~ Textbook 1916. 9. ----
398. tb a. -
399. "'bbCT. 
400. lb!d •• 10. 
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During the months of the campaign the problem of evolving a satisfactory 
position as to the issue of a toreign policy be~e more and more difficult. 
Cleverly and effectively the Democrats played up their campaign slogan: 'He 
Kept Us Out of War.' The Republican editors bent all their efforts toward 
showing the reading public that the slogan really was not a correct expressiaa 
401 
of' the Danocratic actions, that slogan actually was a misnomer. It was 
the belief of one editor that it was "••• almost inconceivable that any 
President could have so mismanaged affairs as to have forced us into a 
402 
European war when both sides are so amcious to maintain our good will." 
He continued: "We Americans have no quarrel with any country and we wish all 
403 
men of all nations peace and prosperity ••••" He believed that the 
nations were extremely eager tor our friendship and that only by our own 
404 
sho eking mi smanagem.ent could we be dragged into a war-. 
Another writer felt that the slogan was inapt, that there was no purpose 
to saying that the President had kept us out ot war since there was no 
406 
reason for our being at war. Therefore, the Administration had no right 
to expect merit on this score. 
However, a dilemma faced the Republicans. If' they had attacked the slogan 
too earnestly the,y would have implied an intention, a willingness to take 
the nation into a war. It the,y had failed to attack the Dem.oc rats• slogan, 
401. Editorial: "Keeping Us Out of War." The American Review of Reviews, 
November 1916, 471; David Hill, "Pre"Sl<<ent Wilson's AdiDiiii'stration of 
Foreign Affairs." The North American Review, October 1916, 574; The 
Chicago Daily Tribune, October 7, 1916; and Pringle 587. -
402. Editorial: WKeeping 't1s Out of War." The American Review of RevieW's, 
November 1916, 471. - -
403. Ibid. 
404. 'f6I'a. 
405. ~d Hill, "President Wilson's Administration of Foreign Affairs, 11 ~ 
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such a failure ~uld have implied satisfaction with the Administration and 
would have given a stamp of approval to the acts behind the slogan. 
The Democrats saw and wsed the situation to their own advan.tage. Presi-
dent Wilson in one of his speeches stated that the inference he gathered 
from the addresses of Hughes was that the Republicans contemplated a change 
in the nation's foreign policy. Wilson saidt 
There is only one choice as against peace, 
and that is war. Some of the supporters 
of that pa.rty, outspokenly declare they 
want war, so that the certain prospect of 
the success of the Republican Party is that 
we shall be drawn in one form. or another 406 
into the embroilments in the European war •• •• 
The Republican candidate openly refuted the inferences made by the 
President and "••• charged the President with attempting to escape deserved 
condemnation by trying to make the public think the alternative of his 
407 policy is war. 
In his campaign speeches Hughes again and again expressed his attitude on 
foreign relations but always spoke in generalities. He failed to bring 
forward a real positiveprogram. One editor felt that the candidate and his 
managers by their actions and words failed to set before the people the real 
truth about the nation's relations with foreign countries, and, therefore, 
many citizens "••• derived the impression that Republican leaders thought 
408 
that we ought to have gone to war." 
North American Review, October 1916, 471. 
406. Editorial: Current Opinion, November 1916, 295. 
407. Hughes' in a speec"h in Philadelphia on October 9, 1916. ,!!! ~ 
Tribune, October 10, 1916. 
408. lditoria1: The .American Review 2_! Reviews, December 1916, 582. 
Hughes by his very words and actions definitely indicated his belief 
that the Adamson law was a major issue in the political campaign. In an 
article written on this subject Hughes stated: 
But there is one fundamental issue that 
has such far-reaching significance for the 
future of the American people, one occasion 
on which the present Administration,by its 
surrender of a vital principle, has so gravely 
threatened the soundness of our national 409 
government that I am glad to anphasize it again •••• " 
Clearly he stated his belief that the passage was "••• not only a serious 
170 
misuse of official power, but a deplorable abdication of moral authority." 
Criticizing the bill he stated that it was a mistake to call it an eight-
hour law for it did not provide for an eight-hour workday, in fact, it 
simply provided that eight hours should be "••. deemed a day's work, and the 
411 
measure or standard of a day's work." Therefore the act became only a 
wage bill and as such it sboula be judged. On this basis the legislative 
bill became only an effort on the part of a oertain group of railroad men 
to demand an increase in wages and "••. the administration in advance of 
412 
legislation surrendered to this demand," claimed Hughes. That, to him, 
was the crux of the situation. In his opinion, the railroad situation 
should have been thoroughly investigated, and in due time the proper action 
taken. Those who sponsored the bill claimed a crisis had arisen which :made 
the bill a necessity. Hughes believed this untrue for he claimed that the 
409. Charles Hughes, "Shall Force or Reason Rule."~ Independent, October 
9, 1916, 62-64. 
410. Ibid. 
411. 1'61'<!. 
412. Ibid., 63. 
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Administration had been made aware of the situation but had failed to act. 
Hughes claimed that arbitration would have been the means for solving 
the problem. He statedt 
I stand for the principle of arbitration 
in industrial disputes. Labor least of all 
can afford to have that principle surrendered 
•••• The essence of the matter is a fair and 
reasonable hearing of all parties concerned 
and a iust determination according to the 
facts. ~13 
To him 'force' would never be the correct means for the solution of a 
problem. He declared ~en force is proposed and arbitration is refused 
there is but one stand to take, and that is to appeal to the judgment of the 
414 
country, to vindicate the processes of reason." Hughes firmly believed 
that if the chief executive of our country had gone at once to Congress 
"••• for immediate authority to secure prompt and thorough investigation of 
the stated grievance in~ advance of action and he had thus made instant pro-
vision for an inquiry so entirely competent as to command the respect of the 
country, I em satisfied there could have been no strike. We are still ruled 
by public opinion and no administration need fear results if it stands 
416 
firmly for essential principle.• 
In conclusion Hughes reiterated that the issue of the Adamson law was 
important, was fundamental for 
••• the multiplying activities of the govern-
ment would be intolerable if we did not pro-
ceed in accordance with judgment based on an 
e:xem.ination of the facts. OUr problems in 
the future are likely to be, in the main, 
economic problems end they will severely test 
our capacity, but we shall find solution if 
we are open minded and thorough in our investi-
gation. 
We can stand mistakes in our policy if 
we are sound in method, but we cannot 
yield force to reason. That is the path 
of sure disaster. I should not take the 
first step in that path.4l6 
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While some editors and wri tars agreed with the stand taken by Hughes 
417 
others did not. Criticisms of the Adamson law were based not on the 
question of whether an eight-hour law was justifiable, necessary, or correc~ 
but rather on the manner by which the law was so hurriedly passed through 
Congress and signed by the President. That Congress after a very brief 
consideration of the bill whose passage muld have far-reaching economic and 
social effects, that our chief legislative body in response to the threaten-
ing demands of a certain group of railroad workers, voted on the issue, 
was the cause of the great stor.m of protest which was heard throughout the 
418 
nation. 
-In this campaign as no doubt in others, the vote of the laboring group 
proved an important factor. The passage of the Adamson law with the ensuing 
controversy concerning its passage combined with the active participation 
of Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in the 
re-election of President Wilson served to focus political thought on the 
• 419 pol1tical alignment of the laboring group. One editor stated that "••• 
it rests with the labor element in this country to decide the turn this 
420 
campaign will take." In August political observers remarked that the 
413. Ibid. 
414. Ibid. J 64. 
415. 1"6'ICJ. 
416. 1'6ld:'. 
417 • Articles and accounts of the law found in John Fitch, "Settling a StrikE! 
by Congressional Enactment." The Surv!Y, September 16, 1916, 599-600; 
editorials: "Congress Stamped8Cr." The Nation, September 7,1916, 213; 
"Hughes and Wilson on the Eight Hour-Law." The Literarl Digest,October 
7, 1916, 875-876; ~. Hughes and the Rail~ Issue." The Outlook , 
Republicans were slow in appreciating the tendency of the labor vote to 
421 
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drift toward President Wilson. However. two months later Hughes made a 
definite bid for the support of organized labor. While not overconfident 
of its support his attack on the Adamson law, his exposition of what he 
regarded "••• as its menacing effects upon the maintenance of the principles 
for which organized labor has always fought, made a decided impression upon 
422 
the labor communities which he (Hughes) visited," reported one newspaper. 
According to this paper the friends of the former Supreme Court Justice 
believed that the labor group after it had thought over the Adamson act, and 
had looked beneath its surface, would give to the Republican candidate in 
423 November at least the normal percentage of the labor votes. Late in 
October the efforts of Samuel Gompers to misrepresent the labor record of 
Hughes for the purpose of influencing organized labor in the interests of 
October 11, 1916;~542; "For President." The North American Review,Octobe 
1916, 503-509; The New Republic. Ootober~6, 297; *Progress of the 
World." The Amenoa'ii"'lreview of Reviews. November 1916, 475; "The Fight-
ing Hughes." Current Op!Dlon:-october 1916, 217; and Samuel Dunne, "The 
Threatened Railroad Strike." The North American Review, October 1916, 
573-88. ---
418. Protests to the Adamson law were found in the followingt "Hughes and 
Wilson on the Eight-Hour Law." •• Literary Digest, October 7, 1916, 
875-76; John Fitch, "Settling a~rike by Congressional Enactment." The 
Survey, September 16, 1916, 599-600; Samuel Dunne, "The Threatened -
Railroad Strike." The North American Review, October 1916, 573-588; and 
"The Fighting Hughes." CUrrent Opinion, October 1916, 217. 
419. The Chicago Dailz Tribune, October 28, 1916; and Samuel Gompers, 
American Labor and the War, George Doran ana Co.' New York, 1919 I 548. 
420. Editorial: 6Politicar-Etfects of the Labor Victory." The Literazz 
Digest, September 16, 1916, 651. 
421. The Christian Science :Monitor, August 29 1 1916. 
422. New York Tribune. 6ctober 21, 1916. 
423. Ibid;--
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the President caused Republican editors to repudiate these charges by calling 
attention, in their columns, to organized labor's own support of Hughes when 
424 
he bec~e Justice of the Supreme Court in 1910. 
Hughes in a stirring speech in Terre Haute, Indiana, defied the efforts 
of Samuel Gompers and the railroad brotherhood chiefs to swing the vote of 
organized labor to the President. In speaking on this subject he said: 
I understand that word has gone out through 
labor circles in official channels to vote 
against me, and I know perfectly well that 
I am saying a profound truth, and every 
union labor man knows it - that nobody can 
direct or control the labor vote of the country. 
That vote is going to be cast according to its 
sound judgment, according to what the men 
think is right and fair. 
This is an American Government and our work-
ingmen are the best citizens we have because 
they are producing and working, and I have 
the utmost confidence in the freedom of their 
judgment, according to their conscience, 
uncontrolled by any power.425 
The approval and enthusiasm which this audience gave these remarks more than 
426 pleased the Republican candidate. 
An interesting feature of the eampa.ign was the use of the medium of 
advertising in order to bring the Republican message to the attention of the 
voters. During the last weeks of the campaign large advertising cartoons, 
often tull page, appeared in the newspapers. They directed the attention of 
the voter to Hughes• opinions on labor and labor questions, and to organized 
427 labor's opinion of the eandidate in 1910. 
424. Editorials' New York Tribune,October 23,1916; The Chioajo Daily Tribune, 
OotGber 24,1~;-and Th8 Independent, October ~1§16, 9. 
425. New York Tribune,Nove.mber.2,1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune,November 2, 
ms:-- - -
426 • ..ill£,. 
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In his demand for the return of' a protective tariff' policy Hughes 
stressed the fact that the country was enjoying a greater prosperity than it 
had witnessed in many years yet, in his opinion, the prosperous conditions 
were based on weak, false foundations. That the country was enjoying pros-
perity was true. Reports on the nation's export and import trade during the 
first seven months of 1916 surpassed the amazing figures of the previous 
428 
year was the report. Reports from leading industrial firms were extremely 
favorable and the stock market began in September a rise in prices. 429 In 
the last weeks of the campaign, leading newspapers carried the work on their 
financial pages that the slump in business and in the stock market which 
430 
usually preceded a Presidential election had not taken place. One editor 
expressed the opinion that If ••• probably never in the history of' business 
in the United States has a national political contest had less influence upon 
general trade than during the Presidential c~pe.ign now drawing to a close~1 
432 
This viewpoint was held by editors of' other newspapers as well. While the 
political contest had been heated it had "••• not hampered business nor 
caused any slackening of' business so f'e.r as can be noticed," wrote one 
433 
financial editor. So it would seem that business and especially Wall 
Street had not been espeoially concerned w.tth the outcome of' the Presidential 
427. New York Tribune, October 3l,November 1,2,3,6,1916; and The Chicago 
iifty:lribUne, October 29, November 1,2,6,1916. ---
428. 1 orla1s: ,Our Enormous Foreign Trade." The American Review of' Reviews_, 
October 1916, 373; "The Specter of' an Impen4rng EUropean War upon 
American Industries." Current Opinion, November 1916, 300; The Nation, 
August 31 1916, 97; and The Christian Science MOnitor, September 36,1916 
and October 28, 1916. ---
429. Ibid. 
430. ~Chicago Daily Tribune,October 31,1916; The Christian Science Monitor 
OCtober 3i,November 4,1916; and New York TribUne, November 4,19T6. 
431. Financial editor: The Christian ~e~ November 4,1916 
432. l,dito,ri~lq: 1Jg ~Tribune, November 7 ,1916; and Chicago Daily Tribune 
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election. It was reported, however, by one newspaper that those on Wall 
434 
street favored the candidacy of Hughes. This belief was also held by the 
opponents of the Republican candidate. 
That business interests were beh~nd Hughes was at least evident in 
Chicago. In that city an organization known as ~Hughes Business :Men's 
League had been formed and had held many meetings, some of them in the 
industrial houses and plants were the political speakers reached the working 
people directly and carried to them the message of w~ Hughes should be 
435 
elected. In P~iladelphia a leading merchant publicly gave his reasons for 
supporting Hughes and the Republican managers were confident that his efforts 
436 
would "••• prove potent in enlarging Republican vote." 
However, the Republican candidate in his speeches toward the end of the 
campaign argued that the prosperous condition of the country was one of the 
serious problems facing the American voter. In his opinion the economic boom 
caused by the unprecedented demand for American products and commodities by 
European countries had resulted in a false prosperity in the United States, 
437 
a prosperity which would collapse at the cessation of war in Europe. When 
European workers went into the trenches, leaving idle their places in the 
factories, mills, and mines, an extraordinary opportunity was created for 
433. The Christian Science MOnitor, November 4, 1916. 
434. l'li8 Chicago Daily Tribune, November 3, 1916; and Norman Hapgood, "Wall 
~eet for Hughes." The Independent, October 16, 1916, 102. 
435. The Chio:!i Dail~ Trllnine, October 22, 23,24, 1916. 
436. 'J'Olin: Wanaker. ew York Tribune, October 31, 1916. 
437. New York Tribune-;-c1ct'O'Oir 28, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 
~~;and The Christian Science MOnitor, October 23, 28, 1916. 
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American enterprise. Europe stretched out £or everything America could 
produce. Rov1aver, after the war this demand would stop and American labor 
employed to meet this demand would be without employment. Asa result labor 
in America would compete with labor and the purchasing power o£ the workers 
would be reduoad and the soldiers in Europe returning to their peace time 
438 
o ocupations would produce more than aver, Hughes declared, The oandidate 
said: "It is perfectly idle £or work:nlen to think there is a future tor them 
with continuous employment at good wages unless we sat about protecting 
439 
American industry.'' In words o£ warning Hughes frequently admonished his 
audiences to consider the graveness of the situation, to realize that the 
nation must prepare to meat the economic oondi tiona which would come after th: 
4i0 
war, and that the nation must "••• builld and maintain a. new American policy." 
He said "... and I tell you at this time you have got to apply the Republican 
441 
doctrine of protecting American industries." 
Hughes disagreed with his critics who maintained that European nations 
would be too weak, too devastated to stage a. comeback for at least a. year. 
Re believed that the European nations would be able to put up keen competitia: 
442 
with the labor of our country shortly after the war ceased. 
In order to proteot American industries and the American standard of 
living the Republican candidate and his party advocated a protective tariff~~' 
438. Ibid.; and editorial: "Prosperity and the Campaign." The Nation,October 
26, 1916, 390. Also, Jacob Schurman, ''Vfe Want Hughes." The Inde;eendent, 
November, 1916, 228. 
439. The Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1916. 
440. 1'6Id. 
441. 1'6I<J. 
442. New York Triblm.e, October 28, 1916. 
443. Eartoria.ls: The Christ~n ScienQe Monitor October 17 1916; "Dissatis-
faction and ~tection~CurrentiJpi~on, ~ctober 191~,218; and Republicac 
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A tariff which would be adequate and sound, one which would insure safety to 
the American industries. Hughes in addressing the mine-m>rkers in southern 
Indiana painted a picture of the economic conditions caused by the war and 
said: 
It is a perfectly absurd thing that any 
intelligent man should stand before an 
American community and talk about tariff 
for revenue only. You cannot run the United 
States that way. The nations on the other 
side are learning the necessity of protecting 
their interests •••• Of course theywill 
seek our markets and then what will happen? 
Either their products will sell here and our 
products won't sell or our men have got to 
take less money in wages. Now that is all 
there is to it.444 
Hughes felt that the governments in the European countries had ne.de every 
effort to stimulate business interests and after the war would adopt a policy 
of protecting their industries through a protective tarif~. A banker in New 
York, holding a view similar to Hughes', predicted that unless protective 
legislation was provided before the termination of the war "••• American 
manufacturers will find both their ~xport and domestic trade in the hands of 
445 
foreigners." 
In most of his speeches in the campaign Hughes discussed the conditions 
which made a protective tariff policy a necessity and in one speech he made 
this concluding statement: 
If you want protection to American industry, 
the protection of the American wage scale, 
then put in power those who believe in the 
protective principle, not those who did not 
bali eve in it • 446 
Campaign Textbook, 1916, 5o. 
444. Tlie Chlca~ Daily TrlbUiie, November 2 1916. 
445. New Yorkioune,October 28 1 1916.Simiiar view held by Representative 
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One newspaper editor while stating that the nation had never enjoyed 
"••• a protracted prosperity except under Republican protective tariff ••• " 
expressed his fir.m belief in a protective policy by stat~ that "••• a vote 
for a Democratic legislator or executive is a vote for a return of hard 
447 
times." 
That the Republican leaders were extremely anxious to bring the tariff 
issue before the public was evident by the fUll page advertisement which 
448 
appeared in a New York newspaper. It was oa.ptioned: "Back to the Bread 
Line if Wilson's Tariff is not Repealed." Below this appeared a message 
addressed to President Wilson. In this message the facts were brought out 
that only the war had saved the nation trom the ruinous effects of the Wilson 
tariff and t..l]at with the cessation of the war the work of ruining .Amerioa.n 
industry, because of the Democratic tariff, would be completed and American 
449 
worlanen would return to the breadlines. Similar advertisements appeared 
not only in the New York paper but also in a Chicago paper. They called 
attention to the advantages of a protective tariff, gave statistics on busi-
ness conditions, showed graphs which illustrated the upward.climb of the cost 
of living, and by means of cartoons and pictures called upon the readers to 
450 
"Vote for Hughes" and the protective tariff. 
446. 
447. 
448. 
Rodenberg (Illinois) as found in New York Tribune, August 26, 1916. 
Schurman, The Independent, November 631" 1916, 229. 
Editorial:~e Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1916. 
New York Tri'6Une, October 3d, 1916. This advertisement was put in the 
pape~ the Republican National Publicity Committee. 
449. Ibid. 
450. TheChica§o l)l.ily Tribtme, November 2,4,5,6, 1916; and New York 
"T'rrbune, ovember 4,5,6, 1916. --
r 
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During the oa:mpa.ign Hughes and other Republican speakers had gi van 
little attention in their speeches to an important item in the Wilson admin-
istration, that is, to the Federal Reserve law of 1913. Not until Hughes 
had begun his second tour did he bring this ~ocratic piece of legislation 
451 
into his addresses, and then only in an incidental fashion. In Milwaukee 
on Septe1p.ber 9, Hughes in speaking of the Federal Reserve act expressed his 
belief that this bill, from whose passage the Democrats had hoped to gain 
452 
political friends, had been primarily a Republiean accomplishment. He 
maintained tm t the greater part of this valuable act had been taken from 
material supplied by a. Republican Commission and from a draft of a. Republican 
453 bill. In his co.mments on the bill Hughes stressed these facts and like-
wise added that the bill as first presented by the Danocra.ts to Congress 
"••• was faulty and objectionable. The ranova.l of the worst of these defects 
was due to Republioa.n criticism on the floor of Congress, notably from 
454 Senator Root," reported one editor. In the opinion of this editor Hughes 
had not only used unsound reasoning in his remarks on the Federal Reserve 
act but had neglected to point out that Republican Congresses for several 
455 
years ha.d failed to consider the matter while they were in power. 
A noteworthy and interesting angle of the political campaign was the 
active part played in it by the women of the nation. Ten days after Hughes' 
announcement that he favored an amendment to the Federal constitution which 
451. Editorial: "Federal Reserve Law.• The Nation, September 28,1916, 293. 
452. The Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1916. 
453. I'Ofd., "Why Hughes §li'ould Be Elected." The Forum., October 1916, 436. 
454. Eariorial: "Federal Reserve Law." The Nii:fon, September 2811916, 294. 
Similar view expressed in an editorials "For President." The North 
.Amerioa.n Review, October 1916, 494. 
455. Ibid. 
r 
vrould give the right of suffrage to women, a oont'erence of the National 
456 Womans' Party was held in Colorado Springs. This group pledged itself 
for the defeat of President Wilson and commended Hughes for his attitude 
457 
toward woman suffrage. From. then on the women worked actively and with 
great fervor planning, organizing, and financing their own campaign for it 
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was believed, stated one paper, that the ~men could best deal with the four 
458 
million women voters. 
That the women of the nation had risen to importance politically, that 
they could wield power in political affairs was a fact not to be denied. 
The women in half the territory of the United States had the franchise. 459 
It was estimated that four million women would vote in the November election 
410 
in the twelve states whose electoral count totaled ninety-one votes. 
Writers agreed that the ~men were to be an important factor 1n the Presi-
dential election and wise politicians, early in the campaign, were advised to 
461 
give heed to the woman angle, especially in the western states. 
In September the National American Woman's Association met in Atlantio 
City. Since an amendment to the Federal Constitution needed the support of 
both major political parties the group decided to maintain its traditional 
non-partisan attitude and to work for "WOman suffrage without alienating eithe 
462 
the Democrats or the Republicans. 
456. New York Tribune, August 12, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily Tribune, August 
!2; I91T. 
457. Editorial: '~fomen at Colorado Springs." The Independent,August 21,1916, 
261. -
458. New York Tribune, August 25, 1916. 
459. Harrm. Laidlaw, "The Womans' Hour." The Forum, November 1916, 531. 
460. Editorial: ~r. Hughes Surprises the Country. 1Current Opinion,Septamber 
1916, 44. 
461. ~·; Laidlaw, 540; Senator Helen Robinson, "About the Woman's Party." 
The IndErn_enden~. September 11.1916, 381: and The Chioa.e:o Iailv Tribune 
182 
Early in October the 110m.en began their five week trans-continental 
463 
trip. They were ready and eager to vote for Hughes not only because of 
his definite stand on woman suffrage but also because of his views on other 
464 import;ant issues. The 'WOmen traveled westward in their private train 
addressing large groups of men and women in such important cities as Detroit, 
465 Chicago, Billings,Montana, and then on to the Pacific coast. On their 
return trip they held parades and meetings in such cities as Kansas City, 
Springfield, Chicago, Baltimore, and New York. In their meetings they 
stressed the reasons why the men and V«~men of the nation should cast their 
ballot for the Republican candidate. While Republican leaders were willing 
to admit the vrorthwhileness of the woman's campaign tour and while large, 
often enthusiastic groups gathered to hear the women speakers, yet the tour 
was not entirely successful. In mny instances the reception given to the 
women was not always a friendly one. Political opponents of Hughes fre-
quently staged unfriendly receptions or by their heckling attempted to 
466 interrupt the political gatherings sponsored by the women. 
On their return to New York these women Calllpaigners had traveled over 
11,000 miles, had addressed 191 meetings in twenty-eight states, and it was 
467 
believed that their trip had been successful in changing many votes to Hughes. 
October 21, 1916. 
462. "The Woman Suffrage Convention." The Independent, September 81 1916,648J 
"Feminine Political Strategy." The Literary Digest,September 23,1916,730 
and The Christian Science MonitOr';" September 7, 1916. 
463. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 3, 1916. 
464. Jacob Schurman, ~r. Hughes' Trip." The Independent,September 4,1916,342; 
and New York Tribune, October 3, 191"6."'"" 
465. Acco\Uits~the trip found in T.he Chicago Daily Tribune,October 16,18, 
and November 105, 1916; New YorK:Tribune, October 16,18,19,20,23,30,31, 
November l-6,11, 1916. --
466. New York Tribune, November 6 1 1916. 
467. ~ mi!'Oago Daily Tribune, November 1, 1916; ~ ~ Tribune,Novem.ber 4. 
,. 
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The importance or the woman• s vote mounted as the campaign drew to a close 
for it was generally agreed that their vote would be a deciding factor in 
468 
the Presidential election. was the report:. 
1916; and The Christian Science Monitor. November 4• 1916. 
468.New York Tri'&tiie, November 6, 1916; anCI Tl}e Christian Science Monitor. 
NOVember 5.7, 1916. ---
r 
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SUPPLEMENT 
Primarily the purpose of this thesis has been to set forth the 
attitudes and activities of' the Republican Party in the election of' 1916. 
With the close of' the campaign to all practical purposes the scope of' this 
work was concluded. No effort has been made to present a detailed analysis 
of' the vote, no great attempt has been made to examine the polled results 
in order to determine, if' possible, the alignments of' the polled vote and 
to learn the causes and ef'f'eots of such alignments. To make such an attempt 
would present a problem or problems more in the nature of' another thesis. 
However, a br~ef' report of' the election is here presented in order to 
complete the picture of' the political situation in the Presidential election 
of 1916. 
On Tuesday, November 7, 1916, the citizens of' the United States went 
to the polls to decide whether the affairs of' the nation should continue 
under the direction of Woodrow Wilson or be committed to the administration 
of' Charles Evans Hughes. The election was outstanding in as much as the 
result of' the count was not definitely known until the third day after the 
1 
election. 
1. Accounts of' the election found in New York Tribune~ November 8-14,23,1916; 
The Chica~o Datly Tribune, November 8-l4,23,l9l6; The Christian Science 
iO'iiitor, Novem er 8-14,23,1916; editorials: "Presidential Elections." 
The Independent, November 20, 1916, 302; "Presidential Elections." 
!he Outlook, November 15, 1916, 573; and Xbe Nation, November 9,16, 1916, 
43'1',453. -
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The early reports on Tuesday definitely gave the Republican candidate 
victory in the state of New York, in six of the New England states and the 
reports from Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana were so encouraging that two New 
York papers conceded the victory to Hughes. On Wednesday morning the 
reports from the Middle West and far West changed the story and as the day 
advanced it became very evident that the victory would not be decisive after 
all. On Thursday the victory was still undecided. Wilson seamed assured 
of 251 electoral votes but the count for Hughes varied from 243 to 252. 
The three states remaining doubtful were California with its thirteen votes, 
2 
Minnesota with its twelve, and New Mexico with its three. By Friday morn-
ing Wilson was assured of his re-election, having received 276 votes to 
Hughes' 255. HOwever, because of the recounts in California the Republican 
3 Party did not concede the election to the Democrats until November 23. On 
that day Hughes acknowledged his defeat and sent a congratulatory telegram 
to President Wilson. 
The Democrats in their victory claimed thirty states, leaving eighteen 
states for the Republican column. Wilson had carried the South and the 
4 
West. In the main he had carried every state west of the Missouri River 
and South of the Ohio or, as one editor expressed it, by the "••• solid 
5 
South and the insurgent, progressive and radical West." According to him 
2. Reports from these three states came in slowly because of the voting 
methods used, or due to the fact that it took time to obtain the election 
results from the men stationed on the border, or because the results were 
so close. 
3. New York Tribune, November 23,1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, 
Novamoer 23, 1916. ---
4. Meyers, 427. For detailed account of electoral vote by states see Append 
D. . 
5. Editorial: "The American Election." The Fortnightly Review,Decamber 1916, 
1056. (These totals were changed later to 277 and 254.) 
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the election was "••• as complete an expression of the popular will as could 
probably be secured in a country with a population of one hundred million 
6 
people." In the record of the popular vote Wilson received 9,116,296 votes 
7 
and Hughes polled 8,547,474, roaMing the Democratic plurality 568,822. 
8 
It was reported that this was the largest popular vote f!1Ver cast. In 
accounting for this large number several reasons were given such as increased 
9 
population, woman's suffrage, and a widespread interest in the campe.ign. 
The re~eleoted executive, although a majority President, had received the 
smallest margin of electoral votes sinoe 1876, and the mnallest popular 
10 
margin since 1892 reported one editor. However, the popular vote received 
by Wilson represented better than 49% of the total vote while that of Hughes 
11 
represented 46% of the popular vote. The consensus of opinion was that 
the election had been a definite tribute to the President, personally, 
12 
rather than a victory of the Democratic Party and its policies. 
Congressional election returns remained uncertain for ~ days after 
the election. The final count indicated that the Democratic majority in 
13 
Senate had been reduced from sixteen to twelve. In the HOuse the Democrats 
6. Ibid., 1057. 
7. Meyers, 427. The Tabulations as found in the .American Year Book 1916, 170, 
were as follows: Wilson, 9,128,837 and Hughes, 8,536,~----
8. Editorial: "Presidential Elections." The Independent,November 20,1916,302t 
9. Ibid. -
., 10. Ea!'torial: "The Election Looks Ahead."The Independent,November 20,1916,29'l 
11. Davids. Muzzey, The United States of liiiBrioa II, dinn and Company,Boston 
1924, 628; and AiEEUr N'.HOioombe, Tlie Poli ticarParties 2!. Today, Harper 
Brothers, New York, 1924, 292. 
12. Holcombe, 293; New York Tribune, November 10,1916; editorials: The Nation 
November 16, 19!6'; 4B'S7 and "The Election." !E!, Independent, November 26, 
1916, 297. 
13. American ~ ~ 191~, 46. 
l 
controlled 215 seats and the Republicans 215. The remaining five seats 
14 
were scattered among the Progressives, Socialists, and Independents. 
While the Democrats had been successful in re-electing President Wilson 
their control in Congress was definitely ended. 
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Once the election was over it evidently ceased to be of great interest 
to the American reading public. In the days immediately after the election 
the newspapers and the magazines nade some efforts to review the election 
and to summarize its results. 
No attempt has been made in 'this :raper either to analyze or evaluate 
~he results of the election, or to explain the alleged drifts of sectional 
sentiment and opinions as sho-wn by the popular vote tor such an attempt • 
as one editor expressed it• would be 'absurd' because of the inability to 
15 
obtain accurate information on such election results. However, many 
writers seemed to agree on certain outstanding and apparent results of the 
Presidential race. The conclusion most commonly commenl;ed upon was the 
16 
new, regional alignment of the political parties. Repeatedly it was 
observed that the far West had given Wilson his victory or, as expresseQ 
by one writer, "•.. the scepter of power is passing to the West in conjunc-
17 
tion with the South and the South-West." Forcibly the East was made to 
realize by this election that the Atlantio States were not the United States 
14. Ibid. 
15. Editorial: "t!he Election." The American Review of Reviews, December 1916• 
582. - -
16. Editorials: "Changing the Political Map of the United States." Current 
Opinion, December 1916, 365; "East is East and West is West." The Inde-
pendent, November 20, 1916, 298; New York Tribune, November 14~~ 
The Chicago De'tly Tribune, November lr;-!9!6; a! so "Why Wilson Won." The 
litera~ Diges , November 18• 1916, 1312; "Re-Election of President ---
Wi!son. The Nineteenth Century, December 19~6;1186; and "The American 
Presidency;" The Livipg Age, December 16,1916, 700. 
18 
and that no longer could the West be ignored in political affairs. 
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One writer in summing up the reasons for the Republican defeat outlined 
19 
four significant elemenlis. First, he pointed out that the West approved 
Wilson's success in 'Keeping Us Out of' War;' second, he felt that the women 
in the suffrage states except for Illinois and Oregon had given their 
support to the Democratic Party; third, the Progressives had favored Wilson 
and his policies; and last, he was of' the opinion that the Republicans had 
failed in their campaign to develop any kind of positive app:~al to the voter 
20 
of' the nation. Many other editors and writers expressed views which 
21 
coincided on the whole with the above summarization. The last reasonwas 
enlarged upon by several writers. One editor felt that Hughes' defeat was 
due to his failure to put words of courage, self respect and 'old-fashioned 
patriotism' into the hearts of the people, and his absolute refUsal to meet 
22 
the great questions of the campaign fairly and squarely. In the defense 
of Hughes one historian expressed the belief that no Republican candidate 
23 
had faced a more difficult task than had Hughes. In his campe.ign the 
former Justice had been drawn one way by Roosevelt, another by the hyphenats 
and still a third by the radical element of the former Progressives. There-
17. '~{hy Wilson Won." The Literary Digest, November 18, 1916, 1312. 
18. Editorial: "East is-last and West is West.• The Independent, November 20, 
1916, 298. -
19. Editorial: "The Election."~ Independent, November 20, 1916, 297. 
20. Ibid. 
21. ~rials: New York Tribune, November 11, 1916; The Nation, November 23 
1916, 502; ~American Review of Reviews, December 1916; 583; also, 
Meyers, 42sr-Ibdd, 189; Sey.mour;-368; Hiioo.mbe 292-293; and ~y 
President Wilson Was Elected." The Outlook, November 22, 1916, 636-38. 
22. New York Tribune, November 11, M6. Similar view held by editor of The 
Clircago-:oaily Tribune, November 11, 1916. -
23. Dodd, 1s9. 
I 
' 
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fore, stated this historian, "••• the outcome was a weak appeal on every 
24 . 
vital matter that was before the public.• Another historian commented 
that the plans and procedure used by the Republican candidate indicated that 
either he had lacked courage or else his campaign manager had ordered him 
' 25 
"••• to offend no one." Consequently he had failed to commit himself on 
the campaign issues and had based his hope of victory on the belief that the 
26 
Republican vote of the country would be large enough ~o elect him. A poll 
of the press of the nation as to the causes of the Republican defeat not 
only stressed those already mentioned but added several others as, the 
prosperous condition of the country, especially in the agricultural regions, 
the power of Wall Street, and the failure of the Progressives to unite with 
27 
the Republicans. As one. editor expressed it, there were as many reasons 
as there were groups, sections, interests, and political parties concerned 
28 
in the outcome. 
One phase of the election to which the writer paid particular attention 
but on which no effort was made to reach a conclusion concerned the part 
played by the state of California in the Presidential election. The politi 
situation which existed in that state was explained in an earlier chapter. 
The final election results in California revealed that while Governor Johnso 
had received a plurality of 300,000 votes in his senatorial contest, the 
24. Ibid.; similar view held by Meyers, 425. 
25. Seymour, 368. 
26. Ibid. 
27. ~President Wilson Was Elected." The Outlook, November 22,1916, 638; 
similar views held by Meyers, 425. -
28. Editorial: "Why Wilson Won."~ Literary Digest, November 18,1916, 1312. 
I 
Republican Presidential candidate had lost the state by a plurality of 
29 
31 800 votes. This count revealed that the state 'Which was strongly 
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Progressive had voted for Johnson but bad failed to vote for Hughes. If the 
thirteen ele~toral votes of California had been cast for Hughes he would 
have been elected by a margin of three votes over Wilson stated one 
30 
historian. That the count was very close ~s indicated by the fact that 
31 
a difference ot 4 1 000 votes ~uld have turned the scale for Hughes. 
The final results in California raised a hue and a cry across the 
nation. Republicans accused Johnson~ stating that he had failed to openly 
32 ~paign for Hughes in California. In retaliation Johnson accused the 
'Old Guard' and the local campaign managers for the part they had played in 
33 
the state campaign. One editor stated that Hughes would have won in 
California if "• .. these groups had not created a spirit of distrust among 
34 
the rank and file of the Progressive voters." This was the view taken by 
a newspaper writer 'Who believed that not only had the petty politicians 
misrepresented the Republican candidate to the people of California~ but by 
making him appear as a confirmed reactionary they had affronted the pro-
35 
gressive~nded voters in California. On the other hand the Progressive 
29. Editorial: The Nation, November 16~ 1916, 453; and American~~ 
1916, 44. -
30. :Muzzey~ 629. 
31. Editorial: "The Election." The Independent, November 20~1916~ 297. 
32. Ibid., 303. ---
33. 'ib!'Ci.; Fred Davenport., "The Last Stand of Political Bou:bbonism." The 
<5UE'!ook, November 22, 1916, 644-46; and New York Tribune, Novem.ber-!'2, 
1916. --
34. Editorial: "The Election." !he Independent, November 20, 1916 303; 
similar view held by Meyers:-425. 
35. ~ ~ Tribune, November 11,12~ 1916. 
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leaders charged that Hughes by his failure to meet and confer with Johnson 
36 
had lost for himself the thirteen electoral votes of the state. HOwever. 
the fact remained that a sufficient number of californians cast their ballot 
for Wilson to give him the thirteen electoral votes of the state. 
Likewise. in the nation as a whole a large enough number of citizens 
had so marked their ballots as to voice their desire to keep Woodrow Wilson 
at the helm of the government and had indicated their demand that the 
Democratic administration remain in office. 
36. The Christian Science MOnitor, November 13, 1916; similar views found 
~~y Wilson Won." The Literary Digest, NOvember 18, 1916, 1312; and 
Seymour, 368. ----
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
In the preliminary reading on this topic a careful search for all 
possible material relating to the subject we.s made. The amount of source 
material to be found in book form was disappointing. Good biographies of 
all the leading figures could not be found, or as in the case of Roosevelt, 
was incomplete on the period covered in this thesis. The writer concluded 
that the wisest procedure was to use daily newspapers and periodicals in 
order to obtain the best source material. 
Newspapers 
In using the newspapers the writer carefully examined and read each 
issue from February 1 to ~ovember 25, paying attention to news items, 
editorials, special articles, advertisements, and cartoons. The following 
newspapers were consul ted: 
New York Tribune 
The Chic&§O Daily Tribune 
The Christian Science Monitor (Boston) 
For the period of the conventions additional material was found in: 
Chicago Examiner 
Chicago Herald 
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1 
!!!~Tribune, listed as a Republican paper, indicated early in 
February its allegiance to Charles Evans Hughes and throughout the year 
continued to sponsor his candidacy and worked for the success of the 
Republican Party. 
2 ~Chicago Daily Tribune, listed as an Independent-Republican paper, 
was an uncompromisingly Republican paper. It was definitely prejudiced 
against the Democrats. Its daily reports and its editorials were colored 
by its political allegiance. As the campaign drew to a close the editorials 
against the Administration and the Democratic Party were extremely critical 
and hostile. 
The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), listed as an independent 
3 paper, reported the political news from February through November in an 
impartial, calm manner. The editor, on occasions, criticized the Republican 
candidate or his pe.rty, but on the whole was very fair in reporting the 
political news. However, it was observed that during the last weeks of the 
campaign the paper seamed rather indifferent toward the political activitie~ 
Periodicals 
The periodicals were carefully consulted, issue by issue, from January 
through December of 1916. Special care was taken to check and read the 
editorials, news items, special articles, letters from subscribers, and 
cartoons for all possible data referring to the topic of this thesis. A 
wealth of material was found in these periodicals, especially in the weekly 
1. N.w. Ayer, American Newspaper Annual and Directory, N.W.Ayer and Son, 
Philadelphia, 1916, 186. ---
2. Ibid. , 64. 
3. "''66I. , 115 • 
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journals. In view of the great quantity of material in these periodicals 
the writer believed that it would be out of place to list the individual 
references in the critical essay but has carefully footnoted them in the 
thesis proper. 
The periodicals mve been grouped as weekly or monthly. The weekly 
magazines in their cOlumns reported the political activities week by week, 
stressing the high points in the campaign and in the speeches of the 
Republican candidate. 
The Independent, The Independent Corporation, New York, a weekly 
magazine, made every effort to present both sides of the political situation 
but became quite sympathetic toward the Republican cause in the later part 
of the campaign. 
~ Literary Digest, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York, a weekly 
magazine, ranained neutral in its viewpoint. While it seldom reported on 
the political activities of the campaign it was especially valuable for its 
presentation of the views of editors and citizens from all parts of the 
nation. 
~ Nation, The Nation Press, Incorporated, New York, a weekly magazine 
declared itself to be neutral in the earlier weeks of the campaign and aimed 
to present both sides of the questions. However in October and November, 
it became definitely critical of Hughes. 
~~Republic, The Republic Publishing Company, New York, a weekly 
magazine, was Progressive in its complexion in June and by September had 
indicated that it was anti-Republican. 
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~Outlook, The Outlook Company, NEWt York, a weekly magazine leaned 
toward the candidacy of Roosevelt in May and June, and remained neutral 
during the remaining months of the campaign. It reported the campaign trips 
fairly although at times very briefly. 
The monthly magazines while not reporting on the conventions and the 
c~paign tours in great detail yet they did present splendid, general 
accounts of the political situation and carefully reviewed the important 
issues of the ~paign • 
.!!:! .Am.eric~ Review~ Reviews, edited by Albert Shaw, the Review of 
Reviews Company, New York• a monthly magazine, while definitely for Roosevel 
in June, attempted in its later issues to report impartially on the political 
situation. Toward the close of the campaign while reporting the Republioan 
activities in an openminded fashion yet the tone of its columns indicated a 
leaning toward the Democratic side. 
Current Opinion, edited by Edward Wheeler, The Current Literature 
Publishing Company, New York, a monthly magazine, devoted considerable space 
to accounts of the Presidential campaign and to the campaign issues in an 
impartial manner. 
The North American Review, edited by George Harvey, American Review 
Corpo~tion, New York, a monthly magazine favored Root or Roosevelt in the 
months before the conventions but indicated in July that it would sponsor 
Hughes. During the last two months of the campaign this magazine earnestly 
worked for the election of the Republican candidate • 
.!!!! World's ~. edited by .Arthur Page, Doubleday, Page and Company, 
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was definitely prejudiced against the Republican Party and its candidate. 
The following monthly magazines were consulted and some naterial was 
found in them: .!!:,! Forum, The Forum. Publishing Company, New York; 
.!!:,! Fortnightly Review, edited byW.L. Courtney, Leonard Scott Publishing 
Company, New York; ~Living A~ The Living Age Company, Boston; .!!:! 
Nineteenth Century and A:f'bar, Leonard Scott Publishing Company, New York; 
and .!!:! Century Magazine, The Century Company, New York. 
The following monthly magazines were consulted but the political 
material in them did not directly relate to the scope of this thesis: 
Harper's Monthly Magazine, Harper and Brothers, New York; and~ Contmnpo-
.!!:!1: Review, The Contemporary Review Company, London. 
Source Material 
Republican Campaign Textbook~' issued by the Allied Printing Trade 
Council, Washington, D.c., 1916, contained the Republican Party platform 
and several of the more important political speeches of the convention and 
the campaign. It did not have a report of the Republican Convention. 
Selections from~ Correspondence~ Theodore Roosevelt ~Henry Cabo1 
Lodge, ~~ .. II, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1925, proved useful in providing a general background for the 
topic. However, the value of the book was lessened because it contained 
very few letters pertaining to the period of this thesis. 
Theodore Roosevelt, .!!!! Works of Theodore Roosevelt,!Y!.!_, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926, national edition, proved of little value. 
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Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore .:.;Bo;;;..o..,.s_ev_e_l_t ~ ~ ~ - ;!! Shown ~ ~ 
~Letters, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925, was written at the 
request of Roosevelt and based on his letters. However, the book did not 
prove very valuable because the period between January and November of 1916 
was hardly touched upon in the book. 
A splendid account of the life of the Republican candidate prior to 
1916 was found in Addresses ~ Charles Evans Hughes, 1906-1916, introduction 
by Jacob Schurman, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1916, It also had copies 
of the more important political addresses of Hughes. 
Samuel Gompers, American Labor~~~' George Doran and Company, 
New York, 1919, was especially helpful in presenting the part played in the 
campaign by the labor leader. 
A very good account of the Democratic plans to defeat the Republican 
program, and a negative view of the Republican activities was presented in 
The Intimate Papers~ Colonel House -~Neutrality~~. ~-~·..!!.• 
arranged by Charles Seymour, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1926. 
Secondary Material 
General Histories: The following books presented a general overview of 
the period and were especially valuable because of their bibliographies: 
Preston Slosson, ~Great Crusade ~After, 1914-1928, The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1928; Arthur Schlessinger, Social Growth of the United 
States, 1852-1933, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935; and David s. 
MUzzey, The United States of America from the Civil War,II, Ginn and Com-
- - -- --
pany, Boston, 1924. 
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Relating ~ ~ Republican Party: Good but brief accounts of the 
subject of this thesis ware found in: William Starr Meyers, ~ Republican 
Partz, The Century Company, New York, 1928; Arthur N. Holcombe, ,.!!!! PoliticaJ 
Parties ~ Todaz, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1923; and Newton Wyeth, 
Republican Principles ~ Policies, The Republican Press, Chicago, 1916. 
Copies of the Republican platform and statistical results were found in 
Republicanism 2!_ ~~ edited by Frank Hendricks, The Journal Company, 
Albany, New York, 1920; and Edgar E. Robinson, .!!:!, Evaluation!:!_ American 
Parties, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1924. A splendid, detailed 
bibliography of magazine articles relating to the topic of this paper was 
found in P.Onnan Ray,,.!:!! Introduction to Political Parties, Charles 
Scribner's and Sons, New York, 1924. The material for the election of 1912 
was found in Edward Stanwood, History ~the Prasidenc;r, Houghton, Mifflin 
Company, Boston, 1912; and William·J. Bryan, !_ ~ 2!_ Two Conventions, 
Funk and Wagnall s Company, New York, 1912. 
Relating ~ ~ Political Leaders: The following books were consult~ 
but proved ot little value: Claude G. Bowers, Beverid~e ~~Progressive 
!::!• Houghton, Mifflin Company, Cambridge, 1932; John J. Leary, Jr. Talks 
~Theodore Roosevelt~,!!:! Diaries 2!_ ~~Leary,~·· Houghton 
Mifflin Company, New York, 1920; Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt,!_ 
Biography, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1931; Oscar K. Davis, 
Released tor Publication, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1925; William 
R. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1919; 
William Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Doubleday Page and Company, New 
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York, 1920; and William Ransom, Charles E. Hughes, E.P. Dutton and Company, 
New York, 1916. 
Miscellaneous 
.American Newspaper Annual and Directory, N.YV. Ayer and Sons, N.w. 
Ayer and Son, Philadelphia, 1916; The American ~ Book, ~~ edited by 
Francis G. Wiokware, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1917; and The World 
Almanac ~Encyclopedia, 1918, The Preas Publishing Company, New York,l918. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Hughes Accepts - His Forceful and Comprehensive 
Telegram to Chairman Hardingl 
Mr. Hughes• telegram to Chairman Harding of the Republican 
National Convention, formally accepting the Republican nomination for 
the Presidency, was as follows: 
Ron. warren G. Harding, Chairman Republican National 
Convention, Chicago, Ill. 
I have not desired the nomination. I have wished to remain on 
the bench. But in this critical period in our national history I 
recogmze that it is your right to summon and that it is my paramount 
duty to respond. 
You speak at a time of national exigency, transcending merely 
partisan consideration. You voice the demand for a dominant, 
thorough-going Americanism, with firm protective upbuilding policies 
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essential to our peace and securityJ and to that call, in this crisis, 
.I cannot fail to answer with the pledge of all that is in me to the 
serviee of our country. Therefore, I accept the nomination. 
Stands for Americanism 
I stand for the firm and unflinching maintenance of all the 
rights of American citizens on land and sea. I neither impugn 
motives nor underestimate difficulties. 
1. Republican Campaign Textbook, ~. 30-31. 
But it is most ragettrably true that in our foreign relations 
we have suffered incalculably from the weak and vacillating course 
which has been taken with regard to Mexico - a course lamentably 
wrong with regard to both our rights and our duties. 
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We interfered without consistency; and while seeking to dictate 
when we ware not concemed, we utterly failed to appreciate and discharge 
our plain duty to our own citizens. 
Brave Words Stripped of "Force" 
At the outset of the administration the high responsibilities of 
our diplomatic intercourse with foreign nations were subordinated to 
a conception of partisan requirements, and we presented to the world 
a humiliating spectable of inaptitude. 
Belated efforts have not availed to recover the influence and 
presti~e so unfortunately sacrificed; and brave words have bean 
stripped of their force by indecision. 
I desire to see our diplomacy restored to its bast standards and 
to have those advanced; to have no sacrifices of national interest to 
partisan expediencies; to have the first ability of the country always 
at its command here and abroad, in diplomatic intercourse; to maintain 
firmly our rights under international law; insisting steadfastly upon 
all our rights as mutual and fully performing our international 
obligations, and by the clear correctness and justness of our position 
and our manifest ability and disposition to sustain them to dignify 
our place among the nations. 
Knows No Ulterior Purpose 
I stand tor en .Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose; 
for a patriotism that is single and complete. Whether native or 
naturalized, of whatever race or creed, we have but one country 1 
end we do not intend to tolerate any division of allegiance. 
I believe in making prompt provision to assure absolutely 
our national security. 
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I believe in preparedness, not only entirely adequate for our 
defense, with respect to numbers end equipment, in both army and navy, 
but with all thoroughness to the end that in each branch o:f' the service 
there may be the utmost efficiency under the most competent adminis-
trative heads. 
Urges Proper Preparedness 
We are devoted to the ideals o:f' honorable peace. We wish fu 
promote all wise and practioe.l measures for the just settlement of 
international disputes. In view of our abiding ideals, there is no 
danger of militarism in this country. 
We have no policy of aggression, no lust for territory, no zeal 
:f'or strife. 
It is in this spirit that we demand adequate provision for 
national defense, and we oondamn the inexcusable neglect that has 
been shown in this matter o:f' first national importance. 
We must have the strength which self-respect demands, the strength 
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of an efficient nation ready for every emergency. 
For Readjustment of Tariff 
Our preparation must be industrial and economic as well as military. 
Our severest tests will come after the war is over. We must make a fair 
and wise readjustment of the tariff, in accordance with sound protective 
principl~, to insure our economic independence and to maintain American 
standards of living. 
We must conserve the just interests of labor, realizing that 
in democracy patriotism and national strength must be rooted in 
even-handed justice. In preventing, as we must, unjust discrimin-
ations and monopolistic practices, we must still be zealous to assure 
the foundations of honest business. 
Particularly should we seek the expansion of foreign trade. We 
must not throttle American enterprise, here or abroad, but rather 
promote it and take pride in honorable aohievemmts. 
Stands for Civil Service 
We must take up the serious problems of transporlation, of 
interstate and foreign commerce, in a sensible and candid manner, 
and provide an enduring basis for prosperity by the intelligent use 
of the constitutional powers of Congress, so as adequately to 
protect the public on the one hand, and, on the other, to conserve 
the essential instrumentalities of progress. 
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I stand for the principles of our civil service laws. In 
every department of govermnent the highest efficiency must be 
insisted upon. For all laws and programs are vain 'Without efficient 
and impartial administration. 
Fully Indorses Platform. 
I cannot within the limits of this statement speak upon all the 
subjects that will require attention. I can only say that I fully 
indorse the platform you have adopted. 
I deeply appreciate the responsibility you impose. I should 
have been glad to have that responsibility placed upon another. But 
I shall undertake to meet it, grateful for the confidence you express. 
I sincerely trust that all former differences may be forgotten, and 
that we may have united effort in a patriotic realization of our 
national need and opportunity. 
I have resigned my judicial of£1ce, and I am ready to devote 
myself' unreservedly to the camJ;aign. 
Washington, D.c. 
June 10, 1916 
CHARLES E. HUGHES 
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Mr. Hughes to Progressive Committee 
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Hotel Astor, New York City, 
June 26, 1916 
O.K. Davis, Secretary Progressive National Committee, Blackstone 
Hotel, Chicago, Ill: 
I welcome the support of Progressives. We make common oause in 
the interest of national honor, of national security, of national 
efficiency. We unite in the denll.'nd for an undivided and unwavering 
loyalty to our country, for a whole hearted patriotic devotion over-
riding all racial differences. We want a reviyal of the American spirit, 
a nation restored. We insist upon prompt and adequate provision for the 
common defence, upon the steadfast maintenance of al~ the rights of 
our citizens and upon the integrity of international law. 
The most serious difficulties the present Administration has 
encountered have been due to its o~nweakness and incertitude. I am 
profoundly convinced that by prompt and decisive action, which existing 
conditions manifestly called for, the Lusitania tragedy would have been 
prevented. 
We strongly denounce the use of our soil as a base for alien 
intrigues, for conspiracies and the fomenting of disorders in the 
interest of any foreign nation, but the responsibility lies at the 
door of the Administration. The moment notice is admitted responsibility 
1. Republican C~paign Teatbook 1916, 39-40 
is affixed. For that sort of thing could not continue if the Admin-
istration took proper measures to stop it. That responsibility the 
Administration cannot evade by condemning others. 
Indictment of Mexican Policy 
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It was officially stated by the Secretary of State in the Mexican 
note of June 20, 1916, that "for three years the Mexican Republic has 
been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens 
have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and 
enterprise have been destroyed or rendered non-productive; bandits have 
been permitted to roam at will through territory contiguous to the 
United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective 
attempt at punishment, the :rroperty of Americans while the lives of 
citizens of the United States who ventured to remain in Mexican Terri-
tory or to return there to protect their interests have been taken, in 
some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been 
apprehended nor brought to justice. 
What an indictment by the Administration of its Mexican policyl 
And still we are unprepared. That unpreparedness in the midst of 
perils, and after the experiences of three years, is a demonstration 
of an unpardonable neglect for which the Administration is responsible. 
The Govermnent now has and must have most emphatically the 
unstinted and patriotic support of eve~ citizen in the existing exi-
gency. But unquestioning, loyal and patriotic support of the Govern-
ment is one thing; approval of the fatuous course which the Administra-
tion has followed is quite another. I cannot in this message 
adequately review that course; that I shall do later. 
Renews Plea for Protection 
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No intelligent man is deceived by the temporary prosperity due to 
abnormal conditions. and no one can fail to appreciate the gravity of 
the problems with which we shall be faced when the war ends. We are 
alive to the imperative necessity of assuring the bases of honest 
business. I am in deep sympathy with the effort to ilr.\prove the con-
ditions of labor; to prevent exploitation; to safeguard the future of 
the nation by protecting our women and children. I believe in workmen's 
compensation laws; in wise conservation of our national resources so 
that they may be protected, developed and used to the utmost public 
advantage. But underlying every endeavor to promote social justice 
is the indispensable condition that there shall be a stable foundation 
for honorable enterprise. 
American industry must have proper protection if labor is to be 
safeguarded. We must rescue our instrumentalities of interstate and 
foreign commerce, our transportation tacilities from uncertainty and 
confusion. We must show that we know how to protect the public without 
destroying or crippling our productive energies. 
Has Not the National Outlook 
To what agency shall we look for the essential constructive 
programme on "Which our seouri ty and prosperity must depend? It is 
vain to expect it from the Democratic Party. That party has not 
the national outlook. Both its traditions and dominating inf'luences 
are fatal handicaps. I have no sectional word to utter. We are to 
elect a President of the whole country, not of a part. The South, 
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as well as the North, East and West, will be the gainers from our 
endeavors. But it is sober truth as I see it that as we go forward we 
must make the Republican Party the instrument of our advance. We 
want deeds, not words; far reaching national policies. 
The Progressives have insisted on responsible, not invisible, 
government; on efficient administration. I yield to no one in that 
demand. I am eager to call the best ability of the country to our aid. 
For the conduct of the great departments the Executive is directly 
responsible and there is no excuse whatever for the toleration of 
incompetence in order to satisfy partisan obligations. 
I am deeply appreciative of your indorsement. I find no 
difference in platfonn or in aim whichpreoludes the most hearty 
co-operation and the most complete unity. It is within the party that 
the liberalizing spirit you invoke can have the widest and most 
effective influence. I solicit your earnest effort for the common 
cause. 
CHARLES E. HUG!m3. 
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Mr. Hughes Tells Colonel Roosevelt of Nation's Debt to Hfm 
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Hotel Astor • New York Ci 
June 26. 1916 
My Dear Colonel Roosevelta 
I warmly appreciate the cordial letter 
of indorsement which you have sent to the Progressive committee. No 
one is more sensible than I of the lasting indebtedness of the nation 
to you for the quickening of the national spirit• for the demand for 
an out and out one hundred percent Americanism. and for the insistence 
upon the immediate necessity of a thoroughgoing preparedness. spiritual. 
military and economic. 
I am. in the campaign because of my conviction that we must not 
only frame but execute a broad constructive programme. and that for 
this purpose we must have a united party 1 a party inspired by its 
great traditions and reconsecrated to its loftiest ideals. I know 
that you have been guided in this emergency by the sole desire to be 
of the largest s'ervice to the United States. You have sounded forth 
the trumpet that shall never call retreat. And I want you to feel that 
I wish to have all the aid that you are able and willing to give. I 
want the most effective co-operation with all those who have been 
1. Republican Campaign Teatbook ~~ 40-41. 
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fighting by your side. Let us work together for our national security 
and for the peace of righteousness and justice. 
I enclose a copy of my telegram to the committee, in which I have 
set forth my attitude. I shall later undertake a full discussion of 
the issues of the campaign. 
Hoping that I may have the pleasure of seeing you at an early 
day I am, my dear Colonel Roosevelt, with cordial regards, 
Faithfully yours, 
CHARLES E. HUGHES 
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1 
Electoral Vote In Presidential Election of 1916 
State Wilson Hughes State Wilson 
l.Alabama 12 32.North Dakota 5 
2.Arizona 3 33.0hio 24 
3.Arkansas 9 34.0klahoma 10 
4.Calii'ornie. 13 3I.Oregon 
5.Colorado 6 36.Pennsylvania 
6.Connectiout 7 37 .Rhode Island 
7.Delaware 3 38.South Carolina 9 
8.Florida 6 39.South Dakota 
9.Georgia 14 40.Tennessee 12 
~.Idaho 4 4l.Te:xas 20 
~.Illinois 29 42.Utah 4 
~Indiana 15 43.Virginia 
~3.Iowa 13 44.Washington 7 
~4.Kansas 10 45.West Virginia 1 
5.Kentuoky 13 46. Wis oonsin 
~6. Louisiana 10 47.Wyoming 3 
7. Maine 6 
118- Maryland 8 
~9. Massachusett:s - 18 
a>. Michigan 15 
21. Minnesota 12 
122. Mississippi 10 
~3. Missouri 18 
~4. Montana 4 
25. Nebraska a 
-126. Nevada 3 
-27. UewHampshire 4 
~8. Uew Jersey 14 
29. New Mexico 3 
~o. New York 45 
31. North Caro-
lina 12 
Hughes 
-
5 
38 
5 
5 
4 
7 
13 
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